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THE MARINE CORPS GAZETTE



RIFLE TEAMS OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGATION GUARDS AT PEIPING, CHINA, COMPETING IN THE FIRST MATCH FOR THE JOHNSON TROPHY. UNITED STATES, BRITISH, ITALIAN AND FRENCH GUARDS REPRESENTED.



Vol. XVII. No. 2

August, 1932

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The Marine Corps Gazette

WASHINGTON, D. C.

VOL. XVII

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CONTENTS

Recent Legislation Affecting the Marine Corps.....	3
Captain John Williams, U. S. Marine Corps—A Tradition.....	11
<i>By Brigadier General George Richards, U.S.M.C.</i>	
The Battle of the Little Big Horn.....	15
<i>By Captain Maurice G. Holmes, U.S.M.C.</i>	
The Marine Band—The Washington Post.....	22
<i>By Chief Pay Clerk Harry H. Thompson, U.S.M.C.</i>	
The Legion in Morocco.....	25
<i>By Colonel Frank E. Evans, U.S.M.C.</i>	
The Adjutant and Inspector's Department.....	31
<i>By Brigadier General Rufus H. Lane, U.S.M.C.</i>	
Membership in the Marine Corps Reserve—What it Costs.....	37
<i>By Lieutenant Colonel J. J. Staley, F.M.C.R.</i>	
The Purple Heart Badge and Order of Military Merit.....	39
<i>By Major J. C. Fegan, U.S.M.C.</i>	
Signal Communication.....	45
<i>By Captain James F. Moriarty, U.S.M.C.</i>	
The King and Royal Welch Fusiliers.....	48
U. S. Marine Corps Operating Plan, for the Fiscal Year 1933.....	50
Increased Membership: The Marine Corps Association.....	54
<i>By Brigadier General George Richards, U.S.M.C.</i>	
The Sino-Japanese Situation.....	56
Notes and Comment.....	60

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THE SPIRIT OF 1917

THE MARINE CORPS GAZETTE

Vol. XVII

AUGUST, 1932

No. 2

Recent Legislation Affecting the Marine Corps

■ During the first session of the 72d Congress of the United States the legislation of greatest interest to the personnel of the Marine Corps is contained in the Naval Appropriation Act and in Part II of the Act making appropriations for the Legislative Branch of the Government for the current fiscal year, this part of the Act being commonly known as the "Economy Act."

These two Acts of Congress are herewith reprinted as to such portions as have a direct bearing upon the Marine Corps together with comments thereon.

NAVAL APPROPRIATIONS FOR 1933

AN ACT

Making appropriations for the Navy Department and the naval service for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1933 and for other purposes.

MARINE CORPS PAY, MARINE CORPS

Pay of officers, active list: For pay and allowances prescribed by law for all officers on the active list—pay and allowances, \$3,602,277, together with \$129,101 of the unexpended balance of "Pay, Marine Corps, 1932," including not to exceed \$138,148 for increased pay for making aerial flights; subsistence allowance, \$493,116; rental allowance, \$648,063; in all, \$4,743,456; and no part of such sum shall be available to pay active duty pay and allowances to officers on the retired list;

For pay of officers prescribed by law on the retired list, \$794,786;

Pay of enlisted men, active list: For pay and allowances of noncommissioned officers, musicians, and privates, as prescribed by law, and for the expense of clerks of the United States Marine Corps traveling under orders, and including additional compensation for enlisted men of the Marine Corps qualified as expert riflemen, sharpshooters, marksmen, or regularly detailed as gun captains, gun pointers, cooks, messmen, including interest on deposits by enlisted men, post-exchange debts of deserters and of men discharged or sentenced to terms of imprisonment while in debt to the United States, under such rules as the Secretary of the Navy may prescribe, and the authorized travel allowance of discharged enlisted men, and for prizes for excellence in gunnery exercise and target practice, and for pay of enlisted men designated as Navy mail clerks and assistant Navy mail clerks both afloat and ashore, and for gratuities to enlisted men discharged not under honorable conditions—pay and allowances, \$7,497,537, together with \$100,000 of the unexpended balance of "Pay, Marine Corps, 1932"; allowance for lodging and subsistence, \$670,542; in all, \$8,168,079;

For pay and allowances prescribed by law of enlisted men on the retired list, \$620,208;

Undrawn clothing: For payment to discharged enlisted men for clothing undrawn, \$155,160;

For pay and allowances of the Marine Corps Reserve (a) excluding transferred and assigned men, \$237,620; (b) transferred men, \$281,696; (c) assigned men, \$65,750; in all, \$585,066: *Provided*, That hereafter no enlisted man of the Marine Corps shall be assigned to the Fleet Marine Corps Reserve as provided for in section 22 of the Act of February 28, 1925 (U. S. C., title 34, sec. 783);

Not to exceed for mileage and actual and necessary expenses and per diem in lieu of subsistence as authorized by law to officers traveling under orders without troops, \$84,334;

In all, \$15,151,089: *Provided*, That no money appropriated in this Act shall be used to defray the expense of sending additional Marines to Nicaragua to supervise an election there, and the money herein specifically appropriated for pay of the Marine Corps shall be disbursed and accounted for in accordance with existing law and shall constitute one fund.

PAY OF CIVIL EMPLOYEES, MARINE CORPS

Pay of civil force: For personal services in the District of Columbia, as follows:

Offices of the Major General Commandant and adjutant inspector, \$127,590;

Office of paymaster, \$50,880;

Office of the quartermaster, \$126,560; in all, \$305,030: *Provided*, That the total number of enlisted men on duty at Marine Corps headquarters on May 7, 1930, shall not be increased, and in lieu of enlisted men whose services at such headquarters shall be terminated for any cause prior to July 1, 1933, their places may be filled by civilians, for the pay of whom, in accordance with the Classification Act of 1923, as amended, either or both the appropriations "Pay, Marine Corps," and "General expenses, Marine Corps," shall be available.

GENERAL EXPENSES, MARINE CORPS

For every expenditure requisite for, and incident to, the authorized work of the Marine Corps, other than as appropriated for under the headings of pay and salaries, as follows:

For provisions, subsistence, board and lodging of enlisted men, recruits and recruiting parties, and applicants for enlistment, cash allowances for lodging and subsistence to enlisted men traveling on duty; ice, ice machines and their maintenance, \$2,123,598;

For clothing for enlisted men, \$698,672;

For fuel, heat, light, and power, including sales to officers, \$475,000;

For military supplies and equipment, including their purchase, repair, preservation, and handling; recreational, school, educational, library, musical, amusement,

field sport and gymnasium supplies, equipment, services, and incidental expenses; purchase and marking of prizes for excellence in gunnery and rifle practice, good-conduct badges, medals, and buttons awarded to officers and enlisted men by the Government for conspicuous, gallant, and special service; rental and maintenance of target ranges and entrance fees for competitions, \$495,300;

Not to exceed for transportation of troops and applicants for enlistment, including cash in lieu of ferrage and transfers en route; toilet kits for issue to recruits upon their first enlistment and other incidental expenses of the recruiting service; and including not to exceed \$26,250 for transportation for dependents of officers and enlisted men, \$381,250;

For repairs and improvements to barracks, quarters, and other public buildings at posts and stations; for renting, leasing, and improvement of buildings in the District of Columbia, with the approval of the Public Buildings Commission, and at such other places as the public exigencies require, and the erection of temporary buildings upon the approval of the Secretary of the Navy at a total cost of not to exceed \$10,000 during the year, \$360,000;

For forage and stabling of public animals and the authorized number of officers' horses, \$40,000;

For miscellaneous supplies, material, equipment, personal and other services, and for other incidental expenses for the Marine Corps not otherwise provided for; purchase, repair, and exchange of typewriters and calculating machines; purchase and repair of furniture and fixtures; repair of motor-propelled passenger-carrying vehicles, purchase of five motor cycles, at not to exceed \$295 each, and purchase, exchange and repair of horse-drawn passenger-carrying and other vehicles, including parts; veterinary services and medicines for public animals and the authorized number of officers' horses; purchase of mounts and horse equipment for all officers below the grade of major required to be mounted; shoeing for public animals and the authorized number of officers' horses; books, newspapers, and periodicals; printing and binding; packing and crating of officers' allowance of baggage; funeral expenses of officers and enlisted men and accepted applicants for enlistment and retired officers on active duty; including the transportation of their bodies, arms, and wearing apparel from the place of demise to the homes of the deceased in the United States; construction, operation, and maintenance of laundries; and for all emergencies and extraordinary expenses, \$1,789,900.

Marine Corps Reserve: For clothing, subsistence, heat, light, transportation, and miscellaneous expenses, \$95,000;

In all, \$6,458,720, to be accounted for as one fund: *Provided*, That the sum to be paid out of this appropriation for employees assigned to Group IV (b) and those performing similar services carried under native and alien schedules in the Schedule of Wages for Civil Employees in the Field Service of the Navy Department shall not exceed \$90,000.

SEC. 2. No part of any money appropriated by this Act shall be used for maintaining, driving, or operating any Government-owned motor-propelled passenger-carrying vehicle not used exclusively for official purposes; and "official purposes" shall not include the transportation of officers and employees between their domiciles and places of employment except in cases of medical officers on out-patient medical service and ex-

cept in cases of officers and employees engaged in field work the character of whose duties makes such transportation necessary and then only as to such latter cases when the same is approved by the head of the department. This section shall not apply to any motor vehicle for official use of the Secretary of the Navy, and no other persons connected with the Navy Department or the naval service, except the commander in chief of the United States Asiatic Fleet, Marine Corps officers serving with expeditionary forces in foreign countries, and medical officers on out-patient medical service, shall have a Government-owned motor vehicle assigned for their exclusive use.

SEC. 3. No part of any appropriation made by this Act shall be used to pay the actual expenses of subsistence in excess of \$6 each for any one calendar day or per diem allowance for subsistence in excess of the rate of \$5 for any one calendar day to any officer or employee of the United States in a travel status, and payment accordingly shall be in full, notwithstanding any other statutory provision.

Approved, June 30, 1932.

In the efforts to balance the budget for Government expenditures all of the estimates for the appropriations for the current fiscal year have been drastically cut. The following comparison of the amounts appropriated under the different headings for the fiscal year 1932 (ending June 30, 1932,) and for the fiscal year 1933 (ending June 30, 1933,) will show where these cuts have been made in the appropriations for the Marine Corps for the current year. From these comparisons it will be seen that great economy in all expenditures must be exercised during the current year, especially under the subheads of "Transportation of Troops and Recruiting", "Mileage, officers", "Clothing", "Military Supplies and Equipment", and "Miscellaneous Expenses". The transportation of dependents of officers and enlisted men limited to \$26,250 which sum is less than one half of the amount expended for this purpose during the fiscal year 1932.

The following is a comparison of the appropriations "Pay, Marine Corps," for the fiscal years 1932 and 1933:

Subhead	1932	1933
Pay of Officers, Active List	\$ 3,778,944	\$ 3,731,378*
Subsistence allowance, officers	518,811	493,116
Rental Allowance	693,272	648,063
Officers' Retired List	649,862	794,786
Pay, Enlisted Men, Active	8,486,894	7,597,537**
Lodging and subsistence, enlisted men	802,747	670,542
Enlisted Men, Retired	469,559	620,208
Undrawn Clothing	265,230	155,160
Marine Corps Reserve:		
(a) Excluding transferred and assigned men	265,200	237,620
(b) Transferred men	341,606	281,696
(c) Assigned men	74,000	65,750
Mileage, officers	125,000	84,334
TOTALS	\$16,471,125	\$15,380,190

* Includes re-appropriation of \$129,101, "Pay, Marine Corps, 1932."

** Includes \$100,000, re-appropriation, "Pay, Marine Corps, 1932."

The following is a comparison of the appropriations under the Quartermaster Department for the Fiscal Years 1932 and 1933:

	Appropriated 1932	Appropriated 1933
Subheads	(17,500 men)	(15,343 men)
Provisions	\$3,080,000†	\$2,123,598‡
Clothing	1,057,288	698,672
Fuel	500,000	475,000
Mil. Sup. & Equipment	825,000	495,300
Trans. Troops—Recruiting	549,765	381,250
Repairs of Barracks	375,000	360,000
Forage	40,000	40,000
Miscel. Sup. & Expenses	2,061,209	1,789,900
Marine Band, Yorktown, Va.	2,000	
Marine Corps Reserve	108,173	95,000
TOTAL	\$8,598,435	\$6,458,720

† Based on 48c ration.

‡ Based on 35c ration.

THE ECONOMY ACT

AN ACT

Making appropriations for the Legislative Branch of the Government for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1933, and for other purposes.

PART II

TITLE I—FURLOUGH OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES FURLOUGH PROVISIONS

SECTION 101. During the fiscal year ending June 30, 1933—

(a) The days of work of a per diem officer or employee receiving compensation at a rate which is equivalent to more than \$1,000 per annum shall not exceed five in any one week, and the compensation for five days shall be ten-elevenths of that payable for a week's work of five and one-half days: *Provided*, That nothing herein contained shall be construed as modifying the method of fixing the daily rate of compensation of per diem officers or employees as now authorized by law: *Provided further*, That where the nature of the duties of a per diem officer or employee render it advisable, the provisions of subsection (b) may be applied in lieu of the provisions of this subsection.

(b) Each officer or employee receiving compensation on an annual basis at the rate of more than \$1,000 per annum shall be furloughed without compensation for one calendar month, or for such periods as shall in the aggregate be equivalent to one calendar month, for which latter purpose twenty-four working days (counting Saturday as one-half day) shall be considered as the equivalent of one calendar month: *Provided*, That where the nature of the duties of any such officer or employee render it advisable, the provisions of subsection (a) may be applied in lieu of the provisions of this subsection: *Provided further*, That no officer or employee shall, without his consent, be furloughed under this subsection for more than five days in any one calendar month: *Provided further*, That the rate of compensation of any employee furloughed under the provisions of this Act shall not be reduced by reason of the action of any wage board during the fiscal year 1933.

(c) If the application of the provisions of subsections (a) and (b) to any officer or employee would reduce his rate of compensation to less than \$1,000 per annum, such provisions shall be applied to him only to the extent necessary to reduce his rate of compensation to \$1,000 per annum.

SEC. 102. No officer or employee shall be exempted

from the provisions of subsections (a) and (b) of section 101, except in those cases where the public service requires that position be continuously filled and a suitable substitute can not be provided, and then only when authorized or approved in writing by the President of the United States. The Director of the Bureau of the Budget shall report to Congress on the first Monday in December in 1932 and 1933 the exemptions made under this section divided according to salary, grade, and class.

SEC. 103. All rights now conferred or authorized to be conferred by law upon any officer or employee to receive annual leave of absence with pay are hereby suspended during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1933.

DEFINITIONS

SEC. 104. When used in this title—

(a) The terms "officer" and "employee" mean any persons rendering services in or under any branch or service of the United States Government or the government of the District of Columbia, but do not include (1) officers whose compensation may not, under the Constitution, be diminished during their continuance in office; (2) Senators, Representatives in Congress, Delegates, and Resident Commissioners; (3) officers and employees on the rolls of the Senate and House of Representatives; (4) carriers in the Rural Mail Delivery Service; (5) officers and members of the Police Department of the District of Columbia, of the Fire Department of the District of Columbia, of the United States Park Police in the District of Columbia, and of the White House Police; (6) teachers in the public schools of the District of Columbia; (7) public officials and employees whose compensation is derived from assessments on banks and/or is not paid from the Federal Treasury; (8) the enlisted personnel of the Army, Navy, Coast Guard, and Marine Corps; (9) postmasters and postal employees of post offices of the first, second and third classes whose salary or allowances are based on gross postal receipts, and postmasters of the fourth class; (10) any person in respect of any office, position, or employment the amount of compensation of which is expressly fixed by international agreement; and (11) any person in respect of any office, position, or employment the compensation of which is paid under the terms of any contract in effect on the date of the enactment of this Act, if such compensation may not lawfully be reduced.

(b) The term "compensation" means any salary, pay, wage, allowance (except allowances for subsistence, quarters, heat, light, and travel), or other emolument paid for services rendered in any civilian or non-civilian office, position, or employment; and includes the retired pay of judges, and the retired pay of all commissioned and other personnel of the Coast and Geodetic Survey, Lighthouse Service, and the Public Health Service, and the retired pay of all commissioned and other personnel (except enlisted) of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard; but does not include the active or retired pay of the enlisted personnel of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard; and does not include payments out of any retirement, disability, or relief fund made up wholly or in part of contributions of employees.

(c) In the case of any office, position, or employment, the compensation for which is calculated on a piecework, hourly, or per diem basis, the rate of compensation per annum shall be held to be the total amount which would be payable for the regular work-

ing hours and on the basis of three hundred and seven working days, or the number of working days on the basis of which such compensation is calculated, whichever is the greater.

COMPENSATION REDUCTIONS

SEC. 105. During the fiscal year ending June 30, 1933—

(a) The salaries of the Vice President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives are reduced by 15 per centum; and the salaries of Senators, Representatives in Congress, Delegates, and Resident Commissioners are reduced by 10 per centum.

(b) The allowance for clerk hire of Representatives in Congress, Delegates, and Resident Commissioners is reduced by $8\frac{1}{3}$ per centum, such reduced allowance to be apportioned by the Representative, Delegate, or Resident Commissioner among his clerks as he may determine, subject to the limitations of existing law, but the compensation of such clerks shall not be subject to reduction under subsection (c) of this section.

(c) The rate of compensation of any person on the rolls of the Senate or of the House of Representatives (other than persons included within subsection (a)), if such compensation is at a rate of more than \$1,000 per annum, is reduced by $8\frac{1}{3}$ per centum, except that if the rate of compensation is \$10,000 or more such rate shall be reduced by 10 per centum.

(d) In the case of the following persons the rate of compensation is reduced as follows: If more than \$1,000 per annum but less than \$10,000 per annum, $8\frac{1}{3}$ per centum; if \$10,000 per annum or more, but less than \$12,000 per annum, 10 per centum; if \$12,000 per annum or more, but less than \$15,000 per annum, 12 per centum; if \$15,000 per annum or more, but less than \$20,000 per annum, 15 per centum; if \$20,000 per annum or more, 20 per centum.

(1) Persons exempted, under section 102, from the provisions of subsections (a) and (b) of section 101;

(2) Carriers in the Rural Mail Delivery Service, but in the case of such carriers the term "compensation" does not include the allowance for equipment maintenance;

(3) Officers and members of the Police Department of the District of Columbia, of the Fire Department of the District of Columbia, of the United States Park Police in the District of Columbia, and of the White House Police;

(4) Teachers in the public schools of the District of Columbia;

(5) Postmasters and postal employees of post offices of the first, second, and third classes whose salaries or allowances are based on gross postal receipts, and postmasters of the fourth class;

(6) Officers and employees (as defined in section 104 (a)) occupying positions the nature of the duties and periods of work of which make it impracticable to apply the provisions of subsections (a) and (b) of section 101;

(7) Officers and employees (as defined in section 104 (a)), not otherwise provided for in this section, to whom the provisions of subsections (a) and (b) of section 101 do not apply.

(e) Subsections (c) and (d) of this section shall not operate (1) so as to reduce any rate of compensation to less than \$1,000 per annum, or (2) so as to reduce the rate of compensation of any of the postmasters or postal employees provided for in paragraph (5) of sub-

section (d) of this section, to a rate which is less than $91\frac{2}{3}$ per centum of his average rate of compensation during the calendar year 1931.

RETIRED PAY

SEC. 106. During the fiscal year ending June 30, 1933, the retired pay of all judges (except judges whose compensation may not, under the Constitution, be diminished during their continuance in office) and the retired pay of all commissioned and other personnel (except enlisted) of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, Coast and Geodetic Survey, Lighthouse Service, and the Public Health Service shall be reduced as follows: If more than \$1,000 per annum but less than \$10,000 per annum, $8\frac{1}{3}$ per centum; if \$10,000 per annum or more, but less than \$12,000, 10 per centum; if \$12,000 per annum or more, but less than \$15,000 per annum, 12 per centum; if \$15,000 per annum or more, but less than \$20,000, 15 per centum; if \$20,000 per annum or more, 20 per centum. This section shall not operate so as to reduce any rate of retired pay to less than \$1,000 per annum.

SPECIAL SALARY REDUCTIONS

SEC. 107. (a) During the fiscal year ending June 30, 1933—

(1) the salary of each of the members of the International Joint Commission, United States section, shall be at the rate of \$5,000 per annum;

(2) the salaries of the following officers shall be at the rate of \$10,000 per annum: Commissioners of the United States Shipping Board, members of the Federal Farm Board (except the Secretary of Agriculture), members of the Board of Mediation, commissioners of the Interstate Commerce Commission, commissioners of the United States Tariff Commission, the American commissioner of the General Claims Commission, United States and Mexico, and the umpire and American commissioner of the Mixed Claims Commission, United States and Germany;

(3) no officer or employee of any of the boards or commissions enumerated in paragraph (1) or (2) shall (except as provided in paragraph (4)) receive salary at a rate in excess of \$10,000 per annum;

(4) no officer or employee of the United States Shipping Board, the United States Shipping Board Merchant Fleet Corporation, or the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, shall receive salary at a rate in excess of \$10,000 per annum, except that in the case of any position the salary of which at the date of the enactment of this Act is at a rate in excess of \$12,500 per annum such salary may be at a rate not in excess of \$12,500 per annum; and

(5) the salaries and retired pay of all judges (except judges whose compensation may not, under the Constitution, be diminished during their continuance in office), if such salaries or retired pay are at a rate exceeding \$10,000 per annum, shall be at the rate of \$10,000 per annum.

(b) The furlough provisions and the compensation reductions contained in other sections of this title shall not apply to any office, position, or employment the salary or retired pay of which is reduced or fixed under the provisions of subsection (a) of this section.

GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS

SEC. 108. In the case of a corporation the majority of the stock of which is owned by the United States, the holders of the stock on behalf of the United States,

or such persons as represent the interest of the United States in such corporation, shall take such action as may be necessary to apply the provisions of sections 101, 102, 103, 105, and 107 to offices, positions, and employments under such corporation and to officers and employees thereof, with proper allowance for any reduction in compensation since December 31, 1931.

REMITTANCES FROM CONSTITUTIONAL OFFICERS

SEC. 109. In any case in which the application of the provisions of this title to any person would result in a diminution of compensation prohibited by the Constitution, the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to accept from such person, and cover into the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts, remittance of such part of the compensation of such person as would not be paid to him if such diminution of compensation were not prohibited.

APPROPRIATIONS IMPOUNDED

SEC. 110. The appropriations or portions of appropriations unexpended by reason of the operation of this title shall not be used for any purpose, but shall be impounded and returned to the Treasury.

LIMITATION ON JURISDICTION OF COURTS

SEC. 111. No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction of any suit against the United States or (unless brought by the United States) against any officer, agency, or instrumentality of the United States arising out of the application of any provision of this title, unless such suit involves the Constitution of the United States.

RURAL CARRIERS EQUIPMENT ALLOWANCE

SEC. 112. During the fiscal year ending June 30, 1933, payments for equipment maintenance to carriers in the Rural Mail Delivery Service shall be seven-eighths of the amount now provided by law.

TITLE II—PROVISIONS AFFECTING PERSONNEL SUSPENSION OF PROMOTIONS AND FILLING OF VACANCIES

SEC. 201. All provisions of law which confer upon civilian or noncivilian officers or employees of the United States Government or the municipal government of the District of Columbia automatic increases in compensation by reason of length of service or promotion are suspended during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1933; but this section shall not be construed to deprive any person of any increment of compensation, received through an automatic increase in compensation prior to July 1, 1932.

SEC. 202. No administrative promotions in the civil branch of the United States Government or the government of the District of Columbia shall be made during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1933: *Provided*, That the filling of a vacancy, when authorized by the President, by the appointment of an employee of a lower grade, shall not be construed as an administrative promotion, but no such appointment shall increase the compensation of such employee to a rate in excess of the minimum rate of the grade to which such employee is appointed, unless such minimum rate would require an actual reduction in compensation. The President shall submit to Congress a report of the vacancies filled under this section up to November 1, 1932, on the first day of the next regular session. The provisions of this section shall not apply to commis-

sioned, commissioned warrant, warrant, and enlisted personnel, and cadets, of the Coast Guard.

SEC. 203. No appropriation available to any executive department or independent establishment or to the municipal government of the District of Columbia during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1933, shall be used to pay the compensation of an incumbent appointed to any civil position under the United States Government or the municipal government of the District of Columbia which is vacant on July 1, 1932, or to any such position which may become vacant after such date: *Provided*, That this inhibition shall not apply (a) to absolutely essential positions the filling of which may be authorized or approved in writing by the President of the United States, (b) to temporary, emergency, seasonal, or cooperative positions, or (c) to commissioned, commissioned warrant, warrant, and enlisted personnel, and cadets, of the Coast Guard. The appropriations or portions of appropriations unexpended by the operation of this section shall not be used for any other purposes but shall be impounded and returned to the Treasury, and a report of all such vacancies, the number thereof filled, and the amounts unexpended, for the period between July 1, 1932, and October 31, 1932, shall be submitted to Congress on the first day of the next regular session: *Provided*, That such impounding of funds may be waived in writing by the President of the United States in connection with any appropriation or portion of appropriation, when, in his judgment, such action is necessary and in the public interest.

COMPULSORY RETIREMENT FOR AGE

SEC. 204. On and after July 1, 1932, no person rendering civilian service in any branch or service of the United States Government or the municipal government of the District of Columbia who shall have reached the retirement age prescribed for automatic separation from the service, applicable to such person, shall be continued in such service, notwithstanding any provision of law or regulation to the contrary: *Provided*, That the President may, by Executive Order, exempt from the provisions of this section any person when, in his own judgment, the public interest so requires: *Provided further*, That no such person heretofore or hereafter separated from the service of the United States or the District of Columbia under any provision of law or regulation providing for such retirement on account of age shall be eligible again to appointment to any appointive office, position, or employment under the United States or the District of Columbia: *Provided further*, That this section shall not apply to any person named in any Act of Congress providing for the continuance of such person in the service.

RATE OF COMPENSATION UPON WHICH RETIRED PAY SHALL BE BASED

SEC. 205. The provisions of this Part of this Act providing for temporary reductions in compensation and suspension in automatic increases in compensation shall not operate to reduce the rate of compensation upon which the retired pay or retirement benefits of any officer or employee would be based but for the application of such provisions, but the amount of retired pay shall be reduced as provided in Title I: *Provided*, That retirement deductions authorized by law to be made from the salary, pay, or compensation of officers and employees and transferred or deposited to the credit of a retirement fund, shall be based

on the regular rate of salary, pay, or compensation instead of on the rate as temporarily reduced under the provisions of this Act.

TEMPORARY REDUCTION OF TRAVEL ALLOWANCES

SEC. 206. During the fiscal year ending June 30, 1933—

(a) all provisions of law which authorize the payment of mileage to officers of the services mentioned in the Pay Adjustment Act of 1922 [U. S. C., title 37] are hereby suspended and in lieu thereof such officers shall be entitled to allowances for travel only as provided for civilian employees of the Government, and the Subsistence Expense Act of 1926, as modified by this Act, and by the Act of February 14, 1931 (Supp. V, U. S. Code, Title 5, sec. 73a), shall apply to such travel: *Provided*, That all appropriations available for the payment of such mileage during the fiscal year 1933 shall be construed as being available for the payment of the allowances herein provided;

(b) the mileage allowance of Senators, Representatives in Congress, and the Delegate from Hawaii is reduced 25 per centum; the allowance to the Delegate from Alaska provided by section 1 of the Act of May 7, 1906, the allowance to the Resident Commissioners from the Philippine Islands provided by section 8 of the Act of July 1, 1902, and the allowance to the Resident Commissioner from Porto Rico provided by section 36 of the Act of March 2, 1917, are reduced by 25 per centum; and

(c) the traveling allowances provided for in the Act entitled "An Act reclassifying the salaries of postmasters and employees of the Postal Service, readjusting their salaries and compensation on an equitable basis, increasing postal rates to provide for such readjustment, and for other purposes," approved February 28, 1925 [U. S. C., title 39, § 633], shall not exceed \$2 per day.

PERMANENT REDUCTION OF TRAVEL ALLOWANCES

SEC. 207. Section 3 of the Subsistence Expense Act of 1926, approved June 3, 1926 (44 Stat. 688, 689), is hereby amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 3. Civilian officers and employees of the departments and establishments, while traveling on official business and away from their designated posts of duty, shall be allowed, in lieu of their actual expenses for subsistence and all fees or tips to porters and stewards, a per diem allowance to be prescribed by the head of the department or establishment concerned, not to exceed the rate of \$5 within the limits of continental United States, and not to exceed an average of \$6 beyond the limits of continental United States."

SEC. 208. Sections 4, 5, and 6 of the said Subsistence Expense Act of 1926 are hereby repealed, and section 7 thereof is hereby amended by striking out the reference therein to actual expenses so that the section, as amended, will read as follows:

"SEC. 7. The fixing and payment, under section 3, of per diem allowance, or portions thereof, shall be in accordance with regulations which shall be promulgated by the heads of departments and establishments and which shall be standardized as far as practicable and shall not be effective until approved by the President of the United States."

SEC. 209. Hereafter, no law or regulation authorizing or permitting the transportation at Government expense of the effects of officers, employees, or other persons, shall be construed or applied as including or

authorizing the transportation of an automobile: *Provided*, That not more than \$5,000 in any fiscal year may be expended for such purposes by the War Department, and not more than \$5,000 in any fiscal year by the Navy Department.

SEC. 210. The provisions of all Acts heretofore enacted inconsistent with sections 207, 208, and 209 are, to the extent of such inconsistency, hereby repealed, and such sections shall take effect on July 1, 1932.

OVERTIME COMPENSATION

SEC. 211. (a) During the fiscal year ending June 30, 1933—

(1) no officer or employee of the Government shall be allowed or paid a higher rate of compensation for overtime work (either day or night) or for work on Sundays and holidays;

(2) wherever by or under authority of law compensation for night work (other than overtime) is at a higher rate than for day work, such differential shall be reduced by one-half;

(3) in so far as practicable, overtime work shall be performed by substitutes or unemployed regulars in lieu of persons who have performed a day's work during the day during which the overtime work is to be performed, and work on Sundays and holidays shall be performed by substitutes or unemployed regulars in lieu of persons who have performed a week's work during the same week.

(b) This section shall not apply to compensation for overtime services performed by Federal employees under existing law at the expense of private interests.

LIMITATIONS ON AMOUNT OF RETIRED PAY

SEC. 212. (a) After the date of the enactment of this Act, no person holding a civilian office or position, appointive or elective, under the United States Government or the municipal government of the District of Columbia or under any corporation, the majority of the stock of which is owned by the United States, shall be entitled, during the period of such incumbency, to retired pay from the United States for or on account of services as a commissioned officer in any of the services mentioned in the Pay Adjustment Act of 1922 [U. S. C., title 37], at a rate in excess of an amount which when combined with the annual rate of compensation from such civilian office or position, makes the total rate from both sources more than \$3,000; and when the retired pay amounts to or exceeds the rate of \$3,000 per annum such person shall be entitled to the pay of the civilian office or position or the retired pay, whichever he may elect. As used in this section, the term "retired pay" shall be construed to include credits for all service that lawfully may enter into the computation thereof.

(b) This section shall not apply to any person whose retired pay plus civilian pay amounts to less than \$3,000: *Provided*, That this section shall not apply to regular or emergency commissioned officers retired for disability incurred in combat with an enemy of the United States.

PERSONNEL REDUCTIONS—MARRIED PERSONS

SEC. 213. In any reduction of personnel in any branch or service of the United States Government or the District of Columbia, married persons (living with husband or wife) employed in the class to be reduced, shall be dismissed before any other persons employed in such class are dismissed, if such husband or wife is

also in the service of the United States or the District of Columbia. In the appointment of persons to the classified civil service, preference shall be given to persons other than married persons living with husband or wife, such husband or wife being in the service of the United States or the District of Columbia.

TEMPORARY ASSIGNMENTS IN POSTAL SERVICE

SEC. 214. During the fiscal year ending June 30, 1933, the Postmaster General may, when the interest of the service requires, temporarily assign any clerk to the duties of carrier or any carrier to the duties of clerk, and in an emergency may assign any Post Office employee to the duties of a railway postal clerk, or any railway postal clerk to the duties of a Post Office employee without change of pay roll status.

ANNUAL LEAVE WITH PAY REDUCED TO FIFTEEN DAYS

SEC. 215. Hereafter no civilian officer or employee of the Government who receives annual leave with pay shall be granted annual leave of absence with pay in excess of fifteen days in any one year, excluding Sundays and legal holidays: *Provided*, That the part unused in any year may be cumulative for any succeeding year: *Provided further*, That nothing herein shall apply to civilian officers and employees of the Panama Canal located on the Isthmus and who are American citizens or to officers and employees of the Foreign Services of the United States holding official station outside the continental United States: *Provided further*, That nothing herein shall be construed as affecting the period during which pay may be allowed under existing laws for so-called sick leave of absence: *Provided further*, That the so-called sick leave of absence, within the limits now authorized by law, shall be administered under such regulations as the President may prescribe so as to obtain, so far as practicable, uniformity in the various executive departments and independent establishments of the Government.

FURLOUGH OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES DURING FISCAL YEAR 1933

SEC. 216. In order to keep within the appropriations made for the fiscal year 1933, the heads of the various executive departments and independent establishments of the United States Government and the municipal government of the District of Columbia are hereby authorized and directed to furlough, without pay, such employees carried on their respective rolls, such time as in their judgment is necessary to carry out said purpose without discharging such employees, the higher salaried to be furloughed first whenever possible without injury to the service: *Provided*, That rules and regulations shall be promulgated by the President with a view to securing uniform action by the heads of the various executive departments and independent Government establishments in the application of the provisions of this section.

Approved June 30, 1932.

In addition to the above provisions regarding pay and leave of absence the Act contains the following provision affecting the military services.

RESTRICTIONS OF TRANSFER OF ARMY AND NAVY PERSONNEL

"SEC. 315. The President is authorized, during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1933, to restrict the transfer of officers and enlisted men in the military and

naval forces from one post or station to another post or station to the greatest extent consistent with the public interest."

Up to the present no Executive Order in this subject has been promulgated.

The general effect of the above quoted legislation is to suspend for the current fiscal year all laws and regulations regarding leave of absence with pay for officers of the military and naval services with the exception of "sick leave," to allow leave of absence without pay for a total not exceeding one month, all further leave to be without pay or allowances.

Under date of July 8, 1932, the Comptroller General rendered the following decision covering certain features of the application of the above quoted law and further decisions are expected as questions arise in the administration of the law.

COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES—WASHINGTON

A-43276

July 8, 1932

The Act approved June 30, 1932, Public No. 212, enacted to accomplish savings in the conduct of the Government, requires that during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1933, each officer and employee, with certain exceptions, receiving compensation on an annual basis at a rate of more than \$1,000 per annum, shall be furloughed without compensation for one calendar month or for such periods as shall in the aggregate be equivalent to one calendar month. This means there shall be retained in the Treasury such portion of all appropriations for personal services as will equal the saving thus provided for. To insure such saving as is so required by the enactment and to avoid payments in contravention of law a minimum of $1\frac{1}{4}$ days' pay ($8\frac{1}{3}\%$) will be deducted from each officer and employee to whom Section 101 (b) is applicable on each semi-monthly payroll or voucher—regardless of whether the officer or employee has or has not been absent during such period—a proportionate reduction to be made where the pay period is greater or less than a half month. When an officer or employee is absent *on furlough* for more than one working day during a semi-monthly pay period, deduction will be made at the rate of $1\frac{1}{4}$ days' pay for each working day of such absence (fractional parts of a day to be considered as a day for this purpose, for instance for an absence of 2 days and 1 hour during such pay period, deduction will be made of $3\frac{3}{4}$ days' pay but only the actual time taken to be charged as time absent) *except that if the aggregate of all absences on furlough from July 1, 1932, to the end of the pay period involved, does not exceed the number of working days for which deduction therefor has been made, the deduction for such semi-monthly pay period will be only the minimum deduction of $1\frac{1}{4}$ days' pay, and when pay has been deducted for 24 working days at the rate of $1\frac{1}{4}$ days' pay per day (one month's pay), no further deduction will be made on account of furlough under section 101 (b) and any additional absences, except on sick leave or military leave when authorized by law or regulations having the force and effect of law, will be regarded as absence without pay and charged for in accordance with rules and regulations heretofore applicable to such absences.*

Where large payrolls are involved it is appreciated this may operate to delay payments because of the time actually required to prepare the roll for certifica-

tion and delivery to the disbursing officer unless there be cooperation by all concerned and coordination of the work of the administrative activities involved, but one of the prime purposes of the law is to retain this saving in the Treasury for other essential uses and there may not properly be made advances to officers and employees on the theory that recovery can be accomplished before the close of the fiscal year. There may occur during the latter days or hours of a pay period an unexpected requirement that an officer or employee be absent from duty but the administrative procedure should be such that notice will be so promptly given the disbursing officer as to enable him to withhold payment to such officer or employee for such adjustment as the facts may require.

The accounting procedure hereunder and necessary supplement to the Government Salary Tables will be promulgated promptly hereafter.

(Signed) J. R. McCARL,
Comptroller General of the United States.

The following ALNAV DESPATCH contains general and specific instructions for applying the provisions of the Act of June 30, 1932, and has been issued for the guidance of all concerned therewith.

NAVY DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON

14 July, 1932.

0014. 32 ALNAV. Under provisions Act June thirty, Nineteen Thirty-two, during fiscal year Nineteen Thirty-three, all commissioned officers, warrant officers, nurses and reserve officers on active duty other than training, must be furloughed without compensation for one calendar month. Comptroller General holds that to accomplish intent of Congress, eight and one-third per cent of compensation of such personnel must be deducted each period for which stated for pay, regardless of whether furlough has been taken and regardless of what checkages have previously been made. This is the normal checkage. The total pay per annum may not be reduced below one thousand dollars by reason furlough deductions. Example: Where for annum rate is ten hundred eighty dollars, no additional furlough deductions need be made after such checkages total eighty dollars. As personnel involved usually paid semi-monthly instructions will be based on semi-monthly periods, but are applicable to pay periods of greater or less duration on a proportionate basis. If furlough taken does not exceed one day exclusive of Sundays and holidays during a semi-monthly period, only the normal checkage will be made. If furlough taken exceeds one day exclusive of Sundays and holidays during a semi-monthly period additional checkage must be made for the period in excess. For purposes of such checkage one day's absence is equivalent to four and one-sixth per cent of monthly compensation. When the total amount deducted during the year equals

eight and one-third per cent of the annual compensation no further deductions on account of furlough will be made. Any further absences in excess of twenty-four days exclusive of Sundays and holidays for personal convenience except authorized absence on account of sickness will be regarded as leave without pay and deductions will be made, as formerly. Time spent awaiting orders, awaiting transportation, and four days proceed on change of station is not repeat not considered absence within purview of statute. Compensation as defined by statute does not include rental or subsistence allowances or allowances for quarters, heat, light and travel. It does include statutory pay, aviation pay, submarine pay, additional pay for aides and mounts, and cash allowance for flag officers and all other forms of additional pay, including money allowances nurses. Separate certificates should be filed by each officer or nurse monthly where accounts rendered monthly, and quarterly where accounts rendered quarterly, setting forth number of days' furlough taken exclusive of Sundays and holidays from July one, Nineteen Thirty-two, to close of current pay period or on transfer to other rolls. Upon departure on extended furlough officers and nurses will immediately notify the pay officer carrying their accounts in writing of the probable duration of absence. Checkages case personnel carried by Navy supply officers should be entered sundry checkage column payroll under caption "furlough act six thirty thirty-two" and in remarks column will be entered total amount checked to date and total number days' furlough exclusive of Sundays and holidays taken to date. Marine Corps paymasters will make checkages under paymasters' statement on officers' pay voucher and transcript such checkages in separate column on debit side of transcript under caption "furlough act six thirty thirty-two" showing same data required above for naval rolls. Reserve officers except one in Navy and one in Marine Corps above repeat above rank Lieutenant, Navy, or Captain, Marine Corps, on active duty except training duty, drills, equivalent or appropriate duty limited to pay and allowances of a Lieutenant with ten years' longevity. Reserve officers on training duty must be checked eight and one-third per cent of amount accrued for compensation as heretofore defined. Deductions in cases of officers whose pay and allowances are limited by existing law to seventy-two hundred and seventy-five hundred dollars and commissioned warrant officers under the limitations prescribed in the act of February sixteen, Nineteen Twenty-nine, will be made as normal checkage on pay and no repeat no increase in allowances will be credited by reason furlough deductions. Transfer pay accounts of officers, warrant officers and nurses will contain statement showing total number days' furlough taken exclusive of Sundays and holidays and total amount checked to date of transfer. All automatic increases and compensation by reason length of service or promotion accruing during fiscal year Nineteen Thirty-three are suspended. This includes longevity pay, period pay, allowances and increases due to promotion and rank. These instructions are not repeat not applicable to any forms of pay and allowances of enlisted men. 1115.

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.



Grave of Captain
John Williams,
U.S.M.C., Arlington
National Cemetery.

Captain John Williams, U. S. Marine Corps A Tradition

BY BRIGADIER GENERAL GEORGE RICHARDS, U.S.M.C.

■ The best traditions of our Army, Navy and Marine Corps have not always found their sources in the great wars of our nation. In our many "little wars" there have been displays of gallantry as brilliant as any of the greater conflicts. Not long ago this writer, on a visit to Nicaragua, was most forcibly reminded of the incidents he would here relate. A force of Nicaraguans—officered by marines—had been ambuscaded. The mutilated bodies of the three marines who there fell were brought to Managua for immediate burial. In the humiliation we concealed and in the sorrow we expressed the comforting thought of the Chaplain conducting the funeral services will ever be remembered. These men had not died in vain; their example would inspire us to better efforts. And the whole-hearted sympathy expressed on behalf of the English people by the Charge d'Affairs of the British Legation will never be forgotten. The following day we had to read the garbled accounts published in the local Managuan papers as to the comments of public men at home as the news of the disaster was there received. They served only to impress upon our minds that our thankless task in Nicaragua did not have the support of public opinion at home. But, despite all these conditions, no weakening of the morale of our forces in Nicaragua was apparent. A few days later, at Apali, in Neuva Segovia, the site of the disaster that cost us those three of the flower of American youth, it was my satisfaction to hear from the lips of the commander of the punitive force an account of his expedition to the lair of bandits who had taken those American lives. He had broken up that force; he had avenged those lost lives. But ambuscades of that sort, it then occurred to me, have been but a part of our lot—it has always been so. And to be fired upon first—before an attack is justified—has been equally our lot. The incident in its sorrowful details brought forth what is now to be related.

Since August 15, 1904, the remains of Captain John Williams, U. S. Marine Corps, a Virginian, killed in action in East Florida more than a century ago, have rested in our Valhalla at Arlington under the shadow of the recently restored Lee Mansion and not far from the tomb of "The Great Unknown." Over Williams' resting place, there was restored a modest "pile" erected in 1811, at

Saint Marys, Georgia, by his brother officers of those times, "in testimony of his worth and their mournful admiration of his gallant end."

Captain Williams was the first officer of the Corps to fall in action since the days of the War of the Revolution. The records of the National Cemetery at Arlington show that his body with that simple "pile" was moved from Saint Marys by the officers of the Marine Corps of 1904. Within a stone's throw of Williams' memorial there rises a more imposing monument, dedicated by those self-same officers of the Corps of thirty years ago, but to the memory of the gallant end of another officer, Captain Austin R. Davis, U. S. Marine Corps, a Georgian, the first of ours killed in action since the so-called "War between the States."

The sentiments inspiring both memorials are alike. They lie at the foundation of our esprit as a military body. But in the one case these were inscribed as words on the memorial itself, while in the other they are depicted not by words, but by the beauty of the monument. A towering granite shaft standing in the open, with its bronzed globe and anchor expressive of our motto "Semper Fidelis"—always faithful—marks the hallowed spot where "Reddy" Davis lies—the light he left behind him shines there upon the paths of men. But the Williams' "pile" has a different setting. In the shade of a grove, it may easily be overlooked by the passer-by. There in death his life and end survive—inspiring perhaps thousands and for years beyond our span. That "pile" tells us how should the brave depart.

Inscribed upon its four facets are related the circumstances of Captain Williams' death and the reasons for his memorial. On September 11, 1812, in what is now known as the State of Florida, then called East Florida, his command was ambuscaded by an irregular force of Indians and Negroes. Captain Williams, the script states, "instantly gave battle, gallantly supported by his men, who, inspired by his animating example, fought 'as long as they had a cartridge left.'" It adds that Captain Williams "bleeding under eight galling wounds and unable to stand was carried off the battleground whilst his heroic little band, pressed by superior numbers, was forced to retreat." And it continues with the statement that "Cap-

tain Williams evinced during this short but severe contest those military requisites which qualify the officer for command." Then it concludes with the thought of Gray's "Elegy in a Country Church Yard," saying that if Captain Williams' "sphere of action was too limited to attract the admiration of the world it was sufficiently expanded to crown him with the approbation of his country." And our officers of these days then wrote on that mute stone that the circumstances of his death "afford to his Brethren in arms an example as highly useful as his exit has sealed with honor the life of a *Patriot Soldier*."

The War of 1812 between the United States and Great Britain was known as impending in 1811. It was then feared that the Floridas would be used as a base of operations in that looked-for contest. There existed reciprocal treaty relations between Spain and Great Britain warranting that belief. For these reasons our Government sought peaceably to obtain possession of East Florida. Some sort of secret authority was granted by the Congress towards that end. American Commissioners were sent confidentially to treat with the Spanish local authorities. But these negotiations failed. We were "land hungry" then, however much in these days we say our policies are different.

After that failure of the peaceable effort, one of the commissioners, General George Matthews, then Governor of the State of Georgia, proceeded to foment a revolt among the inhabitants of the northern part of East Florida, promising assistance of state troops from Georgia, supported by regular forces of the United States. Matthew's plan was to create some sort of recognizable local authority competent to act for the East Floridians and, through it, accomplish the desired transfer of the territory to the United States.

In March of 1812 these promised Georgian troops, known as the Patriot Army, crossed the St. Marys River into East Florida. A Spanish outpost located at Amelia Island was captured; the United States flag was hoisted. That island and the territory north of the St. John's River was then taken possession of in the name of the United States. Subsequently a detachment of United States regulars, including marines from Beaufort, S. C., under Captain Williams followed. The latter were to be established, according to the orders from Washington, at Cumberland Island, off the southeast coast of Georgia. Operations by the Army were at once extended toward the south directed to the capture of St. Augustine. They, the regulars, were commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Thomas A. Smith, of the United States Army. He seemed to be an officer of initiative, he was one who apparently did not look to Washington for orders in detail.

The Washington government was not ignorant of the nature of these operations. But, to the student of today, the account seems like a case where the right hand seemed to know not what the left hand "doeth." It was perhaps then as now a case where operations of the marines lacked the support of popular opinion. At any rate, the expeditionary force was but half-heartedly supported by Washington. Sadly deficient in arms, accoutrements and ammunition, the matter of the subsistence of the troops from day to day to the officers commanding was a question of great concern. And the besieged Spaniards, reduced themselves almost to starvation, had in despair turned to the Indians and some refugee negro slaves. They were let loose upon the invaders.

Colonel Smith's command was first based upon a supply depot established at Davis Creek, a locality now

known as Bayard. The marines were to keep open his line of communications. They had been established for this purpose at Fernandina on the soil of East Florida. It was in the performance of this convoy duty that Captain Williams later met his fate. Colonel Wharton at Washington was the Commandant of the Marine Corps at the time. Picolata, on St. John's River, due west of St. Augustine, had surrendered to Colonel Smith on April 12th.



Grave of Captain Austin R. Davis, U.S.M.C.,
Arlington National Cemetery

Events in East Florida seemed not then to the liking of the Navy Department. Orders there emanated affecting the station and duty of the marines interfering seriously with Colonel Smith's plans.

"I never have been placed in so disagreeable a situation in my life," writes Captain Williams from Fernandina. "I am ordered by Colonel Wharton to leave this place immediately and resume my station on Cumberland Island and I am advised by Governor Mitchell, who is now the Commissioner on the part of the United States to remain where I am. If I evacuate this post all supplies would be immediately cut off from Colonel Smith." In June, Colonel Smith's force was located at Fort Moosa, two miles from St. Augustine. A Spanish armed schooner there attacked Smith and his regulars, who retired to Pass Navarro or Four Mile Creek.

The so-called Patriot Army of Georgia had then fallen back to the St. John's River, where a camp was established called "Camp New Hope," whither Williams and his marines were dispatched. They then were to keep open Smith's communications thence to Four Mile River. Captain Williams writes in early September to the Corps'

Adjutant at Washington, "I wish you, if you can, would find out the reason of the U. S. Troops being kept in this province without the liberty of firing a gun unless we are fired on." This is the earliest evidence of the policies with which the marine of today is familiar in his conduct of our so-called "small wars" in the Caribbean countries. He may defend himself, but he is not to attack.

Major Edward N. McClellan describes the later disaster culminating in Captain Williams' death as follows:

"The duty assigned to the Marines—of keeping communications open, and of escorting convoys of supply wagons, between the camps—proved to be the most hazardous of any service in Florida. A company of Indians and Negroes, under a free Black named Prince, formed an ambush in Twelve Mile Swamp, about twelve miles from St. John's, for the purpose of destroying a convoy of wagons escorted by a force of Marines and Milledgeville volunteers (under Captain Fort) commanded by Captain Williams. The convoy and escort entered the swamp about dusk on the evening of September 12, 1812. A deadly fire was poured into them, being directed first upon the horses. The horses being killed, the wagons blocked the trails, and the Americans were forced to stand and fight against heavy odds—being outnumbered four to one, and the enemy fighting from ambush; Captain Williams was wounded at the first fire, but continued to command his men until, being wounded in eight different places, he gave way to Captain Fort, who later was also wounded. When the enemy advanced with tomahawks, the Marines charged and the enemy retired, giving the Americans an opportunity to withdraw from the ambushade.

"Retaining several of his men to guard the wounded, Captain Williams sent the remainder to the Block House on Davis Creek for reinforcements. From there a detachment was sent out the next morning and found Captain Williams, his right leg broken, his right hand shot through with three balls, his left arm broken, his left leg shot through, a ball in his left thigh near the groin, and another through the bottom of his belly. One Marine was found on the ground, dead and scalped, and several more who had been wounded and hidden in the bushes. There was a total of one killed and eight wounded, including Captains Williams and Fort. In a letter to his Commandant, Captain Williams wrote: 'You may expect that I am in a dreadful situation, though I yet hope I shall recover in a few months.'"

Major McClellan relates that commendations and wishes for a speedy recovery were showered upon Captain Williams before news of his death was received. The Commandant, the Secretary of the Navy, and the news-

But the courageous and hopeful Williams succumbed to his wounds.

On November 6, 1812, Colonel Wharton wrote to "Lieut. Col. Thomas A. Smith, Regiment of Riflemen, near St. Augustine, East Florida," acknowledging receipt of the news of the death "of our late Brother Officer, Captain Williams, whose memory will long remain among us," and that he was "very happy to hear that Sergeant Austin has merited the good opinion of the officers under whom he has served."

It was, as stated, to a small church yard in the town of Saint Marys in the southern part of Georgia, that his sorrowing brethren in arms first laid away the remains of the now immortal *Williams*. There, his grave lay forgotten for almost a hundred years. It was the unique character of the testimonials his brethren caused to be inscribed on that modest "pile" that brought to light that neglected spot. The marines of our day had just re-buried at Arlington my friend and classmate, Captain Davis, killed in action, as stated, before Tientsin in the Boxer hostilities in North China in 1900.

"Reddy" went into that campaign with a premonition he would not survive. We could not eradicate that thought from his mind. Almost a score of years ago the *Army and Navy News* published under the title, "Semper Fidelis," the circumstances of his service and death; it deserves re-printing and preservation as part of this narrative. Here it is:


"The Boxer war in China in 1900 saw our Army, Navy and Marine Corps living up to their best traditions.

"Take, for instance, the death of brave Captain Austin R. Davis, of the Marines, as a single illustration of the fact that we have today in our soldiers and sailors the same mettle we had in 1776, 1804, 1812, 1847, 1861-5 and 1898. Captain Davis, while a lieutenant, was on the battleship *Oregon* during the Spanish-American War. * * * * *

"Captain Davis died a soldier's death a few years later, in far off China, during the Boxer rebellion, when the embassies and legations of the foreign nations in Peking were besieged by the Boxers, and had to be relieved by an allied column, formed of troops of the different nations interested. It was at Tientsin, where the first serious engagement occurred, that Captain Davis fell. Here is the story, as told by Colonel George Richards, U.S.M.C., who was an eye witness of his death:

"ASSAULT ON TIENSIN"

"Captain Davis commanded Company C of Major Waller's battalion, which formed part of the regiment of marines under Colonel Robert L. Meade, engaged in the assault upon the walled city of Tientsin, July 13-14, 1900. This force, in company with a battalion of the Royal Welch Fusiliers, under Captain Gwynne, the whole under Brigadier-General R. F. Dorwood, British Army, composed the left wing of the attacking force, which was the flank immediately menaced by the enemy. The Japanese forces led the attack on the centre of the line. The attack proper began at 7:15 A. M., although the forces had been under desultory fire since 5:30 A. M. The advance of the wing began from a position known as the mud wall. The area between was a Chinese graveyard. Under cover of active artillery, the force of marines and fusiliers by a series of rushes reached finally its advanced position, about 400 yards distant from the walled city. Here they were stopped by an impassable swamp. This was a critical moment. Fire came on the allies from three different directions, and the heaviest losses occurred then and within a few minutes. Captain Davis's company was directing its fire on the Chinese directly in its front. He was standing out in the open himself, a little in advance of the company. He was last seen by me smoking a cigarette, with a swagger stick in his hand, watching the effect of the fire of his company, and at the same time, as he looked along his own line, observing the fire of the Chinese from the left, enfiling us. The fire from the south wall, immediately in our front, here became more heavy. Here Davis fell about 8:30 A. M. A jingal bullet struck him in the right breast and gave him a mortal wound. He fell with a sigh, his cigarette still in his fingers. He did not know what struck him. His body, with his face covered by his campaign hat, lay by our side all that day. A wrist watch he had wound that morn-



Guardia Nacional Post at Apali, Nicaragua

papers were loud in his praises. Colonel Smith officially reported to the War Department that "Captains Williams and Fort acquitted themselves highly to their honor, and would have been victorious beyond a doubt if either had escaped a few minutes as an order had been given to charge and the enemy began to give ground. The Indians fled the second fire, yelling like devils."

ing was in plain sight on his wrist and told us the minutes that passed that seemed to us hours.

"TRUE TO TRADITIONS"

"Such was the gallant death of a true exponent of the motto of the United States Marine Corps: 'Semper Fidelis.'"

"The British General Dorwood, in command of that part of the bloody field, said of the affair:

"We all deeply sympathize with you in the heavy losses you have suffered, especially with the Ninth Regiment in the loss of their gallant Colonel, E. H. Liscum, while at the head of his men, and with the First Regiment of Marines in the death of Captain Davis, who met a soldier's death in the very front of the fight.

"THE STORY OF PEEPO"


"There is a pathetic incident in connection with the death of Captain Davis, which must appeal to all sympathetic natures. Like most big-hearted men, Captain Davis was fond of animals, and had a pet dog, a little thoroughbred poodle named Peepo. Peepo followed him everywhere, even to the Philippines and China, and was a sort of mascot for his company. When Davis was killed, Peepo was inconsolable. Officers and men of Company C did all they could to cheer Peepo, but with only partial success. Peepo was passed from hand to hand, but he always mourned, until one day, about seven years later, Captain G. C. Reid, of the Marines, who had been a lieutenant in Davis's company in China, encountered Peepo again. Peepo sniffed at him, wagged his tail, then went into paroxysms of delight, for he recognized in Reid a close friend of his long-lost but beloved master. Peepo would have nothing to do with anyone else, so Reid adopted him and probably today he is still an attachment of the Reid household.

"Captain Davis was a member of the class of 1891 at Annapolis and always esteemed and popular with his classmates as well as those above and below him. His remains are now buried in Arlington National Cemetery."

As the first of ours to fall upon the field of honor since the Civil War of thirty-five years before, we erected, in 1903, to "Reddy's" memory, the monument pre-

viously described. About this time Brigadier General Charles L. McCawley, of the Marine Corps, while in Cuba, was told by the wife of a naval officer of the inscriptions over the neglected and forgotten WILLIAMS grave. On his journey of return to Washington, General McCawley took time to visit Saint Marys. He copied the inscriptions and later reported his discoveries to our authorities at Washington. Due to the courtesies of the quartermaster's department of the Army, arranged by our friend and associate, the late Major Archie Butt, of that department—that selfsame Butt who later, on the lost *TITANIC* taught also how a gentleman should die—the transfer of Captain Williams' remains with its memorial was arranged.

There in our Valhalla they forever will rest. And that mute "pile" in its simple surroundings will, by its inscriptions, evince, as our Davis memorial was intended to depict, that the underlying sentiments animating both are alike. What we thought to express in our homage to "Reddy" are but the sentiments unconsciously instilled in our hearts as an heritage from the bygone marines. Those who went our way before us were rightly animated. What they thought was for us to perpetuate. We who came after have so expressed ourselves. Those who follow us will not fail to do likewise. And so must it continue until time is no more. As it has a'ways been—so must it ever be. A gallant end—a brave deed, can never fail to inspire all honorable men, especially those of our chosen profession. Deeds of valor always incite admiration. Only to the extent we take pride in the conduct of our heroes of the past can we feel that there is to be guaranteed to our country a glorious future.



Landing Field at Apali, Nicaragua

The Battle of the Little Big Horn

BY CAPTAIN MAURICE G. HOLMES, U.S.M.C.

■ The Battle of the Little Big Horn on June 25, 1876, wherein General George A. Custer, U.S.A., 9 officers, and 255 men of the 7th Cavalry were killed and 52 wounded by Sioux Indians led by Gall, Crazy Horse, Two Moon, Rain in the Face, and doughty warriors, absorbs the interest of the American officer from every point of view.

Perhaps G-2 interest is the most acutely stimulated because it may be demonstrated that every misstep which contributed to this disaster sprang from paucity of intelligence regarding the Sioux or errors in interpreting the little information which was received.

At the same time, G-3 may speculate indefinitely over what might have resulted if Custer had not so disposed his regiment as to subject it to defeat in detail.

Withal, G-4 finds meat for meditation in the paucity of supply during the engagement which is so poignantly indicated by Custer's last recorded order, "Benteen—Come on—Big Village—Be quick—Bring packs." After Cooke, the Regimental Adjutant, had signed this order he added, "P. S. Bring pacs."

But beyond these considerations of the engagement, we Marines find a multitude of appealing subjects of study. The numerous analogies between the General Situation which culminated in the Little Big Horn and those in our Banana Wars are striking.

Let us consider for example the analogy between the Indian Agents of Custer's day and the Bamboo Americans of our own. The Indian Agent made his bread and meat through traffic with the Indians, supported in his turn by the U. S. Government. The Bamboo American made his through traffic with the natives in the locus of our expedition. He was supported by the prerogatives of his American citizenship.

Now the Indian left his zone of quiet behavior when prompted thereto as the Banana native took the field when called to arms to avenge a cause. When the Indian left the reservation, the agent called for the Army; when the native took the field, the Bamboo American cabled for Marines. Then, neither gave timely nor correct information to the force for which he yelled. Both types apparently reckoned that the soldiers' stay would necessarily be only temporary, hence it were safer for themselves to use duplicity. As a source of G-2 material, they have been worthless.

Moreover, we have found our Indian agents delivering arms and ammunition to the redskins; our Bamboo Americans bribing native bandit chiefs to leave their plantations alone, despite the fact that they had begged for the Marines' protection. The same bandit chiefs might attack our patrols on the outskirts of the plantations. Never a word of the bandits would the Bamboo Americans give the Marines.

So, in June, 1876, we find Colonels Custer and Terry among others taking the field to drive the Sioux tribes back to their reservations in ignorance of the following data which the Indian agents might have furnished:

(a) That the Sioux had concentrated the greatest numbers in the history of plains warfare.

(b) That, quoting from the account of General Charles King, "nine out of ten of the warriors known to be on the warpath had not only the magazine rifle (Henry or Winchester) with abundant supply of copper cartridges, but, as a rule, two revolvers, Colt's Navy preferred."

(c) That the Sioux were not only bellicose, but had been inflamed against the white man to the degree that they were eager to meet him in battle.

It is most reasonable to believe that these data would have altered materially the plan which Custer followed.

In addition to these data, it is indeed tragic that Custer did not know these Indians to be encountered along the Little Big Horn had almost whipped General Crook along the Rosebud Creek just a week before. Crook had led north from the posts along the Union Pacific and the North Platte the 3rd Cavalry with a supporting squadron of the 2nd and a composite regiment made up from the 4th, 9th, and 14th. As Charles King expressed it, Crook was "the only man who had prevailed over the Apache, who had spent the best years of his life among the Indians of the Pacific slope and of whom perhaps, the most was expected—Crook drove in confidently to the attack and in one hour learned a lesson that revolutionized his idea of the prowess of the Sioux. At the end of that hour he was glad to be able to extricate his command, to fall back to his intrenched camp, there to double his defensive measures and send back to the States for reinforcements."

EVENTS PRIOR TO THE LITTLE BIG HORN

In 1868, our government made a treaty with the Sioux which gave them in perpetuity a large territory in the Northwest including the Black Hills and certain adjoining lands. The Sioux generally were satisfied until the discovery of gold in the Black Hills brought inroads of white men.

In addition to this disturbing factor, the Sioux were further aroused in 1874 by an expedition into the Black Hills which General Custer led under orders of the Government to reconnoiter and explore that country. The Sioux protested this invasion of their rights, but secured no redress. Hundreds of malcontent Sioux therefore began assembling in the Rosebud country of southern Montana under the Hunkpapa Medicine Man, Sitting Bull.

By November, 1875, the hostile attitude of these Indians prompted the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to recommend that force be used to compel them to settle down. The Interior Department notified the Sioux in December, 1875, that force would be used against them if they failed to come in by January 31, 1876. February 1, 1876, arrived without response from the Indians, so General Sheridan, commanding the Division of the Missouri with headquarters in Chicago, was ordered to subject them.

THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN

General Sheridan decided to strike the Indians from three directions to defeat them or to drive them into the

Big Horn mountains and capture them. He ordered a concentration of three mobile columns with bases at Forts Lincoln, Fetterman, and Ellis, to converge on the Sioux position.

General Crook, with about 1200 men left Fort Fetterman on May 29, 1876, and engaged the Sioux on June 18 as already noted.

General Gibbon with about 450 men marched from Fort Ellis on March 30th, going down the Yellowstone River to meet General Terry's column from Fort Lincoln.

General Terry's column consisted of the 7th Cavalry under Custer with a strength of about 28 officers and 700 men; 3 companies of infantry numbering 8 officers and 135 men; a Gatling Gun detachment of 2 officers, 32 men, and 3 Gatling Guns, horse drawn, and about 40 "Ree" Indian scouts. Terry had a total strength less than 950 officers and men.

GENERAL CUSTER

Let us now consider the officer who was to play the best known, albeit the most tragic, role in this expedition. He was Brevet Major General George Armstrong Custer, U.S.A.

At this time, Custer was just 37 years of age. He had graduated from West Point at the foot of his class in 1861 and was commissioned just in time to take part in the First Battle of Manassas. He rose to the rank of Brigadier General of Volunteers in 1863 at the age of 24; to Major General of Volunteers in 1864 at the age of 25.

As Brigadier General of Volunteers, he was given command of a brigade of Michigan volunteer cavalry, which, under his leadership, became one of the most efficient and best-trained bodies of cavalry in the Federal army. At the head of these troops he distinguished himself at the Battle of Gettysburg.

As General Charles King writes, "It was in the nine days from Five Forks to Appomattox that Custer was in his glory. Leader of the Third Division of the Cavalry Corps of the Army of the Potomac, which swore by him, clad in a picturesque garb of his own devising, bestriding a big mettlesome charger as full of energy and vim as was its rider, he hovered every mile along the southward flank of the retiring remnants of Lee's heroic army, darting in at every cross-road—giving the starving columns no chance to eat, much less to sleep—interposing whenever he found a gap, compelling his adversary to halt and deploy—finally, in one supreme effort, throwing his entire division athwart the Confederate front, and compelling a dead halt until the Union infantry could reach the extreme head of the column, march around and across the turnpikes and roads, and finally, screened by Custer's cavalry, halt their long dusty columns and form their lines of battle facing eastward—squarely across the Confederates' only way to safety."

During the winter of 1865-66, Custer applied for leave of absence in order to accept command of the cavalry which Juarez was organizing to drive Maximilian out of Mexico. In lieu of this, however, he accepted a commission as lieutenant colonel of the 7th Cavalry.

In November, 1868, he brought the campaign against the Cheyenne Indians to a successful conclusion by defeating Black Kettle at Washita, Indian Territory. This battle, according to General King, "starting vaingloriously with the band blaring Custer's battle song of Garry Owen—closing with the abandonment to their cruel fate of Major Elliott and his flanking party as Custer with-

drew the regiment (7th Cavalry), never again to hold its undivided faith or admiration."

"Then came the episode of his (Custer's) court-martial in Kansas for deliberate absence, and the summary shooting down of deserters in the field—."

In the spring of 1876, Custer was removed from command of the 7th Cavalry by order of President Grant, because he had involved himself in impeachment proceedings against the Secretary of War. This occurred on the eve of the greatest campaign yet undertaken against the Sioux with Custer suffering the additional humiliation of being forbidden to accompany the expedition in any capacity whatever. He was restored to command, however, through the intercession of General Terry, his Department Commander, in time to take the field with General Gibbon.

It appears certain that Custer's frame of mind had been influenced by this episode. Withal, he must have been influenced also by the well-known antipathy toward him of a faction of his regiment.

"Among the troop commanders," writes Colonel W. A. Graham, U.S.A., in his *Story of the Little Big Horn*, "were men who had made brilliant records as leaders of cavalry during the Civil War, and several who had held command of regiments and even of brigades. There existed, unfortunately, much jealousy in the regiment which had become a house divided against itself, separated into Custer and anti-Custer factions. Chief among the latter was Captain Frederick W. Benteen, commander of H Troop; and second only to him was Major Reno."

CUSTER'S TACTICS AGAINST THE INDIANS

At the time of the Little Big Horn, General Custer had spent about nine years on the plains constantly in either peaceful or hostile contact with the Indians. There can be no doubt that he had ample opportunity to learn their powers and limitations.

Just before the Cheyenne expedition in 1868, he writes that, "yesterday my twelve Osage guides joined me, and they are a splendid-looking set of warriors, headed by one of their chiefs called 'Little Beaver.' They are painted and dressed for the war path, and well armed with Springfield breech-loading guns. All are superb horsemen. We mounted them on good horses, and to show us how they can ride and shoot, they took a stick of ordinary cord wood, threw it on the ground, and then, mounted on their green, untried horses, they rode at full speed and fired at the stick of wood as they flew by, and every shot struck the target."

In his report on the battle of the Washita, dated November 28, 1868, General Custer says, "After all the officers had reconnoitered the location of the village, which was situated in a strip of heavy timber, the command (900 men) was divided into four columns of nearly equal strength. One was to attack in the woods from below the village. The second was to move down the Washita and attack in the timber from above. The third was to attack from the crest north of the village, while the fourth was to charge from the crest overlooking the village on the left bank of the Washita. The columns were to charge simultaneously at dawn of day; though some of them had to march several miles to gain their positions, three of them made the attack so near together that it seemed like one charge. The fourth was only a few moments later. The men charged and reached the lodges before the Indians were aware of their presence—

"The Indians left on the ground (103) one hundred and three warriors, including Black Kettle—

"The Kiowas, under Satanta, and Arapahoes, under Little Raven, were encamped six miles below Black Kettle's village. The warriors from these two villages came to attempt the rescue of the Cheyennes. They attacked the command from all sides, about noon—

"Though displaying great boldness, about three o'clock, the cavalry countercharged, and they were driven in all directions and pursued several miles."

Custer reports contact with a large force of Sioux near the junction of the Tongue and Yellowstone Rivers on August 4, 1873. He was leading an exploring party of 90 men of the 7th Cavalry and was several miles from the main column when attacked by Sioux in about five times his strength. The Indians, he says, "were enabled to envelop us completely between their lines, formed in a semi-circle, and the river which flowed at our backs."

The entire party except the horses' holders had been dismounted to fight on foot.

"The fight began at 11:30 A. M. and was waged without cessation until near three o'clock, all efforts of the Indians to dislodge us proving unsuccessful. The Indians had become extremely weary, and had almost discontinued their offensive movements, when my ammunition ran low. I decided to mount the squadron and charge the Indians with the intention of driving them from the field.

He did this, driving them "pell mell for three miles."

In regard to this battle, Custer reported further that, "Many of the warriors engaged in the fight . . . were dressed in complete suits of clothes issued at the agencies to Indians. The arms with which they fought us (several of which were captured in the fight) were of the latest improved patterns of breech loading repeating rifles, and their supply of metallic rifle-cartridges seemed unlimited, as they were anything but sparing in their use. So amply have they been supplied with breech-loading rifles and ammunition that neither bows nor arrows were employed against us."

Again on the 8th, Custer encountered the Sioux on the banks of the Yellowstone, routing them finally by a general assault.

That Custer had acquired respect for the Indian's capacity for rapid surprise attacks is indicated by a letter dated July 15, 1874, in which he says, "In looking for a road, I sometimes get a mile or perhaps two ahead of the command, but I always have seventy or eighty men with me, and after today I mean to take in addition two more companies. I have no intention of getting beyond sight and hearing of the main column. There is an advance guard always, and the Indian scouts at the front and on the flanks."

THE START

We have heard the plan of General Sheridan to subject the Sioux and the enumeration of the forces with which he would execute his plan.

After the final dispositions had been initiated, General Sheridan heard of Crook's (Grey Fox) battle with the Sioux and forthwith he sent couriers to give this information to his columns but these could not deliver their message until six days after the tragedy of the Little Big Horn.

General Terry's column, marching from Fort Lincoln on May 17, 1876, reached the Powder River on June 7. On June 10, Major Reno with six troops of the 7th Cavalry departed on a scouting mission up the Powder

River. The remainder of the column under Custer marched on the mouth of the Rosebud.

A message here from Reno, arriving on June 19, reported that he had not encountered any "hostiles" as far as the Rosebud, but had located a large trail that led toward the Big Horn.

It became apparent later that the Indians, like our bandit foes have done in so many cases, had headed toward "the hills" since the Sioux had marched southwest toward the Big Horn mountains after their contact with Crook.

Terry's column joined Reno at the mouth of the Rosebud on June 21, while Gibbon's force arrived at a camp just across the Yellowstone the same day.

At this time there was little vegetation; the trails were dry and dusty; and many stream beds cut the line of march. Improvised pack trains carried rations and reserve ammunition, with all loads reduced to a minimum with tentage and forage left behind.

Custer, writing from "Mouth of Rosebud, June 21, 1876," says, "They saw the trail and deserted camp of a village of 380 lodges . . . the scouts reported that they could have overtaken the village in one day and a half. I am now going to take up the trail where the scouting party turned back. I fear their failure to follow up the Indians has imperilled our plans by giving the village an intimation of our presence . . . But I feel hopeful of accomplishing great results. I will move directly up the valley of the Rosebud. General Gibbon's command and General Terry, with steamer, will proceed up the Big Horn as far as the boat can go . . . I like campaigning with pack mules much better than with wagons, leaving out the question of luxuries."

THE PLAN

As we have seen, General Crook, unknown to the other columns, had made contact with the Sioux on the Rosebud on June 18th. Apparently there was no scheme for liaison between him and Terry.

On June 21, after receiving Reno's report, General Terry laid out the following plan to Gibbon and Custer:

Gibbon would proceed south along the Big Horn River about 50 miles to the west, while Custer would ride south up the Rosebud until he reached the trail Reno had found. If this trail led to the valley of the Little Big Horn, Custer was only to send scouts over it; to proceed with his company to the headwaters of the Tongue, thence to swing west and north in order to cooperate with Gibbon in the vicinity of the Little Big Horn Valley on June 26th.

As we have seen already, Custer did not carry out his part of this plan. He appeared obsessed throughout, even to the hour of contact, with the belief that the Sioux were running away.

When he said good bye to Terry and Gibbon, Gibbon said, "Now Custer, don't be greedy, but wait for us."

Custer answered, "No, I will not."

On the evening of the first day's march, Custer informed his officers that he believed that not to exceed a thousand or fifteen hundred warriors would be met and that he intended to pursue until he caught them.

"He expressed the utmost confidence," wrote General Terry June 27, 1876, "that he had all the force that he could need, and I shared his confidence . . . I offered Custer the battery of Gatling guns but he declined it saying that it might embarrass him: that he was strong enough without it."

Custer left his sabers behind. It was generally believed that the Indians had a horror of the "long knife" in the hands of aggressive troops.

As far back as 1857, the Cheyennes attacking in force, had been routed summarily by the 1st Cavalry in Kansas Territory with a saber charge unsupported by fire.

Whether or not Reno, or Reno and Benteen, or Custer might have altered their respective courses of battle with the saber must be left, however, to mere conjecture.

Custer's men were armed with the .45 caliber single shot Springfield rifle and the six-shot revolver. Each man carried 100 rounds of rifle and 24 rounds of pistol ammunition. The Sioux, as already related, had magazine rifles. It was officially reported that rifles were picked up on Custer's battlefield in which empty cartridges were stuck in the chamber with the rims cut through by the extractor.

Rain in the Face, who admitted cutting out the heart of Tom Custer, the General's brother, said, "We were better armed than the Longswords. Their guns wouldn't shoot but once. The thing would not throw out the empty cartridge shells."

THE FINAL MARCH

Now General Terry had developed his plan on the basis of Custer's estimated route of movement, thirty miles daily average. How well he planned is attested by Gibbon's arrival on the scene of the Little Big Horn in the morning of June 27th. Custer had cut his route short, however. He marched twelve miles the first day, June 22. Thirty miles were covered by 5:00 P. M. the second day. On the 24th, the lodgepole trails became more pronounced and after marching twenty-eight miles, Custer halted at sundown for supper. He resumed the march at 9:30 P. M. heading toward the divide between the Rosebud and the Little Big Horn. Shortly after 9:00 P. M., Custer had informed his officers that the scouts had reported the Sioux trail leading across the divide into the valley of the Little Big Horn. He announced that he wished to get as near the divide as possible by daybreak when he would conceal the command, locate the Indian camp, and plan to attack it at dawn of the 26th.

At 2:00 A. M. of the 25th, the column again halted after marching about ten miles through intense darkness. Custer desired further news from Lieutenant Varnum who, in command of the scouts, had gone to a high point on the divide known as the Crow's Nest from which the Little Big Horn valley was visible.

Soon after daylight, Custer received a message from Varnum reporting that the village had been located. A little after 8:00 A. M., the column moved cautiously upon the Crow's Nest. Custer hastened ahead to observe in person and rejoined his command when it arrived within a short distance of the divide. He told his officers here that the scouts said the village lay ahead but that he had not seen it and doubted if it were there although the chief of the scouts had told him he could see it plainly about fifteen miles away.

Now a sergeant going back along the trail in search of a box of hard bread and a bag which had fallen from a pack during the night found a small party of Sioux examining these articles. When they saw the sergeant, approaching they rode off toward the valley.

While Custer was going to the Crow's Nest, another small party of Sioux were discovered observing the column and fresh pony tracks in a nearby ravine indi-

cated that a large party had been nearby.

Custer's fear that the Indians would escape him reasserted itself here. He believed that the presence of his column had been disclosed to the Sioux and that further concealment were futile. After leading the regiment across the divide, he halted at 12:07 P. M., formed in battalions and prepared for action.

Custer had been assigned originally as only the Lieutenant Colonel of the 7th Cavalry but the Colonel and two majors were away on detached duty. This left him and Major M. A. Reno the only field officers in the regiment.

To Major Reno, Custer assigned three troops numbering together about one hundred and twelve men. Three troops numbering one hundred and twenty-five men were assigned to Captain Benteen while Custer in person took command of five troops aggregating about two hundred twenty-five men in strength. One troop was detailed to escort the pack train. Each of the other eleven troops detailed a non-commissioned officer and six privates to the pack train, each private to lead two pack mules. The pack train, therefore, absorbed about one hundred and twenty-eight men.

The scene of the fight is near the station of Garryowen, Montana, on the C. B. & Q. Railroad. It is about 65 miles southeast of Billings, about 160 miles from the North Dakota and about 35 miles from the Wyoming Boundary. The 7th Cavalry was about 15 miles northeast of this spot when Custer made the groupings of the regiment.

About 12:15 P. M., Custer ordered Benteen to proceed with his battalion on a direction of march about 45 degrees to the left of the route of the regiment, to scout the bluffs about seven miles distant, "to pitch into anything he might find," and report to Custer. Then, twice during the first few minutes of Benteen's march, Custer sent him orders which provided in case he saw nothing "to go on in the same direction to the valley beyond, and, if he still found nothing, to the next valley." So broken was the terrain here that Benteen's detachment had disappeared from view within ten minutes from his departure.

About 2:15 P. M. a heavy dust cloud was seen across the Little Big Horn about five miles away and a party of about forty Sioux were discovered between the troops and the river apparently in flight downstream. Custer ordered his Indian Scouts to pursue but they refused to go.

This reaction of the scouts will no doubt recall to many Marines the interest our native adherents suddenly develop for the pack train at the moment of contact either real or anticipated.

At this time Custer and apparently all his command believed that all the Indians were fleeing.

Reno was then coming up with his detachment. Cooke, the Adjutant, met him saying, "General Custer directs that you take as fast a gait as you deem prudent, and charge afterward, and you will be supported by the whole outfit."

Benteen now was probably eight or ten miles away on the left rear.

Reno proceeded at a fast trot to the river, three miles away, which he crossed at 2:30 P. M. with Custer then about three-quarters of a mile behind.

As Reno's Indian scouts reached the stream they pointed out to Girard, the interpreter, that the Sioux were coming upstream in force to meet Reno. Girard galloped back on the trail, overtook Cooke to whom he

gave this information, and Cooke promised to deliver the report at once to Custer.

Reno halted in a fringe of woods beyond the stream crossing, to form his detachment for action and sent an orderly to report to Custer that the Indians were in force on his front.

As Reno moved out in combat formation, the Sioux stirred up a heavy dust cloud to screen their preparations to meet him. They next threatened Reno's left which he had intrusted to his Indian scouts. These fled instantly upon the approach of the Sioux leaving Reno's left in the air.

The Sioux in the meantime had massed before Reno's one hundred and twelve men a strength greater than their entire number had been estimated originally. About a quarter of a mile from the south end of the village, Reno dismounted to fight on foot thus abandoning the initiative to the Sioux.

He stood off the Sioux for perhaps fifteen minutes here; then, pivoting on his right, he fell back about three-eighths of a mile toward the river into a position along the edge of the timber which bordered the stream. There he fought for about a half hour with the Sioux gradually surrounding him.

Although Reno now had lost only one man, he decided to evacuate his position. As he gave the command "Mount," a party of Sioux broke through the timber firing upon him point blank. Reno ordered his men to dismount then immediately again to mount and led away at a gallop toward the ford where he had crossed the river. He left seventeen men behind in the woods.

The Sioux gave way ahead but pressed his right so firmly that he was forced into the river where there was no ford, a mile short of his objective.

It is interesting to note here that Reno's second position was about three miles in a direct line from Custer's battle ground. He covered more than two miles in his retreat to the next position he chose for defense in a direction generally opposite to that in which Custer was marching when last seen.

Every soldier can well afford to consider these features: in the forty-five minutes of fighting in position, Reno lost only one man killed—between the beginning of his flight and his arrival on the far bank of the river, a distance of less than a mile and a half, the Sioux killed three officers and twenty-nine men; wounded seven men; and forced a number into the timber along the river. These casualties, remember, were inflicted upon a force which originally numbered only one hundred and twelve. That Reno had lost his head completely before his rout began can hardly be doubted; yet, in fairness to him, it must be admitted that he was governed to some extent by the approaching exhaustion of his ammunition.

Custer's pack train apparently carried a heavy ammunition reserve but it was now several miles in rear. In fact, it was after five o'clock when the last mules of the train arrived at the position to which Reno fled.

The pack train was improvised for this particular expedition which is exactly what we Marines have been required to do on every expedition in which we have penetrated the interior to any extent. We may assume that Custer, like ourselves, did not have such pack equipment as would permit his mules the mobility of his mounts. Our Cavalry today have pack equipment, however, which carries its load securely at any gait of which the animal is capable—so should we. At the Little Big Horn, the presence of a few mules loaded with ammuni-

tion might have altered materially the fate of Custer and Reno. Certainly since they were to depend on firearms only, it would at least have been prudent to have an ammunition reserve close at hand.

THE ATTACK ON CUSTER

According to the estimate of Colonel W. A. Graham, U.S.A., who was Judge Advocate of the Court of Inquiry which sat on this case in 1879, Custer was attacked by Crazy Horse and Gall about 3:45 P. M. Reno arrived in his last defensive position about 4:00 P. M. This position is about four miles in a direct line from Custer's battlefield.

While Reno was crossing the river in his retreat, many of the Sioux forded upstream with the manifest purpose to encircle him but abandoned this mission to ride furiously downstream. Only a small force of Indians remained to keep passive contact with Reno.

Red Horse, a Sioux Chief, stated some years later that all the Sioux strength struck Reno and Custer in turn. Heavy continuous firing to the northwest had been heard by Reno's men while arriving on the hill where he assembled.

Benteen joined Reno on this hill shortly after Reno's detachment arrived there, some time between 4:00 and 4:30 P. M. Benteen had decided there was no good in the errand on which Custer had sent him and cut back to the line of march. He had covered about fifteen miles when about 3:30 P. M. he struck its trail. While moving along this trail, he caught glimpses of Custer's gray horse troop along the bluffs above the river. He had received the message ending in "P. S. Bring Paces" about 4:00 P. M. Trumpeter John Martin who delivered this message said the Indians were "skedaddling." Sergeant Kanipe of Tom Custer's troop had arrived before Martin with an order to the pack train to "hurry up the packs."

Benteen rode to the sound of guns, joining Reno instead of Custer. He showed Custer's message to Reno who had run to meet him, dismounted and breathless, shouting, "For God's sake, Benteen, halt your command and help me. I've lost half my men."

While speculating on Custer's whereabouts, two distinct volleys were heard. Lieutenant Weir went to Reno and Benteen insisting that they move to Custer's relief. He made off with his company alone while Reno waited for all the pack train to arrive. Reno and Benteen reached Weir about 6:00 P. M. The Sioux swarming upstream ran Reno back to the hill and besieged him.

It has been surmised that these two volleys were a last extremity distress signal. Even if Reno now had acted instantly and had proceeded toward Custer with all possible speed, it appears doubtful that he could have arrived in time to help.

The position of Custer's battlefield shows that he had moved about five miles downstream after he parted finally from Reno; apparently with the intention to strike the Indian village in the flank or rear.

It has been said of Custer that he acted upon his instincts or hunches rather than upon information. Like Napoleon, he believed strongly in his luck.

On the third day at Gettysburg, he delayed executing an order to move his brigade to Meade's left and, remaining in place, neutralized Stuart's move upon the Federal rear. Later, at Broad Run, he protested Kilpatrick's orders to pursue Stuart and delayed movement sufficiently long to avoid an ambush planned by Stuart and Fitz Lee.

It appears that he acted largely upon hunch at the Little Big Horn. Martin, the trumpeter, has stated he heard Custer tell Cooke that he would bring up Benteen and put him in the center while he attacked the rear. At this time, the Indians had been reported moving upstream out of the village in large numbers but Custer was abreast the north end of the village downstream when he made contact.

Rain-in-the-Face, a Sioux chief who is believed to have made good at the Little Big Horn an earlier boast that he would cut out the heart of Captain Tom Custer, the General's brother, said, "We knew they made a mistake when they separated. Gall took most of the Indians up the river to come in between them and cut them off . . . We saw them trotting along and let them come in over the bluffs. Some of our young men went up the gulley which they had crossed and cut them off from behind. Then we showed our line in front and the Longswords charged. They reeled under our fire and started to fall back. Our young men behind them opened fire. . . . All dismounted and every fourth man held the ponies. Then we closed all around them. We rushed like a wave does at the sand out there—(This interview occurred at Coney Island)."

It is believed that Custer was first struck by Gall from the south. The bodies as left on the field make it apparent that Calhoun's troop "covered" and was wiped out—Keogh's troop then thrown in while Custer formed a dismounted line along the ridge of Custer Hill.

While Calhoun was being annihilated, Gall rolled up Custer's left; Crazy Horse enveloped his right. Custer was soon surrounded completely.

Comanche, Keogh's charger, wounded and bloody, bridle and blanket gone and the saddle turned under his belly, was the only creature of Custer's detachment left alive on that field; none other was ever seen again.

RENO'S DEFENSE

According to Rain-in-the-Face, lack of unity in Sioux command was all that saved Reno and Benteen from Custer's fate. Sitting Bull claimed his big medicine won the victory: Gall insisted that his fighting did it and their respective partisans took sides.

In the meantime, the Americans worked deep into the night to strengthen their position. They formed an oval below the crest of the hill with their animals picketed in a depression in the center. Benteen occupied the key position.

At 2:45 in the morning of the 26th, the Sioux attacked from all sides, concentrating upon Benteen. Reno reluctantly reinforced him with one company. Benteen charged and scattered the Indians from his front. He went then to Reno urging him to do likewise on his front. Reno hesitated; Benteen insisted; and, finally, "Reno lying flat upon the ground at Benteen's feet, told him that, 'If he could see the Indians, to give the order.'"

Four companies dashed forward just in time to scatter a large body of Indians gathering for a rush and returned to their trenches without losing a man.

Reno and Benteen had suffered on the hill eighteen men killed and fifty-two wounded and their ammunition was running low when shortly after noon of the 26th the Indians began to withdraw. The approach of General Terry's column had been reported by the Sioux scouts.

Terry and Gibbon relieved Reno the morning of the 27th. Over fifty-one per cent of the 7th Cavalry were dead or wounded.

SOME ANALOGIES FROM THE LITTLE BIG HORN

Custer had little information on which to base his actions, a condition which we Marines have had to face in all our small wars. While he knew that the Sioux had concentrated, he did not know that they were determined to fight. Communication between the Army forces in the field depended solely upon mounted messengers, who, riding through hostile territory, had perforce to proceed with caution.

Although we have in aircraft and radio an advantage undreamed in those days, we are withal handicapped by the difficulty in finding from the air ground elements marching through thick country in rainy seasons: of equipping numerous detachments with radio.

Thus in our Nicaraguan expedition, there were many cases where periods of twelve to twenty-four hours elapsed between the time a detachment made contact with the enemy and the arrival of that information to the nearest friendly troops. While this was not as bad as the period of nearly two weeks required for the news of General Cooke's fight on the Rosebud to reach General Terry, it is nevertheless ample for the annihilation of a small detachment.

From our point of view, Custer's premature split up of his regiment is not to be condemned utterly. We have been forced to similar measures in every banana war we have fought. He believed that he could encounter not more than fifteen hundred Indians—he couldn't know that he was to meet the largest body of hostiles ever assembled on the plains. Then, as we have had it proved to us, he believed a contact unlikely unless he converged from at least three different directions. We know that the bandit, the gavillero, or the Caco, when he isn't ready to fight, cannot be hit unless so many columns converge upon him as to break down his own intelligence system. In order to get such numbers of detachments around our bandit, we have had to break up proportionately into smaller groupings than Custer did.

It is hard to reconcile the status of fire power in Custer's regiment with Custer's experience. We have seen from his own report that nearly three years before the Little Big Horn, he found the Sioux armed with superior type weapons; amply supplied with ammunition. Why wasn't it known beforehand that many of his rifles would "shoot only once"?

We found bandits in Nicaragua equipped with machine guns and automatic weapons. This was almost as radical a departure from our Haitian and Dominican experiences as must have been the Indians' shift from bows and arrows. We quickly increased our fire power—we wonder why Custer didn't.

Moreover, he left his sabers behind—gave up a weapon the Indians were alleged to fear greatly. Odd as this may appear for a cavalryman, it was perhaps a step toward reducing weight, a sacrifice to mobility. In Santo Domingo our foot detachments often left their bayonets in the barracks for they believed that the gavilleros would never stand until they could approach into bayonet range. Our mounted companies in Santo Domingo and in Nicaragua carried no cutting or thrusting weapon. These practices by mounted and dismounted detachments are believed to be an error: every man should have a weapon which cannot run out of ammunition.

Now Custer left his sabers behind and he also declined the offer of three Gatling guns. He expressed the fear that they might embarrass him—cut down his

mobility. Perhaps of all lessons from experience the one we resist the most consistently is that when irregulars do not choose to fight, regulars find it practically impossible to force an engagement. We seek always to secure mobility equal or superior to that of the irregular to run him down and corner him—we rarely, if ever, succeed. It is rare that we catch him napping. Almost always, we fight him, if at all, upon the ground that he has chosen. Our Indian fighters likewise strove for the highest mobility trying to strike before the hostiles could separate and slip away.

"The rapidity of the hostile movements, which arises partly from the freedom from impedimenta and partly from the singular marching power which are characteristics of irregular warriors," says Colonel Callwell in his *SMALL WARS*, "prejudices the course of the campaign to their great benefit. . . The regular army finds that some mysterious influence will on occasion draw down great hosts of angry foemen to give it battle, but these hosts melt away and vanish when their design miscarries. Restricted by no precedents, governed by no strategic code, embarrassed by no encumbrances, they come and go at will."

Since we but rarely may force a fight surely we should have the heaviest practicable fire power available when the irregular attacks. We, like Custer, have

often begged away from our superiors' offers of machine guns or trench mortars when taking the field. We believed them unnecessary and we didn't want to be bothered with them and now as we look back on the Little Big Horn and our own little bandit engagement, we like to think how different it might have been if in either case the old man's offer had been accepted. With the Gatling guns in or near a pivot of maneuver and the rest of the 7th Cavalry in the envelopment: with the trench mortar to reach onto and behind that ridge; how much might have been done.

But of all the lessons of the Little Big Horn, let us remember how Reno lost only one man fighting forty-five minutes in his first and second positions but in a period probably of ten minutes, running away, he lost thirty-two killed and seven wounded. While defending on the hill using fire only, he and Benteen with probably three hundred and twenty-seven effectives had eighteen killed and fifty-two wounded. And also let us remember that Benteen broke up two attacks by sorties and returned to the trenches without losing a single man.

Here, history adds another instance to a column of examples to show that the irregular when receiving instead of delivering is a horse of an entirely different color.



Red Cloud



John Philip Sousa

The Marine Band—The Washington Post

BY CHIEF PAY CLERK HARRY H. THOMPSON, U.S.M.C.

■ Very recently there was printed in the *Sunday Star*, from the pen of an old friend of this writer, Mr. John Clagett Proctor, an article entitled "Marine Band History and Its Leaders." It included the mention, in an incomplete form, of an incident in the regime of Francisco Fanciulli as Leader, the incident occurring on Memorial Day, 1897, and resulting in Fanciulli's arrest, subsequent trial by summary court-martial, and later the severance of his relations with the Marine Band and the Marine Corps. Mr. Fanciulli succeeded John Philip Sousa as Leader on November 1, 1892, and served five years. He was reputed to be, and doubtless was, one of the most thorough musicians ever heading the Marine Band, but the fact that he followed the ever popular and beloved John Philip Sousa was, in a way, a distinct handicap to Fanciulli's success. He found there was a genuine regret in Marine Corps circles and in the community of the National Capital that the Marine Corps found itself unable to hold the services of John Philip Sousa as the Leader of the Marine Band. Mr. Sousa had left the Corps for fame and for fortune, much to the keen regret of all our officers of those days. A leading Washington daily had this to say with regard to his separation from the Marine Corps:

"'Chicago will want the White House next.' The remark was made this noon in the Senate restaurant by one of a group of Senators and newspaper correspondents who were discussing pie, milk and Chicago's attempt to capture Sousa, the leader of the Marine Band. The news that Chicago was negotiating with the leader caused not so much surprise as

regret. The people of Washington would receive with equanimity the news that Chicago had determined to introduce a bill to remove the Capitol of the nation to her capacious limits or to annex the present capital. But they are not prepared to witness the attempt to deprive them of the able and popular leader of the Marine Band and are very much exercised over the prospect of losing him."

Sousa's popular marches, appealing as they did to the Marine Corps and to the general public, had stirred the marines in those days as they ever since have moved us and the public. In the years that followed Mr. Sousa's departure it was rarely, if ever, that we heard the Marine Band play any of the Sousa marches—this was the condition that brought about the incident that Mr. Proctor has mentioned. The principal actors in the drama have now passed to their great reward. This writer enjoyed a personal acquaintance with all of them. The complete story has never been printed. For the sake of history this account has been written to record the interesting facts.

On Memorial Day, 1897, a battalion of marines commanded by First Lieutenant Herbert L. Draper, U.S. M.C., attached to the Navy Yard, Washington, D. C., participated with the Marine Band under Leader Fanciulli in a parade, the principal feature of the many patriotic observances of that day. As the parade came up Pennsylvania Avenue, approaching the *Evening Star* building, Lieutenant Draper directed his Adjutant, Second Lieutenant Louis J. Magill, to have the Marine Band play one of the Sousa marches, "*The Washington Post*."

The Adjutant returned to report that the Band Leader would play a different march than what they were then playing, but that the Leader of the Band reserved to himself, as a musician, the right to make the selection. Lieutenant Draper promptly directed the Adjutant to carry out his order which was that the Marine Band should play "The Washington Post," adding that if the Leader would not carry out the order he, the Adjutant, should place him under arrest and return him to the Marine Barracks. The Adjutant complied with this order; the parade passed in front of the Washington *Star* building on Pennsylvania Avenue playing under Larsen, the Second Leader, Sousa's famous march, "The Washington Post," while Mr. Fanciulli, under arrest, escorted by a sergeant, was returned to the Marine Barracks, Washington, D. C. It was the first time in five years the fame of Sousa had been so honored. The incident necessarily attracted some attention. The parade continued, the Draper battalion passing along the route of march, with the Marine Band, under Second Leader Larsen, leading the Memorial Day Parade.


The following day an article appeared in the Washington *Star* descriptive of the incident. While that account mentioned that Mr. Fanciulli had said he was ready to play whenever and wherever he was ordered, he reserved the right to select the music himself, the account placed Lieutenant Draper in no favorable light. An editorial also appeared in that issue commenting upon the incident and referring to Lieutenant Draper as "a popinjay officer." That editorial was printed under the caption "A MIGHTY MARINE." It reads in part as follows:

"It is hard for the average citizen to understand how the training enjoyed by an officer in the Marine Corps should especially fit him to pass judgment on musical matters. The arrest yesterday of Professor Fanciulli because his idea of the proper selections for the Marine Band on Decoration Day did not agree with the ideas of the petty popinjay officer in command would seem to show, however, that there is a hitherto unsuspected musical course through which Marine Corps officers are put. * * * It is presumed that after Professor Fanciulli was relieved, Lieutenant Draper had full swing in the choice of music. * * * John Philip Sousa left the Marine Band primarily because he found a constant friction between military and artistic ideas of music. The same friction seems to exist at present."

Lieutenant Draper was not the type of officer to remain inactive under such an imputation. The following day he appeared at the offices of that newspaper in the Washington *Star* building. He was unknown to any of the staff. He handed in his visiting card; asked to see someone in authority. In his pocket he had clippings of the news item and the editorial. He was passed from person to person. None could handle his business. Finally he arrived at the office of Mr. Crosby Noyes, then the publisher and proprietor of the Washington *Evening Star*. Mr. Victor Kauffman, still living, and still connected with the Washington *Evening Star*, guarded that door. To him Lieutenant Draper stated the nature of his mission. Mr. Kauffman stepped in Mr. Noyes' office, arranged for the interview and ushered Lieutenant Draper to the presence of Mr. Noyes.

Lieutenant Draper then said, "Mr. Noyes, I am here to ask you as the proprietor of the *Star* to read these clippings from your issue of yesterday." After Mr. Noyes had read the clippings, Lieutenant Draper said, "I am that popinjay officer your paper refers to. But I came not so much to complain of that, but to ask of you, Mr. Noyes, one or two questions." "All right," said Mr. Noyes, "state them." "First," said Draper, "do you

think that I look like such a person as a popinjay officer is supposed to be?" Mr. Noyes, smiling, said, "Why no, Mr. Draper, you certainly don't appear as such to me." Lieutenant Draper then said, "Thank you, Mr. Noyes, and now for my next question. There are rare occasions, Mr. Noyes, when you yourself might want a particular lead or article or news item written and printed in your issue. You might even write out such a copy in your own way. Now, assuming that such should arise and your copy is sent to the proper people under you, say the copy editor or the men in the composing room or in some other branch of your publishing staff. Some subordinate there does not like what you have written. He



First Lieutenant Herbert L. Draper, U.S.M.C., 1897

sends word to you to that effect and refuses to perform his usual functions in relation to the printing of your article. What I want to know, Mr. Noyes, my question is, do you have your way or does he have his? What do you do?" Mr. Noyes, still smiling, promptly answered, "Why, Lieutenant Draper, I have my way, of course. He is either suspended from duty or discharged. Someone else takes his place and carries out my orders." Then Lieutenant Draper said, "Mr. Noyes, for doing in my field exactly what you say you would do in yours in the same circumstances your paper brands me before the public as that popinjay officer you now say I am not." "And now, Mr. Noyes," said Lieutenant Draper, "neither you nor I are much concerned over the jealousies of musicians. It is a fact, though, that the Sousa marches are very inspiring. The people of Washington and we marines have missed them. For five years we have never heard the Marine Band play them. We marines once ap-

peared to better advantage in our parades when the Sousa marches were played. Nor are we, Mr. Noyes, concerned over what might be termed jealousies, I would say rivalries, that some time obtain, say, between newspapers. I think the *Washington Star* a better newspaper than the *Washington Post*. And had it been left to me when Sousa wrote his most inspiring and wonderful march, I would have done all I could to have had it named "The *Washington Star*." But because he named it "The Wash-



FRANCISCO FANCIULLI
Leader of the Marine Band
1892 - 1897

ington Post," and because musicians are temperamental, sometimes jealous of each other's fame, I don't think you ought to have me remain branded before the public of this community as a "popinjay officer." And so, Mr. Noyes, I come to my third question, do you think that I should continue so to stand before the public of this National Capital?" Mr. Noyes called in Mr. Victor Kauffman and turned Lieutenant Draper over to him, saying, "Victor, you have got to see Mr. So and So and straighten this thing out. Lieutenant Draper must now be put before the public in his proper light; I commend him to you in the most favorable terms."

In the subsequent news items appearing in the columns of the *Evening Star* covering the Fanciulli-Draper incident, the account of the trial by court-martial of Mr. Fanciulli for refusing to obey the orders of his superior officers and for disrespect thereto, Lieutenant Draper and

his adjutant were not treated unfairly. Nor was there any failure by the Marine Corps authorities to give them all proper support.

From this incident a friendship became established between Lieutenant Draper and Mr. Victor Kauffman that continued until Draper's death in 1901. Lieutenant Draper rendered distinguished service in the Spanish-American War, where he served as Adjutant of the Marine battalion, commanded by Colonel Robert W. Huntington, at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. He later commanded the marines operating in and about Subig Bay in the Philippines. While enroute home from command of the Marine Barracks, Naval Station, Olongapo, Philippine Islands, having been invalidated, enervated from prolonged tropical duty, Captain Draper died on board a steamer in Hong Kong harbor on September 19, 1901.

The march "The *Washington Post*" was written by John Philip Sousa in 1889, a few years before Mr. Sousa left the Marine Corps. He has this to say with respect to this composition:

"I sold this famous tune to a Philadelphia publisher for thirty-five dollars. I have smiled almost incredulously many a time at proofs of the world popularity of that march. It seems there is no getting away from it—even in the fastnesses of a Borneo jungle! Major Coffin of the Army, told me that one day as he was walking through a forest in Borneo he heard the familiar sound of a violin and suddenly came upon a little Filipino Boy, with his sheet of music pinned to a tree, diligently working away on THE WASHINGTON POST. As for more conventional places, the wild-fire spread with even greater vigor. When I went to Europe I found that the two-step itself was called a 'Washington Post' in England and Germany, and no concert I gave in Europe was complete without the performance of that march. It was the rage, too, in staid New England, for an orchestra leader in a New England town declared that, at one ball, the only obstacle to his playing the thing twenty-three times was the fact that there were only twenty-two dances on the programme. Even during the recent World War its cadences clung. One of our soldiers told me that he had stopped for a drink of water at a little house in a French village and the old peasant who came to the door invited him in and, learning that he was an American, immediately commanded his little girl to play some American music for the guest. The child obliged—with THE WASHINGTON POST."

Very recently, after forty years of absence from the Marine Corps, years that brought to John Philip Sousa the homage of all peoples of the world, we received him back, but not in the mortal flesh. His remains lay in state in that Band Room of the Marine Band at our barracks in southeast Washington for twenty-four hours before his funeral services, where thousands of Washingtonians paid their silent respect to the memory of that great soul. He was immortalized by the inspiring music he has left behind. Mr. Gene Buck, President, American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers, Mr. Sousa's life long friend, left with our Commandant this tribute to the Marine Corps in appreciation of this act of devotion on our part:

"Permit me to express to you the gratitude of myself and the members of this Society for the beautiful carrying out of the funeral services of my old, affectionate friend and colleague, John Philip Sousa.

"It was a thoughtful and lovely deed to remove the remains of this great composer and friend of the Marines, from the dreary undertaking establishment to the Band Room at the Barracks.

"Sousa was a gentle, kindly, gifted and great man. He brought honor to the Marine Corps, which you have the privilege of leading, to the nation and to the world of music and those of us who had the rare privilege of enjoying his friendship.

"A thousand thanks, sir, for your graceful, dignified and unforgettable tribute to his memory."

The Legion in Morocco

By COLONEL FRANK E. EVANS, U.S.M.C.



The Legion Celebrates Bastille Day in Morocco

■ It was thirty-three years ago when France entered upon her Moroccan adventure. The story of that enterprise is worth while recounting, and should be of special interest to the Marine Corps, for in that land of tropical days and biting nights, the troops in the field have as their theater of war rugged mountains, canyons and swift-flowing streams, or great stretches of desert. In such a difficult terrain mobility of a high order is vitally essential to success, and it is only natural that in its thirty-odd years of almost incessant campaigning a force must develop to a high degree of perfection mobility as reflected in its organization, tactics, equipment, arms and communications. The great Riff campaign of 1925-1926 was also destined to leave an indelible imprint on the French Metropolitan Army. Today all elements of the troops in Morocco are operating under a considerable modification of organization and tactics imposed on them by the conditions of warfare in that colony. Officers of the Metropolitan Army, as the army in France is known, seek a "stage" or tour of two years in Morocco, for such a tour is practically a prerequisite to military advancement. In all truth the coming leaders of the French Army will be the product of Moroccan service as truly as the playing fields of Eton gave England her leaders. The modifications that Moroccan service has imposed on the French Army have been clearly planned, and it is the hope of the writer to present them in a future article.

This article is designed to give a background in sketching the campaigns that have been waged in Morocco since 1899, and which are still in progress. Since the Foreign Legion has fought in every one, and was the only body of white troops in the earlier campaigns, the story of the Le-

gion in Morocco is to a great extent the story of France's military activities in the colony. Whether the Legion has acted alone, fought alongside of native troops, or as a unit in the forces of Lyautey and Petain, it has always been the spearhead, always entrusted with the most difficult missions. The present almost complete pacification of Morocco could never have reached its present stage without the Legion for, not only in battle, but prior to and succeeding all important operations, it was always the Legion that built strong posts and occupied them, that drove roads and trails through the trackless mountains, making it possible to launch the offensive that carried the tricolor deeper into the invaded districts.

Pierre MacOrlean, in his excellent book on the Spanish and French Foreign Legions, "Les Compagnons de L'Aventure," has summed up the Legion's Moroccan adventure in the following words:

"It is to Morocco that the Foreign Legion has given to the extreme bounds of sacrifice its true limit and all the resources of its personality. One finds it wherever the combat is pitiless and often without any other issue than that of death. They speak little of the losses suffered there by the Legionnaires. They know that they will make the sacrifice and that sacrifice is accepted naturally. The Legion knows how to die without publicity. It is, perhaps, an error, that too great modesty of that troop, for even to the present day it is still poorly known by the greater part of France. Make known the true worth of the Legion and you make known the spirit of French colonization which, to my mind, is incomparable."



The Relief of a Battalion Post of the Legion

THE MOROCCAN ADVENTURE BEGINS

France's Moroccan adventure, destined to bring under her domination a veritable empire, and one with a great reservoir of splendid fighting men, began with the occupation of certain important Saharan oases in 1899. For a long stretch of time from that day the battalions of the Legion were the only white troops engaged in the columns whose missions were that of reconnaissance, exploration or punitive in character. The first outstanding feat was the 1140-mile march of 72 days of Colonel Ménétral's column in which two companies of the 2nd Regiment of 9 officers and 400 men took part. At the end of that epic hike, with terrific heat, lack of water and even lack of shoes, only 6 men of the 400 were on the sick list. Escorting camel convoys was one duty assigned the early units, and in 1900 it was recorded that in one column 3,000 of the 4,000 camels perished from lack of water, pasturage and the hard going. By 1901 the capture of the oases was completed and new campaigns were planned. Their story is that of ambushes, skirmishes, flank and rear guard actions against vastly superior numbers of fanatical tribesmen, of bayonet charges, defense of besieged posts, convoy of supply columns to isolated posts and almost incessant actions against the proud tribes that refused submission to either the Sultan of Morocco or the power of France.

Celebrated in the legends of the Legion was the fight at El Mounzar. A platoon of one mounted company and one of the Spahis was convoying one of three echelons of



A Temporary Base Camp in Riff Territory

a supply column to outposts and certain oases. The entire convoy numbered 2,000 men and 3,000 camels. Debouching into the great plain of El Mounzar the tribesmen attacked and the Legion platoon formed in lines to meet the assault. Early in the action Lieut. Selchauhausen, a Dane, was seriously wounded in the melee that followed. He forbade his men to come to his rescue, but they rallied about him to save him from mutilation, falling one by one over his body. Captain Vauchez, in command of the detachment, was shot through the chest, but still exercised command. A second enemy force appeared and by that time the sergeant-major and a majority of the non-commissioned officers were casualties. One section of the Legion, greatly reduced, took position on two rocky salients and its fire proved highly effective. When reinforcements arrived, at the end of eight hours, over 70 per cent of the command had been killed or wounded, its two officers among the killed.

LYAUTEY TAKES COMMAND

Close on the heels of that heroic fight against great odds, Lyautey came to Morocco, fresh from Tonkin and Madagascar where he had learned his trade from Gallieni. He immediately began penetrative moves to the west and north to widen the sphere of French influence. Mounted



Mounted Companies Have Proved Invaluable

companies of the Legion were based on three posts that were natural bastions of the French defensive organization. These, with other units, speedily assured security on an extended front, and the mounted companies, unique in the French Army, soon proved to be an ideal mobile force. That they fought under extreme conditions of heat and cold, was evidenced when one company, caught in a raging blizzard, perished almost to the man.

In 1907 the Moroccan adventure had assumed a new phase. The French, under Lyautey's colonial genius, were now masters of cities, roads had followed the restless hobnails of the Legion and at Casablanca, on the coast, a strong French contingent had landed. What had gone before had had as its objective the assurance of security to caravans in the Sud-Oranais region, but now the occupation of Morocco had definitely begun. There was need of stability on the northern border, of striking deep into enemy terrain and the substitution of solid order for the anarchy that had gripped Morocco for centuries.

THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

European powers were turning uneasy eyes on France's

venture and France faced a double problem—the need of a strong French intervention and the danger of thereby upsetting the delicate equilibrium of Europe. Under the driving genius of Lyautey, she was destined to accomplish her delicate mission in a country given to anarchy and strife.

The new operations began in 1907 with penetrative efforts directed from Algeria limited in effectiveness by difficult terrain and lack of roads. The massacre of French engineers employed on harbor works at Casablanca indicated the Atlantic seaboard as a new theater of operations. On August 7 the first contingent debarked at Casablanca under General Drude.

With two companies of the Legion as his advance guard, General Drude took the field and the rebellious tribes, despite their number, gave ground in a series of bitter attacks. For the remainder of that year and throughout 1908 the newly constituted Marche Regiment under Drude and Aumade took a brilliant role in the columns whose advance steadily widened the occupations, while on the old fronts a similar progress was registered. One of the most important advances was that made in the Tafilalet region to the south of the Grand Atlas region,



Colonel Rollet Decorating Legionnaires

ushered in by an action at Menabha, where one infantry and one mounted company of the Legion, with a loss of one officer killed and three wounded, and ten men killed and fifty-four wounded in hand-to-hand battle, broke the power of the Marabout Moulay Lhassen, inflicted crushing losses on strong raiding harkas, and garrisoned Bou-Denib, now a strong military base. In the eastern sector operations were less active, and mainly confined to reconnaissance, convoy duty and road building. In the western sector active fighting placed a great area under French domination.

THE MARCH ON FEZ

Only when the French held occupied zones, however, was the authority of the Sultan recognized. Beyond those limits the dissident tribes refused to pay taxes and anarchy reigned. Fez was besieged by strong rebel forces and Lyautey despatched three columns from Rabat, the seat of French military authority, to the historic city's aid. Fifteen days later, after a series of sharp engagements, the French entered Fez. Shortly after came an epic fight at Alouana, where a half-company of the Legion, under Captain Labordette was attacked and surrounded in a defile while on a reconnaissance mission.



Legion Company Returning from Punitive Expedition

Labordette was seriously wounded early in the action. His men formed a circle about him and repulsed incessant attacks for five hours, guarding their wounded and their colors until the rest of the battalion arrived and carried the day. In this engagement 29 of the heroic group of 35 were killed, while all of the survivors were wounded. In the overcoat pockets of two of the dead were found the bolts of their Lebel's. True to the traditions of the Legion the two men, at the point of death, had removed them to render their rifles useless to the enemy.

THE CRISIS ARRIVES

The formal establishment of the French protectorate on March 30, 1912, was followed by revolt in Fez with the massacre of its French officers and European civilians. General Lyautey immediately moved his headquarters to Fez. On May 23 the Berbers massed their forces, penetrated through two of the city's gates and were driven out only after sanguinary street fighting. Three days later another attack was repulsed and reinforcements, under command of General Gouraud, administered heavy losses to the rebels.

The first military act of the new protectorate was to establish a covering zone on a wide front and hurry the construction of roads, bridges and posts.

MOROCCO IN THE WORLD WAR

The outbreak of war in Europe created grave difficulties for the Moroccan venture. It made it impossible to reap the fruits of former years and especially those of the last two years. Determined to hold his conquered



A Legion Border Post in Morocco



Roads Following the Penetration Columns

areas, Lyautey fixed his maximum strength at twenty battalions, and received in place of units hurried to France some territorial, or reserve units. Through his masterly employment of his command he not only maintained his hard won ground, but extended it. Repressing revolts stirred up by German agents, he pushed through a comprehensive program of building roads, bridges, posts and bases. Throughout the four years of war, with the Legion as his spearhead, Lyautey carried through his mission. At its end he paid the following tribute to the Legion: "The Legion has been in all my command my troop, my most cherished troop, and during the war from 1914 to 1919 it constituted my first force, my supreme reserve."

The campaign in Morocco was highly unique for the preponderant strength of the six battalions and three mounted companies of the Legion was made up of the allies that were at war with France, fighting for France under the colors of the Legion. Forgotten by the rest of the world Lyautey's troops were constantly in action, with heavy losses on both sides. One of the outstanding of the many bitter hand-to-hand engagements, with the tribes giving battle only when in vastly superior numbers, and typical of the long series, was that of Gaouz on August 9, 1918. A primitive column was sent against a strong enemy harka that had been seriously harassing



A Battalion Advance Guard of Mobile Group

French convoys. contact was followed by a running fight and, at the peak of the clash, the Moroccans infiltrated into the ranks of the Senegalese battalion. The blacks broke in disordered flight. Three times the mounted company of the Legion's contingent, their last rifle grenade exhausted, launched charges into the heart of the melee where Tunisians and Senegalese were weakening fast. Outnumbered ten to one the reckless bravery of these charges drove the Moroccans off. Once more the Legion had won the day and the little column fought its way to safety. Of the mounted company 2 officers were dead, and 50 of its non-commissioned officers and men. Captain Timm, mortally wounded, was rescued from the enemy and was carried out on a mule litter, to receive the Legion of Honor before he died.

MOROCCO AFTER THE ARMISTICE

Armistice Day found Lyautey's heroic battalions firmly entrenched in strategic positions, for Morocco was destined to be the future active theater of war of the French. Four battalions and three mounted companies of the Legion in Morocco were entirely reorganized. Recruits were pouring into the Legion from war-torn Europe. The 3rd Regiment was formed with headquarters at Fez and the old battalions were organized into the new 4th Regiment at Marrakech. The 1st Cavalry Regiment came into being at Saida in Algeria and its squadrons first appeared in Morocco in 1925. Colonel Rollet, born organizer, was laboring like a Trojan at Sidi-bel-Abbes to sow the spirit of the old Legion into the new drafts, and month by month the new Legionnaires made amazing strides to reach the high goal he had set for them.

In 1922 the Legion faced the stern task of reducing the enemy positions in the fortress-like terrain of the Tache de Taza. Three battalions of the Legion were incorporated into each of the two mobile groups assigned this mission, one operating from the north, the other from the south. Always outnumbered by fierce forces—and the world has rarely seen a better fighting man than the Riff or Berber—the work of sector organization moved on slowly. The fighting was at close quarters where only the bayonet, knife and grenade were effective. The Senegalese, despite their gallant record in France, were saved time after time from annihilation by the infiltrating tactics of the tribesmen by the impetuous bayonet charges of the Legion.

In the spring of 1923, under the leadership of Colonel Freydenberg, and later under that of General Poeymirau, the reduction of the Tache de Taza received fresh impetus. The two mobile groups operating from Fez and Meknes were reenforced by a third striking from the south. It was a period of sanguinary fighting, of heavy losses on both sides with ranking officers figuring prominently in the casualty lists. In October the unfavorable weather ended the year's operations, but not until the three concentric groups had effected their function as planned.

All advanced posts were manned by the Legion and the story of that grim winter was one of isolated posts encircled by watchful tribes, pinned to their small area in the Grand Atlas. A winter of incessant ambushes and fierce skirmishes whenever a patrol or working party passed outside the line of barbed wire.

THE MENACE OF ABD-EL-KRIM

The year of 1924 was an uneasy one on the Moroccan

border with reports of unbroken successes against the Spanish forces by Abd-el-Krim's bands of Riffians. Then came the Spanish debacle in which a complete field army was annihilated, its regiments either wiped out or prisoners of the Riffs, its batteries and stores of war captured in immense quantities. Riffian emissaries were inside the French zone, either cajoling or threatening the friendly tribes to revolt, and whipping up the battle-lust of the dissident tribes. The friendly tribes were appealing to Marshal Lyautey for arms and aid, but his hands were tied. The French government was occupied with other matters, and Lyautey's messages for heavy reinforcements went unanswered.

The French posts facing the Spanish zone were cut off by the victorious Riffian hordes, communications to Algeria were severed, and one by one the tribes that had been true to France could see no alternative save to join Abd-el-Krim. The organization of the frontier zone was feverishly hurried and Lyautey pushed a line of small posts to the north of the Overgha River. Fez and other cities were organized for defense against the coming attack. On the front the troops available were assembled in three maneuver groups, the center one covering Fez. The Riffs were not only far superior in number but well armed with rifles, machine guns and grenades, and their captured Spanish batteries commanded by German veterans. The Legion's task was to form the nucleus of columns whose mission was to break through to the rescue or rationing of the beleaguered posts or to dynamite them after all ammunition and stores had been destroyed, and the little garrisons conveyed to safety. In the rear the tribes were rising in a wave of revolt. Only superhuman efforts saved the work of France in Morocco from crushing ruin while Lyautey waited for reinforcements from France. That the Legion rose with its old spirit to its task was shown time after time when, under cover of darkness, complete units joined other columns assigned to the relief of surrounded posts, with the hand-to-hand conflicts that always marked their hazardous return to base.

An exploit that was typical of the spirit that animates the true Legionnaire in battle was recorded at Beni-Rouber. Legionnaire Siegel, with four bullets in his body, and several knife cuts that followed his single hand-to-hand fight with five Riffians, realized that he could not survive that unequal combat. Summoning the last ounce of his strength he threw his rifle clear to his comrades to prevent its capture by the enemy. Still another was that of the company sent to clear a mountain pass of seven canions that had been abandoned and burned by a convoy, with orders to clear the wrecks that were obstructing the road. Under heavy rifle fire from the dominating heights, and following up a Riffian attack with a bayonet counter-attack, the company cleared the road and fought its way back to base.

THE ARRIVAL OF REINFORCEMENTS

Blocked in his efforts to capture Fez Abd-el-Krim concentrated for a drive on Taza with the severance of communications to Algeria as his objective. He also hoped to gain successes that would rally to his side the tribes in that region. His drive was favored by the desertions to his banners of tribes that had in the past fought under the French colors. Again the situation took a grave aspect with many posts cut off or fallen under the weight of his superior numbers. Only the timely arrival of a battalion of the Legion from Algeria



An Isolated Post

reestablished the situation by its heroic work. Through the rest of the year active operations were marked by scattered prodigies of valor performed under the handicaps of a cruel terrain and terrific heat.

Reinforcements began to arrive from France late in August and by the end of September the French forces were organized for a major offensive from a new base of departure that was designed to straighten out the line along the chain of the Riff mountains. To the east the cavalry was massed, supported by several battalions of infantry, including two of the Legion. Torrential rains retarded an intended thrust by this force until September 30. Its series of unbroken successes was finally halted for the winter by unfavorable weather. All along the line the gains had been impressive, however, and from the most advanced posts the troops could see the Spanish camps and the Bay of Alhucemas when the reorganized Spanish force had effected a successful landing against opposition. Two battalions of the Legion returned to Algeria for reorganization while the others were busily strengthening their positions for the coming spring offensive.

Throughout that winter of 1925-26 the French Intelligence Service was active. Abd-el-Krim had fared badly in the fall months and pressure was exerted to whip wavering chiefs into line. In May of 1926 six divisions of Metropolitan troops, Senegalese, Algerian



A Typical Section Blockhouse

Tirailleurs and Moroccans were in the line. All four regiments of the Legion were represented in the various mobile groups. Seasoned Moroccan fighters Marshal Petain counted upon them to stiffen each group for the great offensive. The famous old Moroccan Division, Foch's spearhead in 1918, had two battalions of the Legion formed as a Regiment de Marche. All other divisions had from one to two battalions and two pioneer companies were assigned leading parts. Conferences with the Spanish leaders had led to a well planned co-ordination of effort.

THE OFFENSIVE IS LAUNCHED

On May 8, 1926, the offensive was launched with an irresistible clan. The Spanish troops, attacking at the same time, were hurled back at points but their disposition effectively barred any escape of Abd-el-Krim to the north and east. Abd-el-Krim's power was slowly but surely crumbling under the relentless pressure and unceasing attacks. He attempted flight to the west but hostile tribes attacked and pillaged his convoy. He delivered one desperate attack but the steel-tipped cordon held and on May 26, eighteen days after the general advance, he rode into the camp of the commander of the Moroccan Division and surrendered. The formidable sector of the Tache de Taza still held out. On July 12 a French attack was delivered in force against the two strong tribes that were masters of that sector. For two sanguinary days that battle raged. On the 14th, a day of grenades and bayonet changes, the depletion of ammunition caused a temporary cessation. On the 16th it was renewed, neither side giving or asking quarter and nine days later the subjugation of the heroic tribes was complete.

From Petain's headquarters came the following citation:

"The Legion, by its legendary qualities of coolness, bravery and devotion have remained the finest troops that one could command. Its battalions are remarkable both in attack and defense, compelling the admiration of those who have seen them in action. The greater part of the works that preceded or followed our operations, through their resourceful engineering abilities and their markedly

diverse professions, allowed the High Command to entrust them with the most delicate missions which were always executed with superlative merit."

THE LEGION GOES ON

The shattering of Abd-el-Krim's formidable power was complete, but in the always troubled areas of the south other tribes remained in open and dangerous revolt. In the region of Bou-Denib and on the edges of the Saharan Desert the flank of the caravan routes was under a constant menace of raids. On April 27, 1927, Captain Thomas, commanding a squadron of Legion cavalry, fell at the head of his troops. Another raiding party struck at the escort of General Clavery on his return through the Sahara, and he was numbered among those killed. On October 29 a mounted platoon of the Legion suffered heavy losses in ambush. Other isolated actions took their tolls of the mounted troops.

Meanwhile the bulk of the Legion was carrying on and through 1930 and 1931 was busy consolidating newly conquered ground and driving roads through long hostile country in the Grand Atlas region. It crowned this pioneer work by piercing a tunnel through a mountain of granite at Fom Zabbel, on the route to Aziz. That task finished it chiseled over the entrance a laconic inscription, under its device of the grenade with seven flames, that reads:

"The Mountain Barred The Route.
The Order Was Given To Pass.
The Legion Executed It."

The next step in the long warfare of almost a quarter of a century was the motorization of one of the mounted companies, and assurance of greater security of travel by the mounted companies and squadrons of cavalry. Still in the great oases of the south and in the Grand Atlas, seats of perpetual trouble, the Legion is fighting towards the day when the pacification of Morocco is complete. Morocco is and has been its most fruitful training camp, a camp where mobility is the first principle, and where a fanatical enemy demands soldierly qualities of the highest order.



The Adjutant and Inspector's Department

By BRIGADIER GENERAL RUFUS H. LANE, U.S.M.C.

A lecture delivered by the Adjutant and Inspector of the Marine Corps at the Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, Virginia, January 15, 1932.

■ The subject on which I am to talk to you is the Adjutant and Inspector's Department, a very dry subject, and I fear that anything dry is very unpopular in these days. The work of the Adjutant and Inspector's Department is with the more or less routine activities of the Marine Corps which lack appeal to the imagination, and as important as it is to the welfare and efficiency of the Corps, does not excite a great deal of interest. Unfortunately, the Department has very few handouts which would promote interest in it and advance its popularity, as other departments have. For instance, the Paymaster's Department hands out the pay at times which is most gratifying; the Quartermaster's Department hands out quarters, rations, public property, supplies, transportation; the Personnel Section hands out orders and desirable posts, transfers, and so on. On the other hand, most of the things that come from the Adjutant and Inspector's Department are knocks of one kind or another, and in addition it acquires discredit in many cases of official actions which are not agreeable to the recipients, for which it is not responsible. On the whole the Department not only does not enjoy any degree of popularity in the service, but on the contrary, carries a considerable burden of unpopularity. Nevertheless, the matters which come under its jurisdiction are of great importance to the welfare of the Corps, and the Department should therefore receive the fullest measure of support from the service.

A sketchy account of the Department may be of some interest. Its history dates from the earliest period of the Corps. The Act of July 11, 1793, provided for an Adjutant, and the first one was Captain George Menminger, appointed August 3, 1798. However, somebody must have been laying for him, for he died on August 28. Other officers succeeded to the office until the Act of March 3, 1817, which provided for an Adjutant and Inspector. The first incumbent of that office was Major Samuel Miller. Parke G. Howle seems to have estab-



Brigadier General Rufus H. Lane, U.S.M.C.
The Adjutant and Inspector.

lished a record of continuity in office, he having served from January 1, 1821, to his death, July 17, 1857, a period of 36½ years. That period was characterized by long terms of office, as witness Colonel Commandant Henderson, from 1820 to 1859, and a Commandant of the Navy Yard, Washington, name not recalled, who occupied his office for so long that upon his death he willed the Commandant's House to his son. Major Howle's successor, Henry B. Tyler, went South at the outbreak of the Civil War.

The origin of the title of Adjutant and Inspector may be of some interest. The Act of March 5, 1799, provided an Adjutant and Inspector for the Army, and other acts provided for an Adjutant and Inspector General. Various acts provided also for Adjutants General and Inspectors General who apparently functioned under the Adjutant and Inspector General. The provision for Adjutant and Inspector General of the

Army disappeared in the Act of March 2, 1821, but it is of interest to note that an Adjutant and Inspector General served in the War Department of the Confederate States during the Civil War. It is apparent that the title of Adjutant and Inspector was derived from the Army organization in 1817, and although the title and office were later dropped from the War Department organization, nevertheless, it has continued in the Marine Corps to the present date, which indicates the conservatism of the Department.

The question is often asked as to why the duties of Adjutant and of Inspector are associated in one department, they having no necessary connection with each other. The answer apparently is that while the two functions are not necessarily connected, there is nevertheless no incompatibility in grouping them under one head. Undoubtedly, if the Marine Corps were large enough to justify a separate Adjutant's Department and Inspector's Department, there would be the necessary division into the two departments. However, in a small organization the grouping of various unnecessarily related functions under one head is justified and is common in practice;

witness the Quartermaster's Department in the Marine Corps, which combines under its jurisdiction commissary, subsistence, construction, transportation, supply, ordnance, and other activities.

The duties of the Adjutant and Inspector's Department in the Marine Corps are primarily those of administration. It would be an interesting study to inquire into the genesis of the division of duties at our Headquarters. No doubt the present duties of the Adjutant and Inspector's Department have been considerably curtailed, due to a certain unpopularity of the Department, as referred to before, and also to hostility between the Adjutant and Inspector and the Commandant, which appears to have extended intermittently over considerable periods. There is reason to believe that at certain stages the only communication between the Commandant and the Adjutant and Inspector was by the written word only. No doubt the very long terms of office in a permanent status of Adjutants and Inspectors have contributed to this result. In general it may be said that the present duties of the Adjutant and Inspector include the executive administration, except such as relate to personnel details, transfers, assignment and recruiting. In my opinion a reorganization in this respect is desirable when the time is ripe, which will combine all executive administration under the Adjutant and Inspector, thus reducing duplication of work and promoting efficiency. This I think will be more feasible when a line officer is at the head of the Department instead of a permanent staff officer.

ORGANIZATION

Necessarily the efficient conduct of the large amount of business of the Adjutant and Inspector's Department is dependent upon appropriate organization. Certain principles lie at the base of the present organization, but the practical working structure has necessarily been somewhat adjusted to meet actual conditions which will not admit of classification solely on principle. The basic principle of the organization is functional, and no doubt in a time of considerable expansion of the Corps, as in the World War, it would be practicable to base the working plan almost entirely on these principles.

There are four basic divisions for specific functions. The Division of Office Operations has for its function in general the supply and regulation of the personnel, both civil and enlisted, and of the supply of office space, furniture, stationery and of other necessities. It controls also the office methods and procedure, as well as the provisions for mail and file activities.

The Activities Division has for its function the administration of the various activities which are necessary for the general regulation of the Marine Corps which are not directly concerned with individuals, such as legal matters, legislation, orders, regulations, history, discipline, exchanges and inspections.

The Personnel Administration Division has to do with matters which affect the officers and enlisted men of the Marine Corps in their individual capacities, such as promotions, reductions, retirements, transfers to the Reserve, specialists, discharges, deaths, enlistments, insignia and adjusted compensation.

The Statistics Division is concerned with all general data, such as muster rolls, strength and distribution, Navy Register and Directory and other like matters.

Each of these divisions divides its work into va-

rious sections, the work of which will now be taken up somewhat in detail, to give you an idea of the scope of the work and the way in which it is handled.

The Executive Section, which is presided over by a Chief Clerk, has to do with many matters. It has general supervision over all of the clerical personnel, both civil and enlisted, of the Department. The matter of regulations and administration of the civil personnel is a specialty in itself. The process of appointment, promotion, recording, classification, furlough, pay, and other like matters is extremely complicated and technical, and requires a sound knowledge of law and of procedure in the Navy Department and in the Civil Service Commission. It is charged also with the keeping of the records of enlisted men in the Department and of the preparation of the muster rolls for the entire Headquarters force. The Section is charged also with the matter of allocation of office supplies, of the supply of furniture, stationery, and other necessities. Pay rolls for the entire Headquarters force are made out in the Paymaster's Department upon data furnished by this section. An important function is the administration in regard to office methods, that is, of the relation of the sections among themselves and the method of conducting business. An additional function, which is allotted to this section because of convenience rather than of scientific distribution, is the correspondence in regard to complements of all of the posts and organizations of the Marine Corps. These complements are prepared in the Division of Operations and Training and upon approval of the Major General Commandant, the dissemination of the assigned complements is accomplished.

The function of the Mail Section is to receive all incoming papers and other communications, stamp on them the hour and date of receipt and distribute them to the various departments, divisions and sections of Headquarters, according to their subjects, for the necessary consideration and action. When these matters have all been attended to and action is taken, the correspondence is returned to the Mail Section, which separates the papers for file and is charged with the important function of seeing that the proper papers are forwarded through the mails to those for whom they are intended. The section has a further function, the distribution of circular letters, Marine Corps Orders, Marine Corps Manuals, Headquarters Bulletins and other general publications emanating from the Major General Commandant. Formerly, such orders and publications were sent to the commanding officers for distribution but it was found under this method that in many cases officers did not receive the publications which were intended for them, due to faulty administration in the offices of the various sergeants-major, or for other causes. The present method of distribution is to mail this matter to each officer individually, which has been found to operate much more efficiently. This section also forwards mail for individual officers and men throughout the service which is received at Headquarters. This is a very burdensome task in many cases, due to the fact that there is some tendency on the part of many officers and men and their families to utilize Headquarters as a general forwarding agency. There would be no objection to this procedure if it were practicable to maintain sufficient personnel in the section to insure that distribution would be efficient.

The File Section is charged with the classification and

storage of all retained papers in such manner that they may be readily available at any time in connection with any subject which may come up. All incoming mail is referred to the File Section before distribution to the various desks for the assignment of proper file number in accordance with the classification in effect. Clerks and stenographers in preparing letters, endorsements and other documents enter these numbers on the papers prepared by them so that upon receipt of file copies they may be promptly attached to appropriate file cases. There are 3 general divisions of the files: officers' files, enlisted men's files and general correspondence files. Each officer has 3 cases—military record, correspondence, and orders. The military record case contains such correspondence as fitness reports, letters of commendation, censure, and admonition, and all other like matters which would ordinarily be referred to examining boards for consideration. Nothing goes on this case without the specific direction of the Major General Commandant. The correspondence case contains such matter as may pertain to the individual officer and which is filed thereon for convenience of easy reference, and the orders case contains file copies of all personal orders, intended primarily for the use of the detail section in its work of assignment. Each enlisted man's file contains his enlistment paper, correspondence pertaining to him, his service-record book, and muster roll card after discharge. The general correspondence cases are classified according to subjects, as will most readily afford easy reference in cases of inquiry. These file cases are of great importance not only to the Marine Corps, but to the individual officers and men concerned. All questions involving promotion, retirement, pay, accounting, award of insignia, and innumerable other matters, are dependent upon what is shown in these cases. It is necessary that they be very carefully preserved and that access to them be limited to occasions of official duty in order to avoid loss. Officers' record cases are segregated in a steel cage and the number of officers and clerks who are permitted to consult them is limited to those who may properly be required to do so in execution of official duty. There was a time when access to these cases and others was extremely free and easy. I recall an incident of a casual discussion among junior officers in which the cases of general officers were sent for and freely consulted in order to support or disprove certain contentions which were advanced in a sort of wardroom discussion.

There is a Messenger Section under a leader which is charged with the distribution of all correspondence, and the deposit thereof at the proper desks. Intelligence and a considerable knowledge of the contents of the various papers, and of the organization and procedure of Headquarters are required in order that the many documents may be expeditiously handled and delivered at the proper desk.

A Communication Section has been operating for the past few years for the purpose of securing better coordination of incoming and outgoing dispatches with communication instructions. The Communication Division of the Navy has since its organization become extremely complicated and technical to such an extent that an accurate and technical knowledge of communication instructions is necessary in the handling and preparation of incoming and outgoing dispatches. This tendency to complexity of organization and procedure seems to be a natural evolution of all activities, and is especially char-

acteristic of large organizations. It was found that dispatches prepared on the many desks did not comply in detail with the communication instructions, and the aforementioned section was established for the purpose of calling to the attention of stenographers, clerks, officers and others, the manner in which the prepared dispatches could be so modified or improved as to meet the requirements of the communication service.

There is a Research Section which is charged with legal matters, legislation and like subjects. A great many bills are introduced in Congress which are referred to Headquarters for comment and recommendation, most of which require considerable research and comment based on legal rules and precedents. Many of these bills design to remove disabilities incurred by desertion or discharge not under honorable conditions, with the object of making the subject individual eligible for compensation, pension or other benefits under the law. This section is also charged with the preparation of circular letters, Marine Corps orders, Marine Corps Manual, Navy Regulations and changes therein, as well as in drafting general legislation affecting the Marine Corps, and is available for assistance to all of the Departments, divisions and sections of Headquarters in matters coming under its cognizance. The chief of the section and his assistant are attorneys whose qualifications are of considerable assistance in such matters.

The Historical Section was organized shortly after the World War and is charged with the collection of historical data, the lookup and writing of special historical subjects. It has accumulated quite a mass of historical information with regard to the Marine Corps, which will no doubt be of increasing value as time goes on. Major McClellan is engaged in writing the history of the Marine Corps which when completed will be of the greatest value.

The Discipline Section handles all matters in connection with family support, indebtedness of officers and enlisted men, boards of investigation, courts of inquiry, deck courts, summary courts and general courts. All matters of disciplinary nature in which marines are involved are referred by the Navy Department to the Major General Commandant for his information, recommendation or action, as the case may be. The number of cases of disciplinary nature coming up for consideration is astonishing, and it is deplorable that so much disciplinary action must be taken to preserve the discipline of the Marine Corps. It is a regrettable fact that the number of courts of all kinds in the Marine Corps is all out of proportion to the number for the Navy, as may be verified by examination and analysis of any Navy Department General Court Martial Order. The law throws a great many safeguards around an accused person, and whether all of these are necessary or not is a matter of opinion, but in my judgment these safeguards have become so refined and so technical as to make the administration of justice a process of extreme difficulty. Unfortunately, both in civil courts and in courts-martial able counsel has the power of so dogging up the complex legal machinery as in many cases absolutely to defeat the ends of justice. Law becomes in the hands of these gentlemen an end in itself, not a means for the promotion of justice, which is entirely lost sight of. I regret to state it is my opinion that many of the legal gentlemen of the service use their legal knowledge and skill to conceal the

truth rather than to develop it, for the benefit of their clients, and for their own glory.

The Exchange Section has cognizance of matters pertaining to the exchanges in the Marine Corps, and to amusement and other similar funds. It looks up data in regard to, and corresponds on such matters and reviews and checks all reports coming in from, the exchanges. In several instances the analysis of the returns has elicited information which uncovered gross irregularities in post exchange administration. Unfortunately in other cases the data is not found sufficient to lead to detection.

The Inspection Section handles the reports of inspections, keeps the inspection roster, prepares data from reports and conducts all correspondence in relation to these matters. On a recent occasion, an inspector general of the Army came to Headquarters and asked to see the inspection files. He was astonished to find no more than a few folders in the inspection files as compared with the files of the inspection department of the Army, which were very extensive. This illustrates the advantage of combining the inspection functions with the other activities, with the result of a very considerable saving of files and filing force.

The Officers' Records Section is charged with matters pertaining to fitness reports, promotions, examining boards, retiring boards, nominations, and all related matters in connection with the commissioned and warrant officers of the Marine Corps. There is an astonishing amount of detail and technique in this work. The mere matter of the dates of commissions of officers is one that requires a considerable knowledge of laws, decisions and precedents.

The Military History Section prepares statements of service of all enlisted men as may be required by the General Accounting Office, Veterans Administration and other functionaries. It receives and checks all enlistment papers and is charged with matters pertaining to transfers to the reserve and to retirement.

The Promotion Section keeps the data in regard to promotions and reductions of non-commissioned officers and prepares all the correspondence in relation thereto. It also has charge of the correspondence regarding appointment of specialists and of quarters and subsistence allowances for enlisted men. There is a great amount of detail in connection with these matters and great accuracy is necessary for proper administration.

The Discharge Section handles all questions of discharge of marines, both regular and Reserve. This subject seems to be a simple one in its elements, but the fact is that many problems come up in connection with it. The pay and allowances of a marine are small, and promotion is slow, and especially in the early stages of his career he is denied all of the benefits and advantages of family life. When he enlists he often looks forward to a life of adventure and glory, but finds in a very short while that he is entangled in a dreary routine of drudgery. The consequence is that most men, probably all who enlist in the Marine Corps, at one time or another desire very strongly to be discharged. The Marine Corps must have a stable personnel in order to meet its requirements, and therefore in general men must be required to serve out their terms of enlistment. A few exceptions may be made, but every one is a precedent for others. If marines were permitted to leave the service at any time, it would be impossible to assure that the necessary personnel

would be available for details and duties which are not popular. It is truly astonishing, the number of ways in which requests for discharge can be presented, and the number of reasons which can be presented to support them. Apparently there is a widespread opinion in the service that the proper approach to Headquarters in matters of discharge, as well as all other matters, is through some Member of Congress. It is a fact that Members of Congress have to be listened to and satisfied, at least in some degree; otherwise, they would wreck the Marine Corps. However, most of the Members of Congress are reasonable, and accept the explanations which are given to them, but some feel that they are entitled to favors for their constituents and friends in return for their interest and support of the Corps. However, the fact can not be lost sight of that wholesale discharges would destroy the efficiency of the Marine Corps in a very short time, and therefore most of the requests have to be refused. This calls for discretion and diplomacy.

The Casualty Section looks after matters in connection with the deaths of officers and men of the Marine Corps, and is charged with the correspondence with relatives and others, which is no simple matter. The conduct of funerals and all matters in connection therewith come under its cognizance. It is no easy task to deal with the relatives and friends of deceased marines, whose emotions are naturally in a high state of tension.

The Identification Section has charge of the finger prints of the officers and men of the Corps, which requires a considerable degree of technical skill and long experience of its personnel. Many cases come up in which it has been practicable to identify men by their finger prints on file, and in a number of others these identifications have been of considerable value in the detection of criminals. The finger prints are of great value in the detection of repeaters and deserters.

The Insignia Section has cognizance of the award and distribution of decorations of all kinds, except target insignia. Before the war the work of this section was very limited, and consisted principally of the award of good-conduct medals. The flood of decorations incident to the World War, and the large number of medals for campaigns and activities since the World War have greatly expanded its horizon. In this section there is opportunity for observation of the avidity of the appetite for decorations, which I sometimes think is keener, if possible, than for pay or promotion. There is kept in this section a card for each officer and enlisted man, showing the decorations which he is entitled to wear. A recent provision requires that every reenlisted man have noted in his service-record book those decorations to which he is entitled, which will result in the course of four years that the service-record books will contain in the case of each enlisted man decorations to which he is entitled. It is suspected that there has been in the past and is now a very considerable number of unauthorized medals and badges displayed upon the manly chests of men who never participated in the operations which the decorations represent.

The Adjusted Compensation Section has jurisdiction of all cases under the Adjusted Compensation Act. Each individual case has to be looked up, the amount of adjusted service credit computed from the records and certified to the Veterans' Administration for award of the appropriate amount of compensation. This was a tre-

mendous task in the early days, but the work of the section is now dwindling and will no doubt at some time in the not distant future pass out entirely. It was estimated that there were some 78,000 marines whose service in the World War entitled them to adjusted compensation, and of these something over 70,000 have already applied and have been certified. There remain some 8,000 who have not yet submitted their applications, many of whom are no doubt dead, and many, perhaps, who from patriotic or other scruples refrain from taking advantage of the government's generosity, if such a thing is conceivable. Perhaps there are some who live so far in the backwoods, or whose radios are out of commission, that they haven't heard of the bonus.

The Muster Roll Section receives and checks all muster rolls and conducts correspondence relating thereto. Items of importance in regard to each individual are transferred to his muster roll card, a file of these cards being kept for ready reference. A swift glance at these cards shows the history in its high points of all of the officers and men of the Marine Corps. Upon discharge, death or desertion the muster roll card of a man is transferred to his file case. Every effort is made to minimize the burden upon the service of preparing the muster rolls, and it is believed that they have been much simplified in recent years. There has been much agitation from time to time for the abolition of muster rolls and for combining it with the pay roll, but careful study of the situation indicates that such abolition would be impracticable without a change in the organization of the Corps. Muster rolls are of the greatest importance from the standpoint of the interests of the individual, for the reason that in the event of the loss of other records any man may as a rule be traced through his marine career by following up the muster rolls. Practically the only record of some men is that which is contained in these rolls. After checking and careful scrutinizing, the muster rolls are bound in volumes and carefully stowed away in dust proof cases for future reference. Muster rolls are on file from the year 1798; one of that year for the Marine Detachment on the U. S. S. *Baltimore*; one for recruits enlisted by Lieutenant W. S. Wynkoop; and one for marines under command of Lieutenant William Cammack.

The Strength and Distribution Section is really the statistical section of the Marine Corps. It maintains card files of all individuals according to posts, the unit with which serving, and according to the dates of enlistment and in other ways. It is prepared to give the strength of any post or any unit of the Marine Corps at any time, or to furnish statistical data required for preparing estimates and for other purposes. With the growth of bureaus, commissions and other offices designed to promote efficiency in the Government service, the demand for statistical information increases by leaps and bounds from year to year. It is the purpose of this section to keep up with the demand and if possible a little ahead of it.

The Directory and Register Section has charge of the preparation of those parts of the Navy Directory and the Register of Commissioned and Warrant Officers of the United States Navy and Marine Corps which pertain to the Marine Corps, and of the Marine Corps Reserve Register. This section must get its data wherever it is to be found, and no excuse is accepted from it that it is

not supplied with information. The vast amount of detail going into these volumes must be accurate in every respect, and personnel must be found for this work with the patience and the persistence and the industry to secure accuracy. It is humanly impossible to accomplish such a work without occasional mistakes, and I very well remember a discouraged letter received from a young lieutenant to the effect that his name had been omitted from the register just published, and with a pathetic appeal for information as to whether or not he had been dropped from the service. As a matter of fact investigation developed that the omission was caused by the lapse of the Public Printing Office, after the proof had been read. I was very happy to inform the disconsolate lieutenant that the omission was due to error only, and that his name would be included in the succeeding register, which was duly accomplished, and so the incident passed without further damage.

I have outlined in a general way the organization of the Adjutant and Inspector's Department and the functions of the various units. The amount of correspondence handled by this office would probably surprise you. I have been informed that it constitutes 80 per cent of all of the correspondence of Headquarters.

Before closing I wish to make some remarks in regard to inspections in the Marine Corps. This is a subject which has been under discussion for some time, and there are many divergent views held in regard to it.

In the first place a system of inspection is necessary in any organization, military, industrial, or any other kind. Without inspections the head of an organization is unable to assure himself that the general regulations and procedure prescribed by him and by higher authority are properly observed in any measure. Human nature is such that individuals will not ordinarily comply with regulations of higher authority unless they are faced with some sort of penalty for failure.

Of course the very best inspection that can be made is by the head of the organization himself and it would be highly desirable if he could make all of the inspections and make them with the frequency and the degree of detail that are essential. Unfortunately, in large organizations this system of inspection is impracticable or impossible for the reason that the head is so occupied with his duties of direction that he has not time to give to the necessary details of inspection. If he should attend to all of the inspections he would necessarily have to neglect matters of much greater importance, and the efficiency of the organization would be impaired and it would in all probability fail to attain its objective.

It is therefore necessary that the head of any large organization, military or other, should have under him a staff of inspectors apportioned in number to the amount of inspection required. In no other way can efficiency and observation of law and regulations be secured in large bodies.

A school of thought holds that an inspector should be always senior to officers inspected. Undoubtedly this opinion is sound in principle, but in practical application certain difficulties are encountered which are insurmountable. If such practice were adopted it would be necessary that the senior inspector be next in rank to the commander himself, in order that he might be senior to all other officers, and subordinate officers should be apportioned in rank according to the precedence of the officers

to be inspected. Certainly, in reference to the senior inspector it would be impracticable to have him second in rank to the commander only, for the reason that it would in almost all cases be undesirable to segregate the second in command to inspection duty, in view of his unusual functions of greater importance.

It would therefore be impracticable to carry out in practice the principle that the inspector should always be senior to the inspectee.

There has been division of opinion for a long period on the question as to whether inspectors should be permanent in their positions, or whether they should be detailed from line activities for limited periods. There is much to be said on both sides of this question. Undoubtedly, an inspector who is permanent in his detail acquires by practice a facility of observation and judgment which comes to others only after considerable experience. Further, under a permanent detail an inspector is much more likely to be independent and fearless in his judgment and criticism than he would be if he had to return to duty in the line and be subject to the command of the very officers whom he had recently criticised. On the other hand, frequent service in the line is undoubtedly of great value to an inspector since it freshens his knowledge of military matters and gives him a point of view which he would not otherwise acquire. In addition, the inspector who is serving on detail from the line has the same interest as that of the line officer; whereas, the permanent inspector acquires a different interest in common with others in the same status, which creates a divi-

sion of classes in the service, which is apt to lead to dissension and working at cross purposes. This situation was prominently in evidence in the Marine Corps before the institution of the details of staff systems in 1916; there was then a conflict between the line and staff which was detrimental to morale, discipline and efficiency, and concretely detrimental when matters of organization, promotion, and similar subjects were under consideration. The battles between the line and staff were long and bitter, and the feelings of enmity and envy when one or the other obtained an advantage were most harmful. This situation was relieved in 1916 to a considerable extent, and as the time arrives when the permanent staff will pass out, the dissension will all but disappear.

On the whole, I am strongly in favor of the detail staff system, after weighing its advantages and comparing them with those of the permanent staff system. I am strongly in favor of the continuation of the present organization of the Adjutant and Inspector's Department, with the continuation of detail to this service from the line. In a few years when the rest of the permanent officers of the Adjutant and Inspector's Department will have passed from the stage, the Department will belong wholly to the line; I am free to say that the Department will then reach its highest level of efficiency and of value to the Marine Corps.

In conclusion, I wish to compliment the Commandant, the faculty and students on the excellent discipline manifested in the schools; your attention has been most gratifying.



Membership in the Marine Corps Reserve

What it Costs

BY LIEUTENANT COLONEL J. J. STALEY, F.M.C.R.

■ Strange as this story may sound to reserve officers there are still people in positions of responsibility that believe membership in the Marine Corps Reserve means financial gain. A few years ago there was a chief clerk who, ignoring law and regulations, refused to permit a reserve officer employed in his office to attend annual training. The circumstances of the case were so unusual that the writer, a few months later, when no harm could come to the reserve officer, took the trouble to investigate. The answer was that the chief clerk was opposed to all reserve officers on general principles for, as he said, they all received two months' pay of their grade each year for doing nothing, and in addition, if in the Government service, received double pay during the period of their active duty training. A strange story but only too true in illustrating the lack of knowledge of the reserve general in the service and among civilians.

In direct contradiction of this opinion of the chief clerk mentioned above, it may be stated that the personnel of the Marine Corps Reserve do not receive two months' pay of their grade each year, this provision of law having been revoked in 1925. They do not receive drill pay for weekly attendance at drill, having waived this in order that training in larger numbers could be had, and Marine reserve appropriation is now used only to provide annual training and necessary overhead such as armory rental, and other necessary miscellaneous expense.

Membership in the Sixth Marine Reserve Brigade, of which of necessity the details of administration are better known to the writer than are those of other units, is expensive, and the total cost of this organization to date to its members, paid out of their private funds, if it could be computed would be startling.

Beginning with the Band, instruments are the personal property of the men or of the Sixth Brigade. Music has nearly all been purchased from private funds. Music pouches (45) are the property of the Brigade.

Medical Units—The Field Hospital, 20th Reserve Marines, the Field Hospital, 23rd Reserve Marines, and the field dispensaries are largely equipped by the personal funds of the medical detachment. Two ambulances, field type, are the property of the Brigade.

Trophies and Awards—which include cups, medals, and trophies—are all the property of the Brigade purchased in the most part by officers from personal funds.

Guidons—all purchased from private funds.

Armory decorations—pictures, etc., are for the most part private property.

Shoes are purchased by each man individually. One thousand men times \$3.53 plus 10% gives the investment in shoes.

Uniforms for officers average \$300.00 each—we have 70 officers—a total of \$21,000.00 expended by our officers not including dues or other incidental expenses. The uniform gratuity allowance is \$100.00—officers have khaki, white, and blue dress, and overcoats.

Blue dress uniforms—approximately 400 enlisted men have purchased their own dress uniforms at their personal expense.

Dues—officers pay \$15.00 a year, enlisted men, \$3.00. This fund is used for armory maintenance, music, camp expenses, and for miscellaneous expenses of maintenance during the year for which bills received are sometimes of startling proportions. Also last year transportation to camp and return by road for the Motor Transport Company came out of this fund, and was not paid for by the Government.

Add to the above the time of professional men of whom our officer personnel is largely composed, and to whom time is money, and it should be easily apparent that the objection made to military leave as voiced by the chief clerk mentioned in the first part is somewhat without foundation.

Costs extending over an indefinite period are most difficult to compute and only in a general way can costs be shown on the items listed above.

Since 1 May, 1932, however, a record has been kept of personal expenditures made by the personnel of the Sixth Brigade, which to 12 July, 1932, totalled \$3,962.62.

Weekly there is issued a "Day Book Sheet" showing itemized statement of expenditures from which is posted the totals shown on the "Ledger Sheet" or "Expenditure Sheet."

Recruiting a reserve organization is vastly different from the regular service. A company or unit commander does not receive his men from a training station or through recruiting offices, but must go out and find them himself. This means he must interest his friends and spend his spare time interesting others in his unit. The one or probably two nights each week spent at Company Headquarters will not make a company or get recruits, it takes time and plenty of it on other evenings and week ends.

It is a fairly safe assertion to make at present that each company commander in the reserve has recruited his company.

In the Sixth Marine Reserve Brigade the standard is high, dues keep out a certain class, selection and company pride takes care of others, and after this comes the medical examination—the heart breaker of the company commander who has worked hard to interest a good man only to find that he has missing teeth, is underheight, underweight, or has one of the numerous other physical disqualifications.

These hurdles all past, the man must then be taught something of his profession, which must frequently be sandwiched in between the necessity of earning a living, and attending night classes in law or other subjects. The recruit must be kept interested in his outfit, kept in line for camp, which many times means spending the only vacation he has in training. Here it might be stated that our men by no means all rate military leave and the days

spent in camp mean no vacation period. To have these men return year after year means that camp must be made attractive, time given to athletics, time for recreation, etc., otherwise one tour of duty will kill the budding enthusiasm of the recruit. To crowd this including a training program which ordinarily would require at least thirty days into a fifteen-day period, from which must be deducted a week-end, is not the easiest task in the world.

What has been said relative to the Sixth Brigade applies also to the other reserve organizations. The 19th Reserve Marines, New York, N. Y.; the 1st Battalion, 22nd Reserve Marines, New Orleans, La.; the 3rd Battalion, 19th Reserve Marines, Philadelphia, Pa.; the 24th Reserve Marines, Chicago, Ill.; the two battalions of the 25th Reserve Marines in San Francisco and Los Angeles, Calif., and the separate companies located in Seattle, Wash.; Portland, Maine; Boston, Mass., and Rochester, N. Y., all require time, money and effort which can only be supplied from personal funds and spare time.

Since April 1, 1932, the following have received commissions in the Marine Corps Reserve for duty either with the expeditionary (active) organizations or aviation:

LINE COMMISSIONS

Capt. Chauncey G. Parker, Jr., Washington, D. C.
 1st Lieut. Theodore L. Bartlett, Washington, D. C.
 1st Lieut. George F. Colburn, Washington, D. C.
 1st Lieut. Francis J. Donohue, Washington, D. C.
 1st Lieut. William B. Jones, Washington, D. C.
 1st Lieut. Ned Morris, Washington, D. C.
 1st Lieut. Edward C. Parker, Washington, D. C.
 1st Lieut. Wilfred J. Serpas, Washington, D. C.
 1st Lieut. Wolcott C. Waggaman, Washington, D. C.
 2nd Lieut. Franklin Adreon, Los Angeles, Calif.
 2nd Lieut. John W. Augustine, Landover, Md.
 2nd Lieut. Roy H. Beird, Chicago, Ill.
 2nd Lieut. George H. Brace, Washington, D. C.
 2nd Lieut. Charles M. Byrd, Philadelphia, Pa.
 2nd Lieut. Justice M. Chambers, Washington, D. C.
 2nd Lieut. Robert E. Copes, Jr., Washington, D. C.
 2nd Lieut. Ivan R. Edwards, Washington, D. C.
 2nd Lieut. Neil A. Greppin, Los Angeles, Calif.
 2nd Lieut. Burdette Hagerman, Detroit, Mich.
 2nd Lieut. Patrick J. Haltigan, Jr., Washington, D. C.
 2nd Lieut. James A. Hennessy, Washington, D. C.
 2nd Lieut. Louis J. Hoepfner, Boston, Mass.

2nd Lieut. Valentine P. Hoffman, Harrisburg, Pa.
 2nd Lieut. Alan T. Hunt, Monrovia, Calif.
 2nd Lieut. Henry A. Schweinhaut, Washington, D. C.
 2nd Lieut. Bradford Swope, Washington, D. C.
 2nd Lieut. William J. Wise, New Orleans, La.
 2nd Lieut. James C. Lewis, Philadelphia, Pa.
 Pay Clerk Harry C. Vaughn, Washington, D. C.

AVIATION COMMISSIONS

Capt. Gilbert G. Budwig, Washington, D. C.
 Capt. Alford J. Williams, Garden City, L. I., N. Y.
 1st Lieut. William J. Fox, Hermosa Beach, Calif.
 1st Lieut. George E. Gardner, Washington, D. C.
 2nd Lieut. Charles E. Adams, Detroit, Mich.
 2nd Lieut. Reginald L. Brooks, New York, N. Y.
 2nd Lieut. Fred N. Burlew, Santa Ana, Calif.
 2nd Lieut. John B. Jacob, Washington, D. C.
 2nd Lieut. William H. Grevemeyer, Miami, Fla.
 2nd Lieut. Joe E. Fretwell, Seattle, Wash.
 2nd Lieut. Charles R. Luers, Minneapolis, Minn.
 2nd Lieut. Clyde T. Mattison, Detroit, Mich.
 2nd Lieut. Elliott N. Park, Miami, Fla.

The educational qualifications, business or profession, of a few of our reserve officers—which in a general way apply to the whole—may be of interest.

Major A.—Business man (executive)—former Major, U.S.M.C.

Major B.—Lawyer—Honor Graduate, Georgetown University—Captain 6th Marines overseas—D.S.C.

Captain A.—Stock Broker (own business)—Harvard graduate—2nd Lieut. Artillery, A.E.F.

Captain B.—Congressman—Ensign Naval Aviation, 1917-1919.

Captain C.—Business man (executive)—Former 1st Lieut., U.S.M.C.

1st Lieut. A.—Lawyer—Harvard graduate—Harvard R.O.T.C.

1st Lieut. B.—Business man (executive)—Enlisted and commissioned service, U.S.M.C.—Former 2nd Lieut., U.S.M.C.

1st Lieut. C.—Architect—Plattsburg, 1917—Overseas—Educated Switzerland, France, Italy.

1st Lieut. D.—Business man (executive)—Two years U. S. Naval Academy.

1st Lieut. E.—Instructor High School—Graduate U. S. Naval Academy. Ensign, U.S.N.





The Original Purple Heart (Actual Size)

The Purple Heart Badge and Order of Military Merit*

BY MAJOR J. C. FEGAN, U.S.M.C.

■ It is written in the pages of both French and English history of over a century standing that when Napoleon surrendered himself on board H.M.S. "Bellerophon," he was received by a Captain's detachment of Royal Marines. After acknowledging the salute, he minutely inspected the men, and having remarked that "they were very fine and well appointed," the ex-Emperor added, "Are there none amongst them who have seen service?" Upon being told that "nearly the whole of them had seen much service," he exclaimed, "What, no marks of merit?" The officer explained that it was not customary to confer medals except on officers of the highest rank. The conversation terminated by Napoleon's remarking, "Such is not the way to excite or cherish the military virtues."

Washington evidently agreed with Napoleon when he issued the following order:

HEADQUARTERS NEWBURGH

Wednesday, August 7, 1782.

"Honorary Badges of distinction are to be conferred on the veteran Non-commissioned officers and soldiers of the army who have served more than three years with bravery, fidelity and good conduct; for this purpose a narrow piece of white cloth of an angular form is to be fixed to the left arm on the uniform coats; Non-commissioned officers and soldiers who have served with equal reputation more than six years, are to be distinguished by two pieces of cloth set in parallel to each other in a similar form. Should any who are not entitled to these honors have the insolence to assume the badges of them, they shall be severely punished. On the other hand, it is expected that gallant men who are thus

designated will, on all occasions, be treated with particular confidence and consideration.

"The General, ever desirous to cherish a virtuous ambition in his soldiers, as well as to foster and encourage every species of Military merit, directs that whenever any singularly meritorious action is performed, the author of it shall be permitted to wear on his facings, over his left breast, the figure of a heart in purple cloth, or silk, edged with narrow lace or binding. Not only instances of unusual gallantry, but also of extraordinary fidelity and essential service in any way shall meet with a due reward. Before this favor can be conferred on any man, the particular fact or facts on which it is to be grounded must be set forth to the Commander-in-Chief, accompanied with certificates from the Commanding officers of the regiment and brigade to which the Candidate for reward belonged, or other incontestable proofs, and, upon granting it, the name and regiment of the person with the action so certified are to be enrolled in the book of merit which will be kept at the orderly office. Men who have merited this last distinction to be suffered to pass all guards and sentinels which officers are permitted to do.

"The road to glory in a patriot army and a free country is thus opened to all. This order is also to have retrospect to the earliest days of the war, and to be considered as a permanent one."

Thus, the Purple Heart Badge of Military Merit was created by the general order of the Commander-in-Chief of the Continental Army, issued at Newburgh August 7, 1782.

This is the first time in the history of the United States Army that an honor badge for distinguished service was provided for the enlisted men in the ranks and the non-commissioned officer, and though but a badge of cloth, or silk, sewn on the uniform coat instead of being a pendant piece of metal, it was, in effect, the medal of honor of the Revolution.

*The writer extends his thanks to the Society of the Cincinnati, State of New Hampshire, and to Mr. S. H. P. Pell of Fort Ticonderoga, for their vital and lengthy contributions.

As can be seen, the general order of August 7, 1782, established two distinct and separate honors. As recorded in the transcript of the orders, made that same year under the direction of the Recording Secretary to the Commander-in-Chief and attested by the then Assistant Adjutant-General of the Continental Army, John Singer Dexter, it is arranged in two separate paragraphs; the first established a "Badge of Honorary Distinction," or service chevron, and the second created the "Badge of Military Merit," or Purple Heart decoration, for an unusual and meritorious military act. Unfortunately, little attention was paid at the time to the exact wording laid down by the general order, and the blank forms of discharge issued to the Continental soldiers nearly a year later record the service chevron as a badge of merit for so many years' faithful service. This has caused some needless confusion. The forms of discharge should have been worded, in conformity with the first paragraph of the general order of August 7, 1782: "has been honored with the Badge of Honorary Distinction for — years' faithful service."

Awarding some slight uniform insignia for length of service is an old practice in military annals, but the Purple Heart Badge of Military Merit seems to have been one of the earliest instances of an established honor being created exclusively for the enlisted soldier. That this should have been done by the youngest Democracy then existing in the world was both fitting and significant.

Who originated the idea of the Purple Heart is unknown; but that Inspector General Baron von Steuben had something to do with it is a justifiable premise. That bluff, gruff old martinet, with heart of gold, roundly cursed the Continental soldier for the military blundering, but loved him for his courage and fighting qualities. As early as April, 1783, he had suggested to General Washington that the discharges of the soldiers "be signed by the Commander-in-Chief which will add a dignity to them pleasing to soldiers who have served with fidelity."

He had further suggested that the names of each officer and soldier discharged be entered in a book "which will be kept in the Archives of Congress in memory of those brave citizens who have fought for the Independence of the Country." Later we find among things noted by the Baron to be attended to before the troops were discharged: "The Badges of Honour to be distributed to such Soldiers as have merited them before their dismissal."

So far as the known surviving records show, this honor badge was granted to only three men, all of them non-commissioned officers: Sergeant Daniel Bissell, of Captain David Humphrey's Company of the Second Connecticut Regiment of the Continental Line; Sergeant William Brown, of Captain Samuel Comstock's Company of the Fifth Connecticut Regiment of the Continental Line; and Sergeant Elijah Churchill, of the Fourth Troop of the Second Regiment Light Dragoons, which was recruited in Connecticut. Connecticut certainly had reason to be proud of her soldiers.

The stories of how the Purple Heart was won by each of these three men can nowhere be found in detail. They can be pieced out from cold official records and by inference, but even in this bare form they should be preserved as a cherished part of the proud record of the old Continental Army.

The first, in point of time, is that of Sergeant Elijah Churchill, of the Second Regiment Light Dragoons. It

is in two parts, for it is the story of two raids within the British lines, the first in November, 1780, and the second a year later, in October, 1781. Major Benjamin Tallmadge, of the Second Regiment Light Dragoons, was in charge of the Headquarters secret service, which he managed from the year 1778 to the end of the war; and on November 7, 1780, he received word from his most trustworthy spy that the British had stored several hundred tons of hay, for winter forage, at Coram, Long Island, which is on the north shore, about nine miles southeast from Setauket, or Brookhaven. This forage magazine was protected by a near-by stockade fort, which consisted of three strong blockhouses, connected by a stockade of heavy stakes, twelve feet long and sharpened at the end. There was also a deep ditch, a high wall, and a strong abatis. The work was to mount six cannon, but only two of them were in place when the spy sent in his report. The fortification was called Fort Saint George. The spy's report gave a good description of the work and urged an attempt upon it.

Tallmadge, in forwarding the report to Headquarters, volunteered to make the attempt, and Washington, whose prescience in such matters was remarkable, at once gave his permission and left the management of the entire matter to the Major. Tallmadge decided to stake everything on a surprise, and dismounted about fifty of his dragoons to form the party. To take fifty men across twenty miles of salt water, land then within the enemy's lines, march several miles therein, and attempt such a strong fortification as Fort Saint George, might seem to us, at this distance, a reckless and foolhardy thing; but Benjamin Tallmadge, as chief intelligence officer, knew his ground, and, more important than all, knew his troopers. Sergeant Elijah Churchill was one of the men Tallmadge selected. The small detachment marched to Fairfield, Connecticut, nearly opposite to Setauket, Long Island; but there they were delayed eight days by a violent November gale upon the Sound. In the afternoon of November 21 the wind died down. At 4 P. M. the expedition embarked in the whal boats provided by Lieutenant Caleb Brewster, of Tallmadge's regiment, who had charge of the Continental armed boats on Long Island Sound and who was the conveyer of secret intelligence from the New York and Long Island spies.

The cold blackness of a November night had already settled down when the boats put out from the land, but with wind and oars they crossed in four hours and landed on a deserted stretch of the Long Island shore. They found they had drifted farther from their objective than they expected, and a longer march to reach the British fort was now necessary. A large force of British regulars were in winter quarters on Long Island, and there were, in addition, several thousand Loyalist troops, distributed at various points, making it a hazardous venture to march a body of troops for any considerable distance without grave risk of being cut off from their boats. Capture was inevitable if they could not get away from the Island, and the gale that had delayed them on the mainland again swept down upon the Sound. Tallmadge could not risk discovery if his boats could not leave the shore, so he concealed his men in a wood and made the boats as inconspicuous as possible. All day long, not daring to light fires, the men shivered under the forest cover; but when darkness came again, the wind died down and the cold and stiffened troopers started upon a rapid march down the deserted wintry road.

At 3 A. M., November 23, they were within two miles of Fort Saint George and halted to receive orders for the attack. Tallmadge divided his men into three groups, each of which was to give its entire attention to a specified blockhouse. Sixteen men, in charge of Sergeant Churchill, were to attack the main and largest of the fort buildings. At 4 A. M. the three bodies separated, to move against the works from as many different directions. They moved like shadows and with the swiftness of Indians; Churchill and his men were within fifty feet of the fort before the sentinel challenged and fired. Instantly the black winter morning became alive with flame and uproar. Led by the intrepid sergeant, the little party of sixteen plunged through the ditch, swarmed the stockade, and crashed into the fort building before the defenders could settle into organized resistance. The other two attacking parties cleared the defenses almost at the same time, and all of the detachments met in the centre of the enclosed stockade. But the other parties had expended their energies in getting inside the defenses, and two blockhouses still remained to be taken. A brisk fire was beginning to pour upon the Americans from these two houses, but battering parties beat in the doors, and inside of ten more minutes Tallmadge's men had possession of the entire works.

The growing light now showed a British schooner at anchor close to the shore, near the fort. A detachment captured her with ridiculous ease. The rapidity of the attack had protected the attacker, and they had not lost a man, and only one of them was wounded. This same celerity had also, to an extent, saved the enemy, and the British loss was but seven killed and wounded, though most of the latter were mortally hurt. The fort and the schooner were set on fire, and the prisoners, over fifty in number, were started back toward the boats under a guard. Leaving a small force to see to it that the fort was completely destroyed, Tallmadge marched with the rest to Coram. The few sentries found there fled, and the hay was pulled loose and set on fire. Over three hundred tons went up in rolling clouds of smoke, and as soon as the fire was going beyond all hope of extinguishment, Tallmadge and his hay-burners started back for the boats. By taking a different road and by rapid marching, they joined the men they had left at Fort Saint George and overtook the prisoners and their guard inside of two hours.

It was now broad daylight and the Loyalist militia were beginning to swarm in their rear. But the two huge columns of smoke, some distance apart, one at Fort Saint George and one at Coram, as well as the unbelievable audacity of a body of rebel troops daring to land on Long Island, kept the Loyalist militia from approaching too near. They could not believe that only a small party would risk such a thing, and they preferred to wait until their own numbers were sufficient to ensure success against the supposedly large force. By four o'clock in the evening the American party reached the boats, and by this time the British were firing long-range shots at the little column. A small counter-demonstration pushed the enemy back and the entire force embarked and got away from land without casualties. At 11 P. M., November 23, they reached Fairfield, having twice crossed Long Island Sound, a total distance of forty miles, marched an equal distance, stormed and taken a fort, destroyed a vessel, the fort, and over three hundred tons of hay, all in less than twenty-four hours. This was the first exploit in the story of the Purple Heart.

The second was Sergeant Churchill's second raid on Long Island; this time against Fort Slongo, which was about forty-eight miles northeast of Brooklyn, on the North Shore. Here the British had built a fort that was a nuisance, and Washington directed Major Tallmadge to look over the ground and report on the advisability of attempting the destruction of the work. The Major immediately slipped over to Long Island to investigate. The risks taken by this brave dragoon officer in establishing and keeping open his channels of spy intelligence to Headquarters were tremendous. The Commander-in-Chief frequently cautioned him and, at times, actually forbade some of his excursions within the British lines. This time Tallmadge returned with drawings of Fort Slongo, exact reports of the British vessels there, their size and strength and the number of troops in the fort and at Lloyd's Neck nearby.

With this information he set out for Rhode Island, where the French troops lay, to obtain naval cooperation from the French fleet. He met and talked with the Comte de Rochambeau and the Chevalier Destouches; but, unfortunately, when he reached Newport, the frigates were out on a cruise and the smaller vessels were scattered. Speed was essential for the success of the plan, so the matter was laid aside. Five months later, when Washington and the main army were in the trenches before Yorktown, Tallmadge made the attempt. This time he formed a force of about one hundred men from the Fifth Connecticut Regiment and the Second Regiment Light Dragoons and sent them over from Compo Point under the command of Major Lemuel Trescott, of the Ninth Massachusetts, who volunteered to manage the raid. Through his spies Tallmadge had such complete information that he knew even the exact spots where the British sentries stood.

The expedition started across the Sound at 8 o'clock in the evening of October 2, 1781, and at 3 A. M. of October 3, the fort was in its hands. Again Sergeant Churchill was in the van of the first attacking party and again he acquitted himself with the utmost gallantry. The fort was so strong that Tallmadge had advised Trescott not to make a direct attack, but to try to draw off the defenders by a feint. This idea was not followed. The attacking force went at their job with such vigor that the fort was taken without the loss of a single man, and only four of the British were killed before the works surrendered. The report of the affair shows twenty-one prisoners taken, the destruction of a goodly quantity of artillery and stores of small arms, ammunition, and clothing. It was these two completely successful raids upon fortified works within the enemy's lines on Long Island that gained the Purple Heart for Sergeant Churchill, the award of which was couched in these words:

Sergeant Churchill, of the Second Regiment of Light Dragoons, in the several enterprises against Fort Saint George and Fort Slongo on Long Island, in their (the board of award's) opinion acted a very conspicuous and singularly meritorious part; that at the head of each body of attack he not only acquitted himself with great gallantry, firmness and address, but that the surprise in one instance and the success of the attack in the other, proceeded in a considerable degree from his conduct and management.

Sergeant Churchill was twenty-six years old at the time of this second exploit. He served to the end of the war and then moved to Chester, Hampden County, Massachusetts, where he died, April 11, 1841. He had married, during the war, on March 10, 1777, Miss Eleanor

Nooney. He applied for and received a pension from the United States, and in support of his claim forwarded his sergeant's warrant and his Purple Heart Badge of Military Merit "which he received from General Washington at the end of the Revolution and he requested that they be returned. As said papers are not now in the files (of the United States Pension Office), as no memorandum relative to them can be found, and as said application shows an old discolored stain as of paste near a torn off corner, it is presumed that they were returned as requested."

The second Purple Heart, awarded to Sergeant William Brown, was gained on the historic field of Yorktown. On the evening of October 14, 1781, the two British redoubts that checked the progress of the siege were stormed and taken by the Allied troops. The French took the inner, the Americans the outer redoubt, or the one nearer the river. Sergeant Brown led a "forlorn hope," as it is called, because, being the advance party and the first to attack, the hazard is so great that the attackers can have but a forlorn hope of coming through alive. The assault on this British redoubt was under the direction of Lieutenant-Colonel Alexander Hamilton, then serving as a volunteer. Sergeant Brown's party was the first to dash forward, and the brave sergeant did not wait upon the sappers to cut away the abatis and breach the obstacles, but carried his men over all the obstructions and into the redoubt in the face of a murderous fire. The British seem to have been confused by this unethical performance, and the redoubt was captured in less than a quarter of an hour, with small loss to the stormers.

Sergeant William Brown of Captain Samuel Comstock's Company of the Fifth Regiment, Connecticut Line, was born in Stamford, Connecticut, February 12, 1761. After the war he moved to and settled in Columbia (now part of Cincinnati), Hamilton County, Ohio, where he died in 1808. He is buried there, and his Purple Heart Badge has descended in his family, which is now represented by his great-grandson, the Right Reverend Paul Matthews, Bishop of New Jersey. His wife's name was Ruth Hanford. The Pension Office files show no application for a pension by Sergeant Brown.

The third Purple Heart, which went to Sergeant Daniel Bissell, was awarded for an exploit that began in August, 1781, and did not end until September, 1782. In August, 1781, for the intended attack on New York, in conjunction with the French, Washington had need of exact and detailed information respecting the British Army in New York City that he was unable to get from his spies, and Sergeant Bissell was sent into the city by Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Hanson Harrison, one of Washington's aides, to obtain it. Though there is no positive evidence of it, it is extremely likely that the plucky sergeant saw and talked with the Commander-in-Chief himself, before he set out upon his hazardous enterprise. He got into the British lines at once, but failed in the main purpose, through no fault of his own, because he could not get out again. For one long year he acted the part of a British soldier, in New York City and on Long and Staten Islands, before he found means to escape from the latter place. His life hung by a thread every moment of this time. When he first entered New York, there was a hot naval press going on, and, to escape being forced into the British fleet, Bissell enlisted in Benedict Arnold's corps. He became a quartermaster

sergeant and served all of his time in camp and in the hospitals, so that he never fought against his countrymen while in the British service. He made notes and kept memoranda of troop strengths and locations and checked his information, one item against another, until he knew, practically, the exact situation of the British forces and their condition. Then the enemy became suspicious of something, and an order was issued that any soldier found with written information on him would be treated as a spy. To save his life, Bissell was forced to destroy his precious memoranda, but he had a good brain and used it to advantage. When he escaped, in 1782, he went at once to Headquarters, where he reported to Washington, and his account was written down by Lieutenant-Colonel David Humphreys. The first four pages of this report are in Humphrey's handwriting and Bissell, himself, wrote the last three. It is a remarkably clear statement of facts, what the sergeant knew from personal observation being distinguished carefully from what was reported by others and what was mere hearsay. He described the Staten Island forts and gave minute descriptions, with sketches, of the forts on New York and Long Island. The report is endorsed by Washington himself: "Sergeant Bissell's acct. of the Enemy's force and Works at New Yk., &c."

Sergeant Daniel Bissell of Captain David Humphrey's Company of the Second Regiment, Connecticut Line, was born in Windsor, Connecticut, December 30, 1754. After the war he moved to Randolph, Vermont. Later he settled in Richmond, Ontario County, New York, where he died August 5, 1824. He is buried there. His wife's name was Rhoda Hurlburt. He applied for and received a pension for his Revolutionary service, and his application stated that his certificate of the award of the Purple Heart and, inferentially, the badge itself, were destroyed by fire in July, 1813, when his home and all his papers were burnt.

These are the exploits of high bravery that gained for three Continental soldiers the Revolutionary medal of honor. Lieutenant-Colonel David Cobb's first draft of the form of the certificate conferring the Purple Heart upon Sergeant Churchill bears the endorsement:

"Certificate for The Badge of Military Merit granted to Sergeant Churchill, 2d Light Dragoons to Serjt. Brown, 5th Connet. to Sergeant Bissell, 2d Con. R.

It recites that

it hath ever been an established maxim in the American Service that the Road to Glory was open to All, that Honorary Rewards and Distinctions were the greatest Stimuli to virtuous actions, and that distinguished Merit should not pass unnoticed or unrewarded; and, Whereas a Board of Officers . . . having reported . . .

Now, therefore, Know Ye That the aforesaid Sergeant Elijah Churchill, hath fully and truly deserved, and hath been properly invested with the Honorary Badge of Military Merit, and is authorized and intitled to pass and repass all Guards & Military Posts as fully and amply as any Commissioned officer whatsoever; and is Hereby further Recommended to that favorable Notice which a Brave and Faithful Soldier deserves from his Countrymen."

One month after the Purple Heart Badge of Military Merit was established by general orders, on September 9, 1782, another general order created a board of officers whose duty it was to examine the pretensions and claims of non-commissioned officers and soldiers who were candidates for the Purple Heart. This board did not, apparently, take any action until almost seven months later, when its personnel was Brigadier-General John Groaton,

Colonel Walter Stewart, Lieutenant-Colonel Ebenezer Sprout, and Majors Nicholas Fish and Lemuel Trescott. This personnel is interesting in many ways. Major Fish took part in the assault of the redoubt at Yorktown and, therefore, must have been an eye-witness to Sergeant Brown's gallantry. Major Trescott commanded the detachment that captured Fort Mifflin and therefore had personal knowledge of Sergeant Churchill's bravery. Brigadier-General Gorton had behind him a record of hard and continuous military service from the siege of Boston and the Canadian expedition of 1776, through the entire war. He served until the very end and died within a month of the time the British Army left New York. Colonel Sprout's important service was in the grueling Trenton-Princeton campaign and at Monmouth. He served afterwards as brigade inspector under Baron von Steuben. Colonel Stewart had been aide to Major-General Gates and had received the honor of a sword from the Continental Congress. He had been conspicuous at Brandywine and Germantown and at the time of serving on this board was a Sub-Inspector of the army.

This was the board that recommended the award of the Purple Heart to Sergeants Churchill and Brown. To Churchill, in the words quoted previously, and to Brown because "in the assault of the enemy's left redoubt at Yorktown, in Virginia, on the evening of October 14, 1781 (he) conducted a forlorn hope with great bravery, propriety and deliberate firmness and that his general character appears unexceptionable." This choice of staid words on the part of the board holds some unconscious and unintentional humor. It would be interesting to know if the British soldiers defending the redoubt would have thus described the Connecticut sergeant as he came raging over their breastworks at the head of his glittering bayonets.

On April 27, 1783, General Washington announced in general orders that:

"The Board appointed to take into consideration the claims of the Candidates for the Badge of Merit Report: That Sergeant Churchill of the 2d regt. of Light Dragoons, and Sergeant Brown of the late 5th Connecticut regt., are in their opinion severally entitled to the badge of Military Merit and do therefore recommend them to His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, as suitable characters for that honorary distinction. The Commander-in-Chief is pleased to order the before named Serjt. Elijah Churchill of the 2d regt. of Light Dragoons, and Serjt. Brown of the late 5th Connecticut regiment, to be each of them invested with the badge of merit. They will call at Head Quarters on the third of May, when the necessary Certificate & Badges will be ready for them."

It is greatly to be regretted that no description of this unique presentation ceremony has come to light.

The last entry, so far as known, regarding the Purple Heart, is found in Washington's general orders of June 8, 1783, at Newburgh, when Sergeant Bissell was cited for the decoration. It states that:

"Sergeant Bissell of the 2d Connecticut regiment, having performed some important Services within the immediate knowledge of the Commander-in-Chief, in which the fidelity, perseverance and good Sense of the said Serjt. Bissell were conspicuously manifested; it is therefore ordered that he be honored with the badge of Merit; he will call at Head Quarters on Tuesday next for the insignia and certificate to which he is hereby entitled."

There were no greater honors possible in the Continental Army than to have General George Washington publicly praise a man for his "fidelity, perseverance and good Sense."

The General orders of this same June 8 also directed that "A Board of officers will assemble at the public Buildings on Tuesday at 10 o'clock A. M., to decide upon such pretensions for the badge of merit, as shall be exhibited to them." That there were other enlisted men who gained this distinction seems probable, but no further record has come to light of any awards, other than those to the above three men, of this highest of honors obtained by Continental soldiers.

The pictorial illustration of the Purple Heart as shown herein is one of actual size, being a photograph of the only original and remaining Purple Heart in existence. It is on an old Revolutionary War soldier's uniform resting in the Concord Museum and the property of the Society of the Cincinnati in the State of New Hampshire, having been presented by the patriotic citizen of that State, Mr. W. L. Willey, of Exeter. It is made of purple sprigged silk, faded to a steel grey, edged with a narrow binding, originally silver. It was worn sewn on the left breast of a coarse dark blue homespun coat directly over the heart. Such a combination presented a rather severe and striking impression which was intentionally in keeping with its significance. It is the oldest military order in the world for valor, with the exception of the Order of St. George of Russia established by Empress Catherine II in 1769; which has now become extinct. History reveals that the original order establishing the Purple Heart as quoted herein was never revoked so that the 200th birth anniversary of George Washington was an especially timely, befitting and exemplary date for its revitalization. We are grateful for the urge of those officials in the War Department who sponsored this splendid thought. We must also extend a vivid word of praise to such patriotic Americans as Stephan H. P. Pell, historian and Museum founder of Fort Ticonderoga, whose untiring efforts of nearly ten years standing counseled by the Society of the Cincinnati in the State of New Hampshire, pursued the idea to a reality, thus revivifying a rare military decoration which had been dormant for nearly one hundred and fifty years.

Under changes in Army Regulations just published, award of the Purple Heart is authorized to *persons* who "while serving in the Army of the United States perform any singularly meritorious act of extraordinary fidelity or essential service." Wounds received in action are included in this category. Power to award the decoration is vested in division and higher commanders. Additional singularly meritorious acts performed after the Purple Heart has been awarded are to be rewarded by the grant of the right to wear a bronze oak leaf cluster on the ribbon of the decoration. Except as hereafter noted, the decoration must be awarded within three years from the date of the act or service which earned it. It will not be awarded posthumously. (See War Department Circular No. 6, dated February 22, 1932, for details).

The revised decoration consists of a heart-shaped medal, its face gold bordered and its center of purple enamel. On the obverse is a relief bust of George Washington in the uniform of a general of the Continental Army. Its reverse is gold with the inscription "for military merit." The Washington coat-of-arms is incorporated in the ring which attaches it to a purple ribbon, bordered with white.

From the above military language, it might leave a doubt in the minds of the readers as to whether or not certain commissioned officers stand eligible for the award

of the Purple Heart because of their honorable service plus the fact that they were wounded while serving their country during the World War. However, note is made of the fact that one of the first awards of this revived Order was made to a Colonel who had been a sergeant during the Spanish-American War. It was the expressed and undivided wish of General Washington that this decoration be set aside for non-commissioned officers and common soldiers. Again the records of the war of the

Revolution show that only men in the ranks were so bestowed and then solely in rare cases of recognized and conspicuous personal courage publicly displayed.

The establishing of this order on August 7, 1782, seems in a way to have been an advance thought of the most superior and exclusive of all our officer clans, the Society of the Cincinnati, which was founded May 10, 1783; also, at General Washington's Headquarters at Newburgh on the Hudson.



THE PURPLE HEART

As reestablished February 22, 1932, on the occasion of the Bi-Centennial of the birth of General George Washington

Signal Communication

BY CAPTAIN JAMES F. MORIARTY, U.S.M.C.

(The first two parts of this article appeared in the GAZETTE of November, 1931, and February, 1932. It is here continued.)

■ The preceding parts of this article give a rough historical background, and volumes can be written about the dusty past of Signal Communication, but there is neither space nor time for such. The development of modern means and methods are of more interest and import. Due to lack of time and space, even this must at best be sketchy.

Electrical means of carrying on communication were in use at an early date, but conservatism, prejudice incited chiefly by lack of knowledge of the basic principles underlying this method, and jealousy, militated against any real and rapid advancement in the military organizations of the world.

The art was fostered and nursed by a few who, as usual, never lived to see the future generations revere their names, and these same few had to have the fortitude to force their fellow-humans to accept progress, in spite of themselves.

This particular part of this article will be devoted to the "Military Telegraph."

As stated previously plagiarism is frequently resorted to because other writers have declared themselves so clearly, that no improvement in clarity or briefness can be offered.

It was not until the Crimean War (1854-5) that the first electric telegraph was erected for purely military uses. The British had a telegraph line installed from Varna to the Monastery of St. Georgia, thence to Lord Raglan's headquarters. From this point it was laid to the trenches. A line also connected the principal headquarters of the allied besiegers. In the Indian Mutiny, three years later, the advanced posts and scattered troops of Lord Clyde were kept in telegraphic communication with one another and with the Government at Calcutta. The telegraph was used to coordinate the movements of the armies and to transmit vital intelligence. The wire was carried on rollers, and in carts, and as it unwound, it was allowed to lie on the ground or bushes, or hung on trees and bamboo. Most of it was uninsulated. In dry weather this line is said to have worked one hundred miles, but it was doubtless useless when wet or even moist.

Truenfeld in his "War Telegraphy" states that "if not a thorough success during the two years' war, it certainly did most excellent service." The Crimean and Indian Wars brought the use of the telegraph to the attention of the German Military and they, it appears, were, about 1855, the first in times of peace to introduce the telegraph as a permanent part of their army organization, and their first employment of this method was in 1864 in the war with Denmark.

The British in 1857 began teaching the junior engineer officers of the army their telegraph system for field service and the French used the telegraph the same year in their Algerian War. Two years later the Spanish Government Telegraph Company sent a corps of telegraphers, with the Spanish Army, into Morocco and their equipment was so light and serviceable that Truenfeld (in his "War Telegraphy") who had much service in South America, with war telegraphy, writes very complimentary concerning it and shows also its usefulness. The French used it in their Italian Campaigns and seem to have set the Italians thinking, for, in 1860-1861 the Italians used it in their operations against Ancona, both in keeping the advancing columns in constant communication, and in preserving the besieging forces, when fairly established about the place, from serious assault. These dates are interesting.

Although the telegraph is a "child of the United States" and although the first telegraphic message—"What hath God wrought"—was transmitted in the United States, nevertheless our Military Forces blindly turned their backs on a system which later, in the War of the Rebellion, and shortly after, an Army doctor forced down the throats of the conservatives who were tied by the coat-tails to the system of communication used by Caesar and Napoleon.

As usual, we tag along behind European armies and pay the price in blood and cold cash, for our lethargy.

The Civil War broke, and, like all other wars in which we indulged, we were unprepared. The Signal Corps, as we now know it, was about to experience the usual throes which every technical branch, Signalling, Aviation, etc., must pass through. A few interested hard working men, familiar with their subject, must attempt to sell the idea to a conservative (due to lack of knowledge), prejudiced authority.

Dr. Myers, a surgeon, serving in the southwest, developed a system of communications with flags and his reputation eventually landed him in Washington with the rank of Major. He was told to organize a Signal Corps. At that time the United States had a fair network of commercial and railway telegraphs, organized and operated by an efficient personnel. Myers' idea was to unify all communication systems under one head.

It was very apparent from the beginning that efforts were making in other directions for the establishment of the Signal Telegraph as a separate branch of the service under a distinct control of its own. Corporations interested in the telegraph as ordinarily used, were opposed to the idea of allowing it, or permitting its management in the least degree, to pass from under their immediate con-

trol. In support of this opinion the citizen, too, was very jealous of the least infringement upon civilian duties (as the working of the telegraph might be considered) by the government.

Hence the Civil War opened with a two-headed monster for communications—one a Civilian telegraph organization under a Civilian head responsible only to the Secretary of War, and the other a purely Military "visual" organization.

The Civilian organization employed civilian operators at the headquarters of the various units. Operators were "attached" to a certain general, controlled the codes and ciphers, were not subject to military discipline, and to all intents and purposes were doing the Army a favor by operating the telegraph key.

Let us take the story of the Military Telegraph chronologically. A number of these excerpts were taken from Mr. Plum's notes. His two volumes on the subject are filled with interest.

For the first seven months of the Civil War the U. S. Military Telegraph was without an organized head and it was a case of everyone trying to do something and really not much of anything being done.

The First Government Telegraph line built, connected the War Department with the Navy Yard, Washington, D. C.

Shortly after, Colonel Scott invested Mr. David Strouse (an operator from the Pennsylvania Railroad) with powers (but no money) to erect and maintain such Federal Telegraphs as should be required by the Military Authorities at Washington, D. C., and the Department of the Potomac but left him dependent upon the American Telegraph Company for every dollar necessarily expended in building, operating and maintaining such lines. E. S. Sanford, president of that company, was, more than any other man, responsible for furnishing nearly all the funds and supplies used by the U. S. Telegraph in the Department of the Potomac for seven months. What an embarrassment of riches—for the U. S.!

During the seven months the usual troubles broke out. Conflict immediately arose between the civilian and military telegraphs and we find operators asleep and deserting at Bull Run. One operator's report is quite interesting. It reads as follows:

"After McDowell's extraordinary efforts to stay the retreat of his troops had failed and there was no longer any need for the Office at Fairfax Court House, it was at 1:20 A. M. on July 22 closed."—Well, so it was!

Even though our Army had a Chief Signal Officer, nevertheless we find that from July to October, Mr. J. R. Gilmore was Superintendent of Military Telegraphs in the Department of the Potomac.

"One Sunday night, September 7th, Gilmore was ordered by the Assistant Secretary of War to build a telegraph line to Bank's Army!"

What, from the most ancient times, other Commanders had dimly comprehended, Napoleon first saw clearly enough to crystalize into his maxim—"Le secret de la guerre est dans le secret de communications"—but Napoleon must have groaned when his shade saw the uncoordinated efforts of a number of really capable men refusing to get together towards the accomplishment of a common result.

To visualize some of the work and problems of the communication units during the Civil War let us thumb

over the old files of that period and glance through the histories of these units. We find that on the twenty-third of June General McClellan took command in person, at Grafton. Detaching a force under General J. D. Cox to watch General Wise in the Kanawha Valley, McClellan advanced early in July from Clarksburg via Buckhannon with the main body and the first field telegraph that ever advanced with an Army, in America, kept pace with this one. For the first fifteen miles or so, the builders, being troops detailed for that purpose, were under Mr. Fuller's (civilian) direction, and subsequently, until Beverly and Huttonville were reached, under Mr. David (civilian). Buckhannon, twenty-eight miles, was reached on the fifth. At this point the telegraph service was highly complimented by General McClellan's staff—notably by Captain Saxton, Chief Quartermaster, and Captain McFeeley, Chief Commissary, who openly declared that "but for the telegraph the Army would have been delayed many days at Buckhannon," * * * but this ray of sunshine brought about by signal communication was overshadowed by a very sad message, because the next day, July 22, Scott notified McClellan by telegraph of McDowell's defeat, nearly in these words, "We have been badly beaten. Our Army is in full retreat, a wonderful transformation of a well appointed Army into a rabble," and ordered him (McClellan) to Arlington immediately.

In spite of the fact that foreign armies had successfully organized and utilized signal units using the telegraph in campaign, we read that about August first (oh, yes, many years afterward and with the Union Army up to its ears in a war) a Mr. George H. Smith was appointed by General Fremont, *manager* of all Government telegraphs in his department. Mr. Smith organized the first telegraph battalion of three companies. This battalion rebuilt the telegraph line to Irontown, Rolla and Sedalia from Jefferson City to a point twenty-five miles south of Syracuse; from St. Louis arsenal to Benton barracks, six miles, and laid a cable across the river, connecting Palmyra and Quincy. All this was before November, 1861.

There being no legal authority for the organization of the battalion, it was disbanded by order of the Secretary of War about the first of November and in the midst of a war! Surely we are proud of our thoughtful and deep thinking forebears. No commissions were ever issued, but the title of Major was permanently attached to Mr. Smith, and sadder, but not wiser, we read further and find that General Sickles' brigade had a telegraph unit called "Chester's Telegraph Corps," in which Mr. Frank A. Lamb and Mr. C. L. Brown were the only operators. This company, or so called "Corps," was enlisted as telegraph troops, having been instructed and trained as such, and was sworn into the service for three years. In spite of the scarcity of telegraph technicians these men were held to ordinary soldier's duty.

The situation bettered when civilian managers and assistant managers were given Commissions in the Quartermaster Corps. It appears, however, that this was done, not to coordinate the signal systems, but to find some legal method for paying these men and to permit them to sign requisitions. The telegraph certainly surprised Secretary of War Stanton. General McClellan, on the Peninsula, apparently decided to give his chief some very definite information as to the state of affairs while nine thousand Federals lay dead or wounded around Gaines

Mills. McClellan to Stanton, by telegraph: "If I save this army now, I tell you plainly that I owe no thanks to you or any other person in Washington. You have done your best to sacrifice this army" (Plum—"Military Telegraph in the Civil War," page 155).

To those of us, who have a smattering acquaintance with the Battle of Fredericksburg, will come a wonderful vision of another probable result of that famous debacle when we think of what a single telegraph line from Burnside on Stafford Heights to each of his corps commanders, Hooker, Sumner and Franklin, would have done. What reputations would have been made and saved! Let us read on and take a peek at some of the signal activities with Hooker's galloping Federals at Chancellorsville. Students of the Battle of Chancellorsville will find an interesting explanation of certain events in the following quotation.

"The Signal Corps put up a line from Banks to United States Ford, about ten miles, expecting to work it with Beardslee's magneto instruments (a trick device saddled on the Signal Corps), but soon after the Army movement began, General Hooker became dissatisfied with its slow work and ordered General Crouch, who was at United States Ford with a part of his Corps to 'establish rapid communications with the telegraph from Banks to United States Ford.' The civilian Telegraph Corps at once took possession of the Signal Corps line and worked it with Morse instruments (note—no fault of the Signal Corps as Major Myers could not make the powers that be believe that he should have trained operators). But the Signal Corps built and operated the only telegraph connecting the United States Ford with the Army about Chancellorsville and as a consequence, business being very great, most of the messages were sent to General Hooker by orderlies.

As soon as the pontoon bridge was laid on April 30 the wire was extended across the river and an office opened in a house near the ford. * * * At Banks Ford, about ten miles down and across the river, were two more telegraph offices, one at the ford, where Mr. W. K. DeWitt operated, and another a little back on the main line, operated by Mr. John B. Pierce. Pierce was later relieved by Mr. Samuel H. Edwards. A Beardslee telegraph was also operated from this ford to headquarters in the rear, as soon as General Sedgwick located there, after returning from his operations on the south side. * * * From a point near Falmouth, messages for Sedgwick, and Reynolds, across below, were to be carried by courier. At least all obtainable information tends to induce that belief. Why a line was not erected upon the heels of Sedgwick's advance and he kept in constant telegraphic communication with the Commanding General at Chancellorsville is an enigma. General Hooker soon felt a natural embarrassment consequent upon a lack of telegraphic facilities, for which it would seem he was responsible, for certainly had lines been ordered, Major Eckert would have had no difficulties in constructing them. Perhaps too much reliance was placed on the Signal Service (note—which had no control over the civilian Military Telegraph) concerning which its chief subsequently reported "In the movements at Chancellorsville, crippled as the Signal Corps was by the failure, through no fault of its own, of some of the apparatus, it rendered such service that it maintained communication with General Sedgwick's Sixth Army Corps, over the heads of the Confed-

erates, even though Sedgwick was entirely cut off. * * * He (Hooker) had previously directed his chief of staff to remain at Falmouth as "from that point," said Hooker, "it being central and the wires meeting there, it is necessary to have some one, in whose capacity and judgment I had confidence."

* * * * *

Hooker, thinking Sedgwick had recrossed at 9 P. M. of the 2d, caused him to be telegraphed to cross at Fredericksburg "on receipt of this order, etc., etc." * * * That despatch which Sedgwick says was dated 10:10 P. M. transmitted over twenty-five miles of wire and carried three more by courier was received at 11:00 P. M. and acknowledged at once. Operator Emerick, at United States Ford, wrote in his diary "We are defeated. Poor General Hooker and his staff, holding consultation with general officers in our office this evening. The General is extremely nervous, though this may be entirely attributable to a pillar, against which he was leaning today, having been shattered by a shot, giving him a terrible shock. For this, *or some other reason*, his mental faculties may almost be said to be temporarily impaired."

Sedgwick in reply by telegraph to Hooker's inquiry regarding Sedgwick's condition and position was transmitted from Banks Ford at 11:45 A. M. as follows: "My army is hemmed in upon the slope covered by the guns from the north side of Banks Ford. If I had only this army to care for, I would withdraw it tonight. Do your operations require that I should jeopard by retaining it here? An immediate answer is indispensable."

General Hooker directed Sedgwick to cross. A few minutes later Hooker received another telegram from Sedgwick saying he would hold his position. Hooker told him to do so and the next he received was dated 5:00 A. M., the fifth, stating that Sedgwick was across.

Hooker explains this as follows: "The messenger with the first dispatch had to ride, perhaps, three miles to reach the place of telegraphing and after he was sent off, General Sedgwick sent another messenger immediately, with the dispatch that he could hold the position, expecting that the second messenger would be able to overtake the first message. But instead of that, the first messenger rode the fastest and the message he bore reached me perhaps ten minutes before the second. Both were answered immediately on their receipt, but in some way the last was delayed in reaching General Sedgwick." A fine military stew made out of a rattled General and two runners, well seasoned with a few miles of telegraph wire.

General Burnside in his landing force attack against the forts on Roanoke Island, had telegraph material and equipment (February, 1862). Mr. Fred J. Grace, an expert telegrapher, accompanied Farragut while running the forts at New Orleans and the batteries at Vicksburg. During the siege of Port Hudson the Union wires were lengthened and offices advanced towards the enemy's works whenever the Federals moved forward."

And then we read "General W. T. Sherman in command at New Orleans, in the absence of General Banks, placed one of his officers in charge of telegraphs, whereupon the two operators rebelled, and being threatened with imprisonment, resigned and refused to reconsider their resignations on Bulkley's (Superintendent of Telegraphs under Banks) return, to remedy matters."



The First Battalion, Royal Welch Fusiliers, headed by their mascot, arriving at Buckingham Palace to be inspected by the King, their Commander-in-Chief. The battalion returned to England recently after eighteen years' continuous service abroad.

The King and Royal Welch Fusiliers

■ After 18 years' continuous foreign service, officers and men of the 1st Battalion, The Royal Welch Fusiliers, were received by the King at Buckingham Palace yesterday.

Headed by the regimental mascot, a white goat with long white horns, a detachment of nearly 100 officers and men, including the band and drums, and officially described as "a representative party," marched into the Palace grounds through the garden entrance.

The King, who is Colonel-in-Chief of the regiment, was in khaki Service uniform. He inspected the detachment, and, after the officers had been presented to him, joined the detachment while a photograph was taken. Addressing the officers and men, he said:

It gives me much pleasure to inspect this detachment and to offer the First Battalion a warm welcome back to this country.

I know how much you must all be looking forward to a tour of home service, and to being with your families, relations, and friends.

You began your foreign service in January, 1914, and of more than 800 officers and men who left these shores for Malta only four, whom I am glad to see here today, are still serving with the Battalion.

The last 18 years have added fresh lustre to the Regiment both in peace and war.

During the South African Campaign King Edward conferred on me the honour of becoming your Colonel-in-Chief. Ever since that day I have always followed with unfailing interest your fortunes.

As your Colonel-in-Chief I share your pride in your 117 Battle Honours, and I wish good luck and prosperity to my Royal Welch Fusiliers.

The detachment left the Palace gardens with the band playing "Men of Harlech."

The battalion left England at the beginning of 1914 for Malta, where they remained until they were drafted to France. In November, 1917, they were in Italy, and in 1919 they saw service in India. Ten years later they went to the Sudan. They returned to England last April for the first time for 18 years with the exception of a short period immediately after the War, when a certain proportion of the 1st Battalion returned home to be reformed.

The Colonel of the regiment, Major-General Sir Charles Dobell, and the Officer Commanding the 1st Battalion, Lieutenant-Colonel E. O. Skaife, were with the detachment.

—From *The Evening Standard*, London, July 5, 1932.

The above account, with illustrations, of the reception at Buckingham Palace, London, on July 4, 1932, *our Independence Day*, of the First Battalion, Royal Welch Fusiliers, the 23rd Foot, after 18 years' service abroad, should be interesting to the U. S. Marine Corps. The Royal Welch Fusiliers served with Pitcairn's Marines at Lexington in 1775. They also served afloat as Marines in August and September, 1778, with Admiral Lord Viscount Howe's fleet, these services being offered in honor of their Colonel-in-Chief, Admiral Howe's brother, Sir William Howe, Commander-in-Chief of the British forces in America. Detachments of the 23rd Foot, as Marines, participated on H. M. S. *Renown*, a 50-gun ship, in an engagement with the French ship, *Languedoc*, 90 guns, Admiral Comte d'Estaing's flagship, and on H. M. S. *Isis*, 50 guns, in an encounter with the French *Caesar*, 74 guns, their spirited and gallant behaviour on both occasions being noted in official reports. At the close of our War of the Revolution the 23rd Foot served "with uncommon gallantry" with the British Marines from H. M. S. *Charon* and H. M. S. *Guadelphe*, at York-

town. The Marine Corps' association with this distinguished regiment came later when Waller's American Marines in North China, in 1900, with Gwynne's Second Battalion, Royal Welch Fusiliers, participated in the relief of Tientsin, China. There, among other Americans who owed their lives to that joint service, was a young mining engineer, by name, Herbert Hoover, whose family was with him. Two years ago, President Hoover's description of this historic incident was printed under date of April 28, 1930, in the *London Times* as follows:

"ANGLO-AMERICAN MEMORIES"

"The Gridiron Club, whose members are the flower of the correspondents in Washington and the salt of whose dinners is a merciless flaying of persons and politics, turned serious for a moment last night and recalled how, 30 years ago, the United States Marines and the Royal Welch Fusiliers had together relieved Tientsin and clasped hands in friendship. A young American engineer named Hoover, who was among the beleaguered and is now President of the United States, and a young Lieutenant of Marines who received a wound and was carried off by Fusiliers, and is now Major General Smedley Butler, sat at the high table and watched the ceremony. On the President's right was the British Ambassador, Sir Ronald Lindsay.

"President Hoover in his speech recalled how, in the Boxer campaign of 1900, for weeks some 900 soldiers and sailors of 11 nationalities, with 300 civilians—a quarter of whom were Americans—had fought in the trenches and behind the barricades against tens of thousands of fanatical Chinese; how they had come to the point of exhaustion and to the edge of despair, when one morning the enemy firing ceased, the attackers melted away, and a few hours later the column of Marines and Fusiliers marched into the Settlement. And there was a Club spokesman to tell how, when the Marines had asked why the battles of the American Revolution were not embroidered as honours on the Colour of the Fusiliers they were told that the Regiment would never permit it because these were fought against men of our own blood, and to recall how, when General Pershing and his staff had landed at Liverpool in 1917 the Royal Welch Fusiliers were drawn up as their escort.

"So 500 men got to their feet when an American flag, carried by a Marine, and a British flag, carried by an Englishman in uniform, were borne on to a little stage,

and the Marine band marched stiffly into place behind them. Then John Philip Sousa himself, 'the March King,' as Americans call him, stepped to the conductor's stand and led the first public performance of his latest composition, 'The Royal Welch Fusiliers,' the full score of which is to be presented to the Regiment it honours by the American Ambassador in London.

"The little ceremony was a touching and graceful tribute to an old comradeship, and it was plain to see that the President was moved. So indeed was everybody else, and something of this stirring of heart was in the warmth of the reception given to Sir Ronald Lindsay when he rose in his place for a first introduction to the Club and its guests."

General Charles G. Dawes, then the American Ambassador at London, referred to the Marine Corps in its relation to this incident in these terms:

"No more opportune or useful contribution could have been made at this time to Anglo-American understanding and friendship than this action of the United States Marine Corps and Mr. Sousa."

Colonel Frank E. Evans, U.S.M.C., who is enroute to Morocco to observe the French Foreign Legion operations in North Africa, recently arrived at Gibraltar, which is the present station of the Royal Welch Fusiliers, and the following extract from a letter of Colonel Evans, dated "Gibraltar, 8 July, 1932," recounts the latest reunion of the Welch Fusiliers and the American Marines.

"Two days out from here I had a radio from the Consul giving me the invitation of the Colonel and officers of the Royal Welch Fusiliers for their monthly regimental dinner. I went with the acting Consul, William Corcoran, and we had a delightful evening last night. I wore my whites with miniature medals. Colonel Hewitt is one of the most charming men I've ever met and the whole outfit was splendid. Both Corcoran and I had some misgivings as to what might happen to two Yanks, but there was not even a suspicion that they had any designs on us. It was a delightful dinner and during dinner the regimental orchestra played the Royal Welch Fusiliers and The Halls of Montezuma. After dinner we adjourned to the billiard room when the youngsters put on a game of billiard fives that ended in an amusing rough house. We broke up at midnight in perfect order and I am writing this before Hewitt drops around at nine to drive me around the place. I called on General Crichton the day I arrived and have met a great many of the colony and have found them a most hospitable and fine host. Tomorrow I sail for Tangier, have a three hours' wait and then the night train for Rabat."



U. S. Marine Corps Operating Plan, for the Fiscal Year 1933

Approved by the Major-General Commandant

■ The Naval policy as laid down by the GENERAL BOARD is: TO MAINTAIN THE MARINE CORPS PERSONNEL AT SUFFICIENT STRENGTH FOR CURRENT REQUIREMENTS. Accordingly, for the Fiscal Year 1932, the Marine Corps had an enlisted strength of 17,500, which was barely adequate to perform Marine Corps duties. During the year this force was reduced for economic reasons by 2,177, although the duties of the Corps had not been decreased, but instead, had been increased. The Bureau of the Budget approved of estimates to maintain 1,030 commissioned officers, 154 warrant and warrant commissioned officers, and 15,343 enlisted marines for the Fiscal Year 1933 (inclusive of 67 in the Marine Band). The reduction thus made is keenly felt and the Corps' efficiency is now below the limit of safety. If any further reduction is made

in enlisted men, the Corps would be unable to carry out the normal demands that are made on it and unable as well, to meet any emergencies that may occur in the future.

OPERATING PLAN OF THE U. S. MARINE CORPS FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 1933.

PLAN AND MISSION UPON WHICH IT IS BASED

The Operating plan of the U. S. Marine Corps for the Fiscal Year 1933 has been formulated with the view to accomplishing, in so far as is possible with the means available, the Marine Corps MISSION. This MISSION, assigned under the Fundamental Naval Policy of the United States defined by the General Board of the Navy, is adequately to support the Navy by furnishing:

DISTRIBUTION FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 1933

	Off.	W. O.	Enl.	Number of enlisted men short of those necessary to fill mini- mum re- quirements
(1) Ships' detachments	63	0	2,132	
(2) Shore Establishments in U. S.	122	21	3,638	292
(3) Garrisons of permanent stations outside U. S.	56	11	1,398	228
(4) Emergency forces now on active duty outside U. S. (Haiti, Nicaragua and China)	137	21	2,755	
(5) Constabulary detachments (Haiti and Nicaragua)	97	6	214	
(6) Marine Corps Aviation	129	13	950	
(7) General administrative activities	68	36	407	
(8) Recruiting service	16	0	125	125
(9) Service Schools (School staffs and Students)	121	1	84	
(10) Recruit training stations (includes staff and recruits under instruction)	38	8	897	165
(11) Permanent garrisons of stations of units available to the Fleet (exclusive of mobile forces)	48	24	941	
(12) Special duty with Army and Navy	14	0	7	
(13) Marine Band	0	0	67	
(14) Other Marine Corps Activities	22	0	385	
(15) Non-effectives (troops in transit, sick, men due for dis- charge, etc.)	72	11	1,069	
(16) Forces available in the U. S. to support the Fleet, Emergency ..	27	2	274	1,847
TOTALS	1,030	154	15,343	2,657
Budget reduction in officer strength authorized by law	63			
Additional enlisted needed to meet <i>minimum</i> naval require- ments			2,657	
TOTALS	1,093	154	18,000	

DETACHMENTS TO VESSELS OF THE FLEET IN FULL COMMISSION;

GUARDS FOR SHORE STATIONS;

GARRISONS FOR OUTLYING POSITIONS, AND

BY THE MAINTENANCE IN READINESS OF EXPEDITIONARY FORCES.

In consideration of the foregoing, the operating plan of the Marine Corps for the Fiscal Year 1933 provides for the distribution of available personnel in the most economical manner consistent with the most effective possible support of the operating plan of the Navy.

In order that the Marine Corps may fulfill its MISSION under the operating plan of the Navy for the Fiscal Year 1933, the activities enumerated in the preceding paragraph should be maintained with complements not below those shown. Because of the limitations imposed by the Budgetary Estimates (1,030 officers, 154 warrant and commissioned warrant officers and 15,276 enlisted men exclusive of 67 in the Marine Band) these complements necessarily below the minimum consistent with satisfactory operation cannot be increased.

NECESSITY FOR MAINTAINING FORCES IN READINESS

The Marine Corps is maintained as a mobile force of sea soldiers. It has its peculiar prime Naval MISSION. It must furnish to the FLEET in war, or in advance of war, a part of the FLEET'S Tactical organization. It must supply an advanced base force of sufficient numbers, organized and equipped to seize and hold that base upon which alone the FLEET can widen its field or area of effective Naval control. Therefore, in time of peace there must be available a force of marines organized and trained available to support the FLEET in time of emergency. Such a force should be periodically trained with the FLEET and thus properly prepared for its work. The principal organizations of this Force should be concentrated at the Marine Corps' main stations.

There are other occasions where the marines have been called upon for prompt service, as, for example, today in China, where they are protecting lives and property of American citizens; in Haiti, where they are carrying out Treaty obligations, and in Nicaragua, where they are assisting that unfortunate government. As well, Marines have been called on for other emergencies so that it is doubly important that there be at the two principal Marine stations (Quantico and San Diego) forces in readiness for prompt emergency service. This does not necessarily mean that this force should be a large one, but it should be adequate to meet Naval requirements.

The foregoing considerations dictate the necessity for the Marine Corps to have available a force organized and trained for that paramount duty—service with the Fleet—and capable of moving out on short notice. In the event of an emergency that requires the prompt dispatching of this force and if such force is not immediately available, the only alternative is the hasty assembling of detachments from a large number of stations separated by considerable distances. The disadvantages are obvious. The efficiency of the depleted stations will be impaired; there will be delay in the movement of this emergency force which, owing to lack of time, would not be organized and trained sufficiently to insure its ability to meet fully all conditions which may arise.

STRENGTH AT WHICH FORCES IN READINESS SHOULD BE MAINTAINED

The ideal situation would be to have two Marine forces, one based on Quantico, the other at San Diego, at full strength ready for instant service with the Fleet. It is realized that this is not possible at this time. Even if all the emergency forces now on duty outside of the United States were available and the enlisted strength of the Corps increased to 18,000, there would be only 165 officers, 23 warrant and commissioned warrant officers, and 4,876 enlisted men, available to support the Fleet. These numbers, except for shortage of officers, are barely adequate to meet the minimum requirements for emergency forces in readiness.

REQUIREMENTS FOR FORCES IN READINESS

In order to meet the *minimum* Naval requirements, the Marine Corps should have available for service with the Fleet and ready to mobilize at Quantico on this coast:

271 Officers.
22 Warrant officers.
4,894 Enlisted men.

There should be available on both coasts to meet *minimum* Naval Requirements to be mobilized at Quantico and San Diego:

312 Officers.
25 Warrant officers.
5,766 Enlisted men.

In order to meet the maximum Naval requirements of forces in readiness, the Marine Corps must have available on both coasts:

356 Officers.
27 Warrant officers.
6,600 Enlisted men.

Today, the Marine Corps theoretically has available for the formation of an emergency force in readiness only a small part of the personnel required for the minimum force in readiness, namely:

27 Officers.
3 Warrant officers.
274 Enlisted men.

Theoretically this personnel can be concentrated in one place and can be organized and trained as a small emergency force. Experience has shown, however, that this is not practical for the reasons that constant emergency calls for small detachments, and the large percentage of men not available for training in emergency forces due to lack of time of current enlistment reduces materially the number theoretically available.

Actually, the Marine Corps today has no organized and trained emergency force in readiness. It has at Quantico and at San Diego the nuclei of several small units which might properly form a part of such emergency force in readiness. These units, however, are skeletonized, independent units, divided between Quantico and San Diego, and are not, in fact, an emergency force in readiness in being.

When the absent troops now in Nicaragua return there will be available the following additional troops:

94 Officers.
9 Warrant officers.
647 Enlisted men.

This will raise the number theoretically available for

the formation of an emergency force in readiness to a total of:

- 121 Officers.
- 11 Warrant officers.
- 921 Enlisted men.

The factors which prevent the number now theoretically available for the formation of emergency force in readiness from being concentrated at one place and organized into a compact, well-balanced force will operate to reduce the number that will become theoretically available when the troops are withdrawn from Nicaragua, and under the best conditions it will be possible to organize and to maintain in being a very small part of the minimum emergency force in readiness required.

The estimates given in the preceding paragraph meet the requirements for emergencies arising in peace time, and as a trained nucleus for war expansion in support of the Fleet.

The estimates of the forces in readiness, above, will be slightly increased as the result of the withdrawal from the Garde d'Haiti of some of the Marine Corps' personnel now serving in that organization. Since there are but 30 officers, 3 warrant officers and 75 enlisted men now in the Garde, the gain from this source will be negligible.

There appears to be no possibility of a return of the Fourth Marines from China, so that force cannot be considered a part of the force in readiness in the United States.

INADEQUACY OF NUMBERS AVAILABLE TO MEET REQUIREMENTS FOR FORCE IN READINESS

With but 23 officers, 2 warrant officers and 274 enlisted men in the force in readiness, there is slightly below 10 per cent of requirements of officers and warrant officers and but 6 per cent of enlisted men in this force.

With the return of troops from Nicaragua, there would be in the force in readiness a total of 121 officers, 11 warrant officers and 921 enlisted men; this gives slightly over 40 per cent in officers and warrant officers and but 20 per cent of enlisted men of the readiness force.

As previously stated, there is little probability of the 4th Marines returning from China for some time. As well there is no reason for including in our estimates the small force in Haiti.

Under any of the considerations noted above, a situation requiring an expeditionary force, even approximating in numbers the minimum required, would necessitate the depletion of activities essential to adequate support of the Operating Plan of the Navy.

The marine complements of the different Naval activities in the United States would be the ones to suffer. As these activities are now operating with marine complements below their requirements for satisfactory performance of their missions, and further reduction, at the expense of these activities, would be to the detriment of the efficiency of the activities concerned.

ADDITIONAL CALLS FOR MARINE PERSONNEL IN 1933

The Marine Corps in the Fiscal Year 1933, will furnish marine detachments for three new cruisers, viz., INDIANAPOLIS, PORTLAND and NEW ORLEANS, a total of 120 enlisted; it will as well be called on to furnish a detachment to the Air Base at Sunnyvale, California, of about 200 men. Foreign duty for the junior officers and enlisted men of the Marine Corps is arduous.

They are making too frequent trips to foreign duty without adequate relief. It is detrimental to their morale. The Marine Corps should have sufficient forces to provide adequate relief for the foreign duty, thus preventing too frequent repetition of this duty for the same officers and men.

EFFECTIVE STRENGTH OF MARINE CORPS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1933

In determining the effective strength of the Marine Corps allowance must be made for non-effectives such as those in transit, sick, men due for discharge, etc. These non-effectives normally amount to at least 7% of the total strength.

	Off.	W.O.	Enl.
Total strength (Budget Estimate) ..	1030	154	15,276*
Deduction of 7% for non-effectives ..	72	11	1,069
EFFECTIVE STRENGTH ..	958	143	14,207

*Exclusive of Marine Band.

AVAILABLE FOR FORCES IN READINESS

	Off.	W.O.	Enl.
Effective strength	958	143	14,207
Less activities listed above	909	140	13,466

AVAILABLE THROUGHOUT THE YEAR (1933) BUT DISTRIBUTED IN ALL ACTIVITIES OF THE MARINE CORPS; IMPRACTICABLE TO ASSEMBLE AS A SINGLE ORGANIZATION

	Off.	W.O.	Enl.
Available throughout year (1933) ..	27	2	274
Additional after return from Nicaragua (tentatively in early part of 1933)	94	9	647

AVAILABLE AFTER RETURN FROM NICARAGUA

	Off.	W.O.	Enl.
Available after return from Nicaragua ..	121	11	921

Before the return of marines from Nicaragua, the force in readiness is short the following number of officers and men:

- 244 Officers.
- 20 Warrant officers.
- 4,620 Enlisted men.

After the return of the marines from Nicaragua in January next, the force in readiness is short the following number of officers and men:

- 150 Officers.
- 9 Warrant officers.
- 3,973 Enlisted men.

The foregoing considerations relate only to the insufficiency of personnel to meet the *minimum requirements* for a force in readiness. When the *greater requirements* are considered, the gravity of the situation becomes even more apparent.

Consideration of all the factors involved leads to the following conclusions:

(a) That the Marine Corps, with the strength provided by the Budget estimate for the Fiscal Year 1933, and with no additional duties imposed upon it, will encounter serious difficulty in the accomplishment of its MISSION of adequately supporting the NAVY and, even under the most favorable conditions, will not be able to meet the requirements for forces in readiness;

(b) That the figures approved by the Bureau of the Budget must be increased if the Marine Corps is to accomplish its MISSION of adequately supporting the NAVY.

(c) That in order to meet the requirements of the NAVY Operating Plan, the Marine Corps should be maintained at a strength of 1,093 officers, 154 warrant and commissioned warrant officers, and 18,000 enlisted men.

(d) That based on a strength of 15,343 enlisted the Marine Corps will have available in its Readiness

Force but 27 officers, 2 warrant officers, and 274 enlisted men. This force is today short 244 officers, 20 warrant and commissioned warrant officers, and 4,620 enlisted men of the *minimum requirements* of the FORCE IN READINESS.

DECISION :

1. Congress will be strongly urged to provide the appropriations necessary to maintain the Marine Corps at a strength to meet the requirements of plans for emergencies arising in peace time, and as a trained nucleus for war expansion in support of the FLEET, namely, 1,093 officers, 154 warrant and commissioned warrant officers and 18,000 enlisted men.

2. Based on the 1933 Budgetary estimates, the Marine Corps will maintain the activities enumerated above, with complements substantially as shown therein, such distribution to constitute the Operating Plan for the Marine Corps for the Fiscal Year 1933.



Increased Membership: The Marine Corps Association

BY BRIGADIER GENERAL GEORGE RICHARDS, U.S.M.C.

■ The Marine Corps Association, organized April 25, 1913, at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to disseminate among its members knowledge of the military art, to provide for the improvement of their professional attainments, to foster the spirit and preserve the traditions of the United States Marine Corps and to increase the efficiency of its members, found itself at the cross roads about six months ago. Out of the Marine Corps commissioned, commissioned warrant and warrant officer personnel, aggregating 1178, only 403 officers were enrolled as active members. Of our 12 general officers, line and staff, only 9 were members of the association, of our 34 colonels, line and staff, only 21 were enrolled, of our 44 like lieutenant colonels there were 27, and of our 124 majors only 62, while in the lower grades dissimilar conditions did not to any great extent prevail. Various propositions in connection with the Association had been proposed. It had been suggested, with the consent of the membership, that the Association be consolidated with the U. S. Naval Institute—also, that its publication *THE MARINE CORPS GAZETTE* be merged with *The Leatherneck*—further, that it, as an organization so instituted and for the objects described, had outlived its usefulness and should be abolished.

The officers of the Association, however, did not believe that circumstances existed warranting consideration of either of the first two proposals, however much under different conditions such might seem desirable. Nor did our natural pride in the efficiency of our Corps permit us to believe that our officer personnel, before described, is now so sated with knowledge of the ever changing military art, so perfect in its professional attainments, and so indoctrinated in our sacred traditions that the, so called, puny efforts of the Marine Corps Association in the direction of improvements could be safely dispensed with. The answer to our questions, the solution of our perplexing difficulties lay in other directions. We would endeavor first to improve our publication, *THE MARINE CORPS GAZETTE*—make it a more attractive issue, at least for once—then appeal for additional support from our officer personnel. It was thought these measures were at least worthy of trial. It was our belief that our efforts in this direction might not only add to our membership, but bring forth valuable suggestions looking to continued improvement in methods for the advancement of the purposes of our organization. Thus far the results of our efforts have been most gratifying.

The responsibility for drafting and distributing the appeal of the Marine Corps Association was lodged upon this writer. The entire officer personnel of the Marine Corps, save those who were members in March last, are presumably familiar with its terms. To those who have responded, either one way or another, this writer returns his most grateful thanks. Many did not respond either orally or by letter. That list includes some officers believed to be interested in the broad purposes of the Association, as well as others known to the service as en-

lightened, progressive and able officers concerned in the welfare of the Corps. It must be presumed that the appeal never came to their attention. It should be stated, however, and in this connection, that General Fuller, as President of the Association, at the time warmly endorsed this appeal. A letter was sent by him in that capacity (i. e., not as Commandant of the Marines) to the commanding officers of various units and posts reminding them that he had once said as Commandant of the Marine Corps "that he thought it their duty (i. e., of all officers of the Marine Corps) to support the purposes of the Marine Corps Association." General Fuller did say to these commanding officers that he would give them the names of any delinquents "that we may know in cases where support is declined the reasons therefor." Many commanding officers have reported, in this connection, either to General Fuller or to this writer that their officers made return one hundred per cent strong. For the information of those who did not respond one way or another, it may be stated that other means are under consideration through which it may definitely be known from them whether they are to be considered as officers of the Corps willing to assist, under the established methods of the Association, in improving the efficiency of the Marine Corps.

For the information of our existing membership, especially those new members we so warmly welcome, in the hope that they may communicate this data elsewhere, it may be said that 870 appeals were sent out by this writer under date of March 10, 1932. To date 341 applications have been received for enrollments. As a result the Marine Corps Association has now 744 active members, in addition to the associate members of the enlisted personnel, few in number, who pay a reduced rate as subscription to our magazine. This has increased the annual income of the Association from the figure of March 1, 1932, \$1209.00, to \$2232.00, an increase of 80 per cent. There has been, also, an increase in the enrollment of officers of the Marine Corps Reserve. This increased circulation of the magazine tends to add to the income we may hope to receive from paid advertisements.

The Association publishes its magazine; the membership receives copies—but no officer should understand that in joining the Association as a member he is subscribing to a magazine. That publication and its distribution are the means through which the purposes of the Association are fulfilled. It is an effective medium through which cohesiveness in the Marine Corps officer personnel can be secured. And if the Marine Corps Association includes but a part of our officer personnel, then only that part can be considered compact. Those who refrain from joining the Association voluntarily place themselves beyond the pale. That such a condition is one to be avoided needs no argument. The Marine Corps as a whole needs some informative publication, more or less official, that is silent but eloquent, that carries authentic data delineating policies that relate to our duties, that makes for union of sentiment and concerted action. In the last analysis the Marine Corps wants to accomplish

results, and results come only from unity of action. It is ventured to state that only to the extent that it accomplishes results does the Marine Corps deserve continued life.

That the Marine Corps has neighbors, so to speak—components of the nation's organized National Defense—who are carrying forward through the self-same methods as our Association an efficient development of their own respective missions and in their own particular fields, is well known to informed officers of the Marine Corps. The prestige of the Corps is, in this relation, involved in the work of our Association.

In those associations that embrace the commissioned personnel of the Army, we have been told that officers failing for insufficient reasons to actively support the welfare work of the Army's associations are not preferred for duties connected with service welfare or at stations where are found opportunities for distinction the efficient progressive officer desires.

Some of the junior officers of the Corps have reported to the writer in effect they were financially unable to contribute the \$3.00 per year to qualify as members. To them it may be said this is less than one cent per day—the cost of one cigarette. Smoke that much less and learn a little more, may be said to them in all kindness. Others have said they did not like the articles heretofore published in the magazine. To them it may be remarked that a stream can rise no higher than its source; the source of our articles is the rank and file of our membership. What one will himself not try to improve represents no field for his criticism. Criticism, however, is at all times most acceptable to the Association—provided only it be constructive criticism, the helpful criticism that has its accompanying remedy. Others complain that while members in times past the publications were never received. That they were held to full account, regardless, and required to pay back dues. To them the existing officers of the Association render for its past management their respectful apologies. The past administration of the Association, it is to be admitted, has not measured up to that efficiency we think is characteristic of the Marine Corps.

The situation of today means many things. Economic or industrial changes are proposed. Well and good. They do not directly concern us. Certain social changes are impending. Equally well and good. These perhaps offer a subject solely for social determination. Political changes may be in order. With that we officers of the Corps are not particularly interested. To the extent, however, that these changes affect the continued efficiency of our National Defense, especially that of the Marine Corps, we are very much concerned. This writer believes that in the list of our commissioned personnel we have officers of general educational qualifications, of service experience who are students of the conditions of today. Their views may be of considerable value to us and to others more responsible for the solution of the manifold perplexities of the hour. It was General Fuller, it is believed, who publicly stated, not long ago, that the military services needed more officers with the burrowing qualities of the mole and the singing qualities of the lark. By that was meant those who do perform their strictly soldierly or military duties efficiently and are able to relate their experiences and views in such form as will interest the general public, as well as the military and naval services. The public, like an individual, does not appreciate good health while it exists. When it is lost and he begins

to feel the loss conditions are different. When the American body politic has lost forever effective National Defense and begins to feel the pain by which such ill health is accompanied the case may be different. In the meantime should the Marine Corps continue to let the burden rest upon officers of the Navy and the Army? We marines must play our important part. We must have writers. What we can do as a Marine Corps Association is necessarily dependent upon the material sent to us. It must be informative.

Many officers, who have re-enrolled or joined as original members, have praised the February issue. Some have commented favorably on that for May, 1932. This little stimulation has not damaged our zeal.

Some of the information that came to this writer following his appeal to our officer personnel is informative as to service conditions. The confidence the writers so reposed is appreciated; it will not be violated. The information may serve as a ground-work for constructive measures for the more efficient administration of the Association. It may also help the Marine Corps. To those who so wrote along these lines, thanks unreservedly and most heartily are extended. With the foregoing resume from the returns associated with this writer's appeal, there should be added a statement of conditions at the present time. Of the general officers there remain not enrolled one; of the colonels there are, similarly, seven who fail to support our organization; of the lieutenant colonels, eleven; of the majors, twenty-eight, while approximately 575 officers in grades below remain not standing behind the officers of the Marine Corps Association. To some of the critics of the Association, dissatisfied with its past administration who refrain for that reason to join with us, this much may be said. The writer has been associated for the past twelve years with the management of the Naval Institute. For 41 years he retained his membership there during a part of which its *Proceedings* (i. e., its magazine) contained many articles unfriendly to the aspirations of the Marine Corps. Disposed then as he was to adopt the less courageous method of showing his disapproval, i. e., by vacating his membership there, he wisely refrained. By holding on, he became later called to his present responsibilities as a member of its Board of Control. He has there seen the Institute, without a suggestion from him, reverse its former policies. It has, in these enlightened days of naval administration adopted the most considerate attitude toward the marines. Their value to the naval service in these days none can gainsay. To those who have so criticised the past policies of our Association, and to those disposed so to do, but who have refrained, this much may be said in conclusion. It is only by retaining your membership, re-enrolling as a member, or enrolling as an original member that you can effectively influence the policies of the Marine Corps Association.

The members of the Association interested in the subject of adding to the strength of our organization, it is believed, will not fail to make these views subject matter for discussion with all their brother officers, especially non-members. When General Fuller assumed his present responsibilities he told this writer he hoped to make this Marine Corps one in sentiment and one in purpose, "One Marine Corps." All officers of the Corps can unite in these times upon such a platform. That unquenchable fire—our old time esprit de Corps—must be kept burning if only to light our way to those better times the future may disclose to all.



Colonel Richard S. Hooker, Commanding Fourth Marines, and Colonel Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., Governor General of the Philippines, at Shanghai.

The Sino-Japanese Situation

■ In the last issue of *THE MARINE CORPS GAZETTE* we gave a chronological summary of leading events in the warlike operations between the forces of Japan and China in the northern theater of Manchuria and also in the central theater, at Shanghai. Since the last date given in that article, May 1, 1932, the active field operations of the Japanese Army in Manchuria, have continued without cessation, but the active operations of the Japanese Army and Navy forces in the vicinity of Shanghai have practically ceased, though a considerable force both afloat and ashore still remain at Shanghai.

A summary of some of the events follows in chronological order.

May, 1932. At the beginning of the month the long discussed agreement between the contending forces at Shanghai was signed by the accredited representatives of China and Japan. This agreement, fostered and urged by the League of Nations acting through the Special Committee of Nineteen at Geneva, provided for the withdrawal of both forces from the immediate vicinity of the areas where the fighting had been in progress since the beginning of the present year. By its terms the Japanese troops were to be withdrawn from the vicinity of Shanghai excepting certain forces to be retained as necessary

within the limits of the foreign concessions and the Chinese troops were to be withdrawn to a distance from Shanghai which would make further operations of the Japanese at Shanghai unnecessary.

The Japanese withdrawal was to be made in two sections, the first one to begin May 6th and to be completed within one month, and the second movement of the withdrawal was to be decided by the Mixed Commission at Shanghai.

The negotiations were delayed and the outcome clouded by an event which apparently had no direct bearing upon the real question between the Chinese and the Japanese forces. On April 28, 1932, while a considerable number of Japanese Military and Civil officials were assembled to witness a review to celebrate the birthday of the Japanese Emperor, a bomb was hurled into the assembly by a revolutionary agent from Korea and several prominent Japanese officials were killed and wounded. However, investigation appeared to prove that the act was not instigated by the Chinese and the negotiations continued to a satisfactory conclusion.

The rising need for additional Japanese troops to combat Chinese activity in the Manchurian war zones acted to expedite the Japanese withdrawal from the Shanghai



Marines from U. S. S. Houston at Defenses of Ichang Road Bridge, Shanghai.

zone and by the end of May the 10th and 14th Japanese Divisions had been withdrawn from Shanghai and transported to the northern area. This movement reduced the Japanese force at Shanghai by about fifty per cent according to published reports.

Meanwhile, events in Manchuria were not progressing favorably to the Japanese plans and the new State of Manchukuo failed to acquire the recognition from other nations that which would justify its existence as a separate nation. In addition, the remnants of Marshal Chang Hsueh-Liang's old Manchurian Army were the skeleton forces around which the venturesome Manchu soldiers were building up formidable bodies for opposition to the Japanese garrisons in Manchuria. Attacks along the railway lines which the Japanese controlled caused concern to the defenders and probably had a deciding effect on the decision to withdraw the Japanese Divisions from the fruitless attacks on the Chinese forces in the Shanghai Area and transfer them to Manchuria to strengthen the scattered forces of General Honjo.

The foreign observers' estimates placed the numbers of armed and organized Chinese rebels at from 30,000 to 40,000 and they formed a serious threat to the supremacy of the Japanese troops scattered over the immense territory of Manchuria. East of Harbin a large contingent of Chinese so-called "rebels" were so strong as to require the despatch of 12,000 Japanese troops to expel them from the territory along the lines of the Chinese Eastern Railway.

Early in the month the Manchurian Commission appointed by the League of Nations to investigate the Manchurian question assembled at Peiping (Peking), China, and interrogated Marshal Chang Hsueh-Liang and other Northern China officials regarding the Manchurian affairs and then proceeded northward into Manchuria to gain first hand information. The American representative on the Commission, Major General McCoy, and the Italian representative went from Peking to Manchuria by rail, while the British representative and Lord Lytton, with others of the Commission, proceeded to Manchuria by steamer via Dairen.

The Chinese representative on the Commission, Dr. Wellington Koo, was objected to by the heads of the new State of Manchukuo, but the Commission insisted upon his presence with the Commission and the Japanese did not forbid his entry into Manchuria with the other members of the Commission.

Under the claim of protection for the railway lines the Japanese troops extended their operations up to the western frontiers of Manchuria, where it meets the territory of the Russian Soviet Government, arousing considerable unrest in the latter country. Up to date the Russian Soviet Government has apparently made no open move to meet the advance of the Japanese forces.

June, 1932. The withdrawal of the Japanese forces at Shanghai from the outlying territory surrounding Shanghai proceeded throughout the month of June, and the end of the month saw the Japanese forces remaining at Shanghai concentrated in the foreign concession area.


As a result of the withdrawal of the Japanese forces at Shanghai and the apparent abandonment of their campaign against the Chinese in the Shanghai Area, the American forces in Shanghai were reduced by the withdrawal of the 31st Infantry, U. S. Army, which proceeded to the regular station of the regiment at Manila via U. S. Army Transport late in the month. It will be remembered that the 31st Infantry was despatched from Manila to Shanghai in January, 1932, to reenforce the Fourth Marine Regiment when the active campaign inaugurated by the Japanese against the Chinese at Shanghai caused concern for the safety of American nationals in the district, and the time required to transport additional Marines from the United States appeared to be too long to meet the situation.

After the withdrawal of the 31st Infantry orders were promulgated increasing the Fourth Marine Regiment from two battalions to three battalions, and the additional (Third) battalion will sail from San Francisco aboard the U.S.S. *Henderson* on August 11th.

In Manchuria the Japanese campaigns against Chinese organized bands of troops continued throughout the month of June, requiring the despatch of additional troops to Manchuria and the extension of the Japanese lines westward and northward to the borders of the Soviet Republic.

In order to shorten the rail journey between Japan and the interior of Manchuria the Southern Manchurian Railway is being extended by the Japanese eastward through northern Chosen (Korea) to the seaport at Tseistin.

The Japanese control has been extended to all of the lines of the South Manchurian Railway and Chinese Eastern Railway within the limits of the new State of Manchukuo (old Manchuria), a territory as large as that



Marine Machine Gunner and Floyd Gibbons Viewing the Battle from American Machine Gun Emplacement at Shanghai.

of the states of the United States east of the Mississippi and north of the Ohio and Potomac rivers. The aided immigration of hundreds of thousands of Chinese men, women and children from the crowded territory of Central China to the open plains of Manchuria, which resemble the lands of the Dakotas and western Canada, have populated the new country added to Japan with a working crew for its wide acres of farm lands and for the development of mineral resources that may find development under the guidance of the Japanese.

Whatever may be the political situation in Manchuria and whatever the rights of China and other nations may be under existing treaties, it must be conceded that under the new regime established by Japan the material development of the country promises much for Manchuria and for Japan.

July, 1932. In Shanghai the situation has grown gradually less tense with the withdrawal of the heavy Japanese forces and the apparent return to "normalcy," which with the unrest constant in China is at best a questionable "normal." Revolutions and rumors of revolutions among the Chinese, with the different local War Lords striving for advantage or gain still keeps the country in an unsettled condition and greatly retards trade and commerce. The so-called boycott against the purchase of Japanese manufactured goods has abated but little, and still remains as a cause for Japanese apprehension despite the attack of the Japanese forces upon the Chinese at Shanghai.

In Manchuria the Japanese forces are still held at full strength and operations throughout the country are carried on against so-called Chinese and Manchurian Bandit forces, while the exploitation of the commercial and material resources of the country newly come under Japanese dominion is progressing as rapidly as the unsettled conditions will allow. The Manchus, a warlike people since the days of Genghis Khan, may be defeated but trained observers say that they are not vanquished, and it is well to think of the remark of a Chinese statesman: "In the past three thousand years China has met many reverses, BUT SHE ALWAYS COMES BACK." Whether the old China is now at the end of the rope or whether she will live up to the opinion of this wily old Chinese War Lord remains to be seen. In any event the Japanese have embarked upon a course from which it will be difficult, perhaps impossible, to turn back and one



Machine Gun Emplacement at Ferry Road, Shanghai.

which will require all of the adroitness of her statesmen and the courage of her military men to maintain.

The whole story of the Japanese "intervention" in Manchuria, which has resulted in the establishment of the new set-up styled the Republic of Manchukuo, is of intense interest to the students of the Oriental Question. Surrounded as it is by references to the "Open Door Policy," the "Nine Power Treaty," the "Mastery of the Pacific," the "Fate of the East," and the "Yellow Peril," it presents much material for conjecture and prophecy. In a recent article published in the *Washington Star*, Count Carlo Sforza, noted Italian statesman, briefly reviews the recent course of action of Japan in Manchuria. Count Sforza's long tour as Italian Minister to China gives to his opinions the authority of experience.

"Thanks to the general anarchy prevailing in China since 1911, and thanks to the lack of any moral and political force in the central Chinese Government in Nanking, and—last but not least—thanks to the complacency shown by the European governments about the doings of the Japanese armies, the Nippon action in Manchuria has ended in a complete success for the Tokio diplomacy.

"If one looks only at the technicalities of diplomacy one cannot help but admire Japan's Manchurian achievement. It has been almost perfection; Japanese cabinet ministers in Tokio and imperial ambassadors abroad declared continually that Japan did not want Manchuria; no, not even as a gift would they accept what under the Manchu dynasty was called the Three Oriental Provinces. It would be too costly for the resources of Japan—the worthy ambassadors went on explaining to the various foreign offices—to have to garrison and defend such a wide territory; Japan's intention was only to protect the treaty rights; and are not treaty rights a sacred thing? And so on.

"Meanwhile, under cover of these phrases, Japanese military occupation spread from day to day, until it reached the very southernmost limits of Manchuria—the Great Wall.

"At one time the spell seemed broken by the blunt intervention of the United States, which—while France, Great Britain and Italy were, for various reasons, keeping silent—dared to call Japan to account and ask her to respect more seriously the various pledges she was at the moment engaged in violating.

"But, as could easily have been foreseen, Japanese diplomacy, strong as a result of the fait accompli was not



Captain John W. Thomason, Fourth Marines, inspecting Chinese trenches

found wanting in argument to answer even Mr. Stimson's strong notes. The respect due to the nine-power treaty? Of course, of course; but 'the present unsettled state of China was not contemplated by the high contracting parties'; the treaty remains just as binding, but it 'must necessarily be applied with reference to the existing facts.'

"In short, aside from the sudden, but, I am afraid, tardy intervention of the United States, everything in the world conspired to establish the success of Japan in Manchuria. The League of Nations did everything in its power to help Japan break the covenant decently; and, strange to say, the British 'national' government did everything in its power to help Japan break the nine-power treaty. For some time it refused even to follow America's diplomatic action; a novel case in the policy which Britain has made her own for years, a fact probably to be explained by the slight resentment existing in England as a result of recent discussions about reparations and war debts.

"As if resentment were admissible in foreign policy, I do not say among peoples, where it is a reality, but among cabinets!

"Of all these successes, in Paris, in Geneva, everywhere, Mr. Yoshizawa, the present Japanese minister of foreign affairs, has been an almost continuous eyewitness, since he was, until a few weeks ago, the Japanese Ambassador in Paris. He must have gone back to Japan with one fixed idea in his mind, namely; that the League of Nations was an institution devoid of the least shadow of real power, and that the great powers of Europe were too taken up with their difficulties and their present fears to be able to pay any attention to what was happening in Eastern Asia.

"Furthermore, being himself the man selected by that military and naval caste which, at the present time, holds all the real power in Japan, it is all too natural that he should have believed his country entitled to do anything it pleased—hence the Shanghai mistakes after the Manchurian success."



Lieutenant Colonel Frederick A. Barker and
Floyd Gibbons on the lines at Shanghai

Notes and Comment

DEVELOPMENT OF EXPERIMENTAL COMBAT TRAIN EQUIPMENT

■ A board has been in session for several months at the Marine Barracks, Quantico, Va., engaged in the development of combat train equipment and vehicles with a view to their adoption for use by organizations of the Marine Corps. It will be a considerable period of time before this board will complete its study and experiment in connection with this project. However, certain developments have been made which, while of a tentative nature at present and the subject of further experiment, are thought to be of interest at this time.

Metal containers have been developed for carrying rations and water. These containers are of a design which will permit their being transported by hand, carried on the Cole cart, packed on animals or transported by truck or by trailer.


The ration container is $15\frac{3}{4}$ " wide, 15" deep and 20" high. The cover fits over the top of the can and extends downward four inches. Handles are provided on the can and the cover. Both the can and the container may be used as cooking utensils. The weight of the

ration container when made of galvanized iron is 20 pounds, and when made of duraluminum, 10 pounds. Two ration cans are required for about 50 rations. Two such cans may be carried on one Cole cart or packed on an animal.

The water can is $15\frac{3}{4}$ " wide, $7\frac{1}{4}$ " deep and 17" high. It is fitted with the same type of seal for its opening as the water can of the Browning machine gun and is provided with handles. The weight of the galvanized iron can is 16 pounds, and that of the duraluminum can, 7 pounds. The water container has a capacity of approximately 35 quarts and may be carried by two men. Four water cans may be transported on a Cole cart and two packed on an animal.

The Phillips pack kitchen has been tested by the board with a view to obtaining easily portable cooking facilities. Two pack kitchens with one water can and a tent fly form one Cole cart load. This equipment may also be packed or manhandled.


An experimental trailer of one ton capacity, which may




Cole Cart Loaded With Four Experimental Water Containers



Cole Cart Loaded With Two Experimental Ration Containers



Two Ration Containers in Pack



Two Water Containers in Pack

be disembarked from a Navy motor launch without difficulty has been designed and constructed. This trailer is a two-wheel vehicle capable of being tractor drawn, animal drawn, or towed at comparatively high speeds by motor truck. It is equipped with dual Ford balloon tires and Ford axle assembly. A detachable draw-bar is provided for use when the trailer is motor drawn. This

draw-bar is replaced with a suitable tongue when the trailer is to be animal drawn.

Experiment is being continued in the further development of this materiel in order to determine its suitability in all respects for the purpose intended. These experiments include improvement of the method already devised of landing vehicles from Navy motor launches by means of ramps.



Experimental Combat Train Trailers in Tow in Tandem by a Tractor



Experimental Trailer Loaded With Ration and Water Containers in Tow by a Tractor



Experimental Trailer Loaded With Experimental Ration and Water Containers, Rear View

NEW MARINE CORPS AVIATION EQUIPMENT

Prior to January 1, 1933, it is expected that twenty-five airplanes of the O3U-4 type will be delivered to Marine Corps Aviation. These planes of the observation type will replace the OC-1 and O2U-1 airplanes now in service. It is expected that these new planes will be distributed as follows:

9 to VO-9M, Haiti;

8 to Aircraft Squadrons WCEF, San Diego, Calif.;

8 to either Aircraft Squadrons ECEF, Quantico, or Aircraft Squadrons, 2nd Brigade, Managua, Nicaragua.

These planes are of the latest type observation airplanes.

It is also expected that sixteen F4B-4 and eight F4B-5 airplanes will be delivered to Aircraft Squadrons ECEF, and Aircraft Squadrons WCEF, respectively, within the very near future. These will replace the F7C-1 and F6C-3 airplanes now in service. They are the latest type "fighters" and are built by the Boeing Airplane Co., of Seattle, Washington.

It is not possible to publish the characteristics of these new airplanes in detail, due to existing regulations.

MARKSMANSHIP TRAINING

When it became necessary several years ago to devise some means of reducing .30 calibre ammunition expenditure a Sub-calibre Board composed of officers long identified in the development of rifle marksmanship training in the Marine Corps, was ordered to conduct certain tests with the .22 calibre rifle in order that part of the rifle marksmanship training might be conducted with .22 calibre ammunition. The tests conducted were highly successful and the Board made certain recommendations involving the use of the .22 calibre rifle in a proposed schedule for recruit marksmanship training from which a revised schedule was drawn up and made applicable to rifle marksmanship training for men who have previously fired the rifle qualification course. The revised schedule was made flexible in order to permit of certain latitude in its operation due to local conditions, ingenuity of range officer and climatic changes. When small bore rifle training was adopted for the entire Marine Corps a little over a year ago there was some assurance of retaining the same degree of efficiency in rifle marksmanship, but it was not expected an increase in qualifications in the higher grades would develop to the extent it has during the past year.

In addition to the interest indicated by the shooter himself, it is the opinion of some officers that very efficient coaches have been developed as a result of the interest manifested in small bore shooting.

Training with the .22 calibre rifle preliminary to the

.30 calibre rifle firing for record is drawing favorable comment from commanding officers and range officers at posts where sub-calibre ranges have been established. In his report at the end of the target practice season the Regimental Range Officer, Fourth Marines, Shanghai, China, made particular reference to the merits of the small bore training stating that, "We have been using the .22 calibre rifle since September, 1931. There has been a marked improvement in our range records. These prove that with the full .22 calibre course and proper preliminary training and coaching the men will make as much in twice over the .30 calibre course as they do in five times over the same course without the .22 calibre course. We keep record on both ranges and when a man does not reach a certain standard with the .22 calibre we give him a special course of preliminary instruction on the school range. This would not be possible without the .22 calibre course and would cause a waste of .30 calibre ammunition. I will admit that I did not believe in the .22 rifle training for service until we started using them out here in September and now I am convinced that it is not only a measure of economy, but also increases the proficiency in marksmanship if properly conducted. A certain score at the end of the .22 calibre training will invariably show what a man can make with the .30 calibre and this information can be used to find the poor shots that need additional school range instruction before they ever start on the .30 calibre firing."

A commanding officer of a post at which the enlisted strength is less than 100 states that during last season the larger portion of .22 calibre practice at his post was held indoors; and this practice, while helpful, did not produce the results he anticipated from it. However, in commenting on the preliminary practice with the .22 calibre rifle as an aid to proficiency with the .30 calibre rifle, he says: "This season after a thorough instruction in the principles of Marksmanship indoors, a .22 calibre range was constructed outside so that conditions of wind and light would be nearly identical with those we would encounter on the .30 calibre range. With only two firing points, individual coaching was possible on the .22 calibre range and many personal errors were cleared up before going on the range."

"I had 22 men who fired this spring and would rate them as better than average. The weather conditions on both record days were splendid, although the light was variable. Of the 22 all qualified, 17 were experts, 4 were sharpshooters and 1 was a marksman. I attribute this to topping the usual preliminary instruction with a thorough course with the .22 calibre rifle under the nearest approach to actual range conditions as regards light, wind and weather."

Whatever success has attended the high percentage of qualifications at many posts during the past year can be attributed in a large degree to small bore training. The fact that such training is of real value is borne out by the increased number of qualifications in the higher grades resulting from the record firing on the .30 calibre range.

AMERICAN LEGATION GUARD WINS INTERNATIONAL SMALL-BORE RIFLE MATCH

PEIPING MARINE TEAMS TRIUMPH; BRITISH SECOND

The first international Johnson Trophy Match, a sub-caliber rifle match between the Legation Guards stationed at Peiping, China, was won by the U. S. Marines of the

American Legation Guard on April 4th and 5th. The match was held on the American Guard's indoor range and each Guard, American, British, Italian and French, entered two four-man teams.

The Johnson Trophy is a handsome, finely-wrought silver shield, presented for competition by the Honorable Nelson Trusler Johnson, U. S. Minister to China, with a view toward improving the marksmanship of the legation quarter garrison and inaugurating friendly rivalry



THE JOHNSON TROPHY

Presented by the Honorable Nelson T. Johnson, U. S. Minister to China, for competition by The International Legation at Peiping, China

between the Legation Guards. This match competition is to be an annual spring event.

The Johnson Trophy Match course consists of ten rounds at fifty feet, reduced "A" target, sitting or kneeling, and thirty rounds at seventy-five feet, reduced "A" target, prone. The American teams took first and second places as individual teams and the British first team finished third. Corporal Borth and Private (1st class) Davison, of the American Guard, were high with a pair of beautiful possibles, following by Color Sergeant Foster (British), who was third with 199 points. Corporals Brown and Roberts and Private (1st class) Peterson, all Leathernecks, tied for fourth with 198 apiece.

The total scores were as follows:

U. S. Marines	1583
British Guard	1533
Italian Guard	1506
French Guard	1470

The Marines 2nd team, coached by 1st Sergeant M. T. Huff, U.S.M.C. (Distinguished Rifleman and Pistol-

man), "pulled a fast one" on the Sea Soldiers' first team by scoring 793 points to the first team's 790. The first team was coached by Sergeant A. J. V. Roberts, U.S. M.C. (also a Distinguished Rifleman).

Upon completion of the match, the results were radioed to the American Minister at Shanghai, and messages of congratulation were received from him and from the 4th Marines.

DECORATIONS

The President of the United States has presented the following decorations to officers and enlisted men of the Marine Corps; under date of June 1, 1932.

Distinguished Service Medal

MAJOR HAROLD W. UTLEY:

"For exceptionally meritorious service to the government in a duty of great responsibility as Commander of the Eastern Area in Nicaragua from 21 January, 1928, until after 26 March, 1929. This command covered a wide area on the East Coast of Nicaragua, a known center of plots and intrigue. Major Utley was thrown on his own responsibility to an extraordinary degree on account of the inaccessibility of this area from Brigade Headquarters and the rest of the country. All decisions as to operations, distribution of troops and their supply devolved upon him. On the occasion of the raid of the main body of the outlaws into the East Coast mining region, Major Utley, with inferior forces, localized the enemy force and drove them back on the route most difficult for them. He then executed an ordered advance up the Coco River, a most difficult expedition, into the outlaws' own territory, the successful execution of which was of the highest effectiveness in crippling the freedom of movement of the outlaws and leading to their eventual suppression. Through his energy, understanding and zeal he distinguished himself in duties of the highest importance. Failure in the performance of these duties would have been fatal to the success of the mission of the Naval Forces and to the United States."

Distinguished Flying Cross

SERGEANT HILMER N. TORNER:

For extraordinary achievement while in an aerial flight when at about 1:35 P. M., 22 March, 1932, Staff Sergeant Orlo S. Hoffer, naval aviation pilot, took off from the field at the Naval Air Station, San Diego, California, in airplane No. 8542 on a local routine test flight, accompanied in the rear cockpit by Sergeant, then Corporal, Hilmer N. Torner, U. S. Marine Corps, an operations clerk. Although Torner had ridden as a passenger on several flights in aircraft, he was not familiar with the controls or instruments of an airplane and previous to this time he had never touched the controls of a plane. At about 2 P. M., while flying at approximately 2,000 feet altitude in the vicinity of Camp Kearney, the pilot became ill and fell forward on the controls of the plane in a fainting condition. The plane, entirely out of control, fell toward the ground with a spinning motion. When Torner discovered the plane was out of control, with the stick and rudder locked, he stood up to jump with his parachute. As he did so, he discovered the condition of the pilot and realized that to jump meant certain death for the other man. He seized the inert body of the pilot, pulled him from the controls and succeeding in righting the plane just before it would have crashed. He was able to climb the plane to a considerable altitude and after fifteen or twenty minutes' experimenting he was able to get the plane headed toward North Island and made a very creditable landing on Rockwell Field. Upon landing he extracted the pilot from the plane, laid him out under the wing and was applying first aid when assistance arrived. By his actions on this occasion he displayed presence of mind, self sacrificing heroism and extraordinary achievement in the face of great danger far beyond the call of duty.

Navy Cross

FIRST LIEUTENANT BENJAMIN W. ATKINSON:

"For distinguished service in the line of his profession as commander of a patrol of the Headquarters Company, Second Battalion, Eleventh Regiment, operating in the vicinity of

Trinidad, Nicaragua, on April third and fourth, 1928. While engaged in a night march upon a mission assigned to investigate reports of bandit activities in the vicinity of Trinidad, the patrol under command of Lieutenant Atkinson, upon approaching the Plaza of Trinidad, was fired upon from three sides of the Plaza. Atkinson, who was with the point of the patrol at the time of the attack, maintained perfect control of his men and directed the patrol with such military ability when subjected to a surprise night attack by a numerically superior force as to outflank the enemy and after approximately one and one-half hours' engagement put them to rout, thereby displaying excellent judgment, initiative, and soldierly qualities of the highest order."

Navy Cross

FIRST LIEUTENANT GEORGE W. McHENRY:

"For distinguished service in the line of his profession while serving as battalion adjutant and Commanding Officer, Headquarters Company, Second Battalion, Eleventh Regiment, United States Marine Corps, operating in the Northern Area of Nicaragua, from about 1 February, 1928, to 6 May, 1929, a period of approximately sixteen months. Lieutenant McHenry during this period performed many duties so efficiently, so cheerfully, and with the display of such high military qualities as to materially aid in the efficient conduct of operations and the maintenance of a high state of morale among the officers and men. Lieutenant McHenry, while in command of a section of a combined patrol operating in the vicinity of Maylote, Nicaragua, participated on 27 August, 1928, in two successful engagements with the bandit group under the leader known as Ortez. This patrol, through the determination, perseverance, and leadership of its officers after a night march and in an exhausted condition, when fired upon from ambush at about 0500, so maneuvered as to outflank the enemy and put him to rout. In vigorously following up the pursuit of the bandit group, the patrol was again ambushed at about 2015 the same day with heavy machine gun fire, rifle fire, and bombs. Once more through successful leadership, the display of excellent judgment, initiative, unusual professional ability and soldierly qualities of the highest order, the bandit force was driven from its position. As a result of these engagements, a great amount of bandit supplies and equipment was captured, a bandit supply depot destroyed, and the suppression of banditry along the western and Honduran border materially aided."

Navy Cross

FIRST LIEUTENANT GREGON A. WILLIAMS:

"For distinguished service in the line of his profession as commander of patrols of Guardia Nacional operating in the District of Somoto, Nicaragua, First Lieutenant Gregon A. Williams, U. S. Marine Corps, successfully led his forces into three engagements against superior numbers of armed bandit forces, namely on 3 October, 1931, an attack against a bandit group of forty or more under the jefe Colindres, in a partially entrenched position, on 13 October, 1931, near Zapote Mountain and near Los Canos on 11 November, 1931. His display of courage and leadership enabled his patrol to completely rout superior bandit groups with loss of lives and ammunition, without suffering casualties themselves."

Navy Cross

FIRST LIEUTENANT JOHN S. E. YOUNG:

"For distinguished service in the line of his profession as an aviator while attached to the Second Marine Brigade, operating in the Republic of Nicaragua. On 12 April, 1931, Lieutenant Young, in the face of machine gun and rifle fire from bandits, located and most effectively bombed a bandit camp near Moss Farm, Nicaragua. On 13 April, 1931, he assisted in effecting a crossing of the Snaki Bridge by a ground patrol and thereafter located a bandit camp at Logtown; this information he delivered to the ground patrol, which he guided to the scene, meanwhile, at great personal risk, effectively harassing the enemy and pinning him to the ground with machine gun fire until the arrival of the patrol. The ensuing engagement resulted in the death of the notorious Sandino jefe, Pedro Blandon, one of the most brilliant successes in the Nicaraguan campaign."

Navy Cross

SECOND LIEUTENANT SAMUEL S. JACK:

"For distinguished service in the line of his profession as an aviator while attached to the Second Marine Brigade, oper-

ating in the Republic of Nicaragua. On 12 April, 1931, Lieutenant Jack, in the face of machine gun and rifle fire from bandits, located and most effectively bombed a bandit camp near Moss Farm, Nicaragua. On 13 April, 1931, he assisted in effecting a crossing of the Snaki Bridge by a ground patrol and thereafter located a bandit camp at Logtown; this information he delivered to the ground patrol which he guided to the scene, meanwhile, at great personal risk effectively harassing the enemy and pinning him to the ground with machine gun fire until arrival of the patrol. The ensuing engagement resulted in the death of the notorious Sandino jefe, Pedro Blandon, one of the most brilliant successes in the Nicaraguan campaign."

Navy Cross

CORPORAL CECIL H. CLARK:

"For distinguished service in the line of his profession as commander of a patrol of seventeen enlisted men of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, on 24 February, 1932, operating in the vicinity of Caracol, Department of Leon, Nicaragua. Corporal Clark and his patrol of seventeen men, while proceeding in formation on a densely overgrown trail, through a defile, were suddenly attacked from three sides by a group of bandits under the bandit jefes Salgado and Umanzor, estimated at two hundred and fifty, armed with automatic weapons, rifles and dynamite bombs. The first burst of bandit fire killed one guardia and wounded two others and killed the mule on which Clark was mounted. A dynamite bomb, which exploded at the same time stunned and temporarily put Clark out of action. After being revived by one of his guardia, Clark reorganized his patrol, placed it in the

best available positions and took up the fire fight. His patrol at this time had become completely surrounded. Clark then took a detachment of six men and personally leading them, he using a Thompson sub-machine gun, charged up one of the flanking hills through the brush in the face of automatic and rifle fire and drove the bandits from their key position. He reformed his patrol in the new position and continued the fight. After two hours of fighting, and by skillful maneuvering under fire, Clark and his patrol completely routed the bandit group and scattered elements of it in all directions, inflicting a loss of eight known killed and many wounded while suffering themselves only two more wounded. Corporal Clark, by his display of heroism, leadership and skillful judgment, turned what might have been disaster into a brilliant success."

Letters of Commendation

The Secretary of the Navy has addressed special letters of commendation to the following officers and enlisted men for their services in Nicaragua against organized banditry:

Major Charles A. Wynn
First Lieutenant Vernon E. Megee
Master Technical Sergeant Clarence B. Kyle
Gunnery Sergeant Lloyd E. Smith
Gunnery Sergeant Frank J. Van
Corporal John A. P. Brown
Corporal Henry Clay Saylor.





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The Marine Corps Association

ORGANIZED APRIL 25, 1913, AT GUANTANAMO, CUBA

OFFICERS

MAJOR GENERAL BEN H. FULLER, President
BRIGADIER GENERAL GEORGE RICHARDS, Vice-President
BRIGADIER GENERAL DION WILLIAMS, Editor
CAPTAIN CHARLES T. BROOKS, Secretary-Treasurer

OBJECT OF ASSOCIATION—"The Association is formed to disseminate knowledge of the military art and science among its members; to provide for the improvement of their professional attainments; to foster the spirit and preserve the traditions of the United States Marine Corps; and to increase the efficiency of its members."—Section 2, Article 1, of the Constitution.

CONDITIONS OF MEMBERSHIP—Active membership open to officers of the United States Marine Corps and Marine Corps Reserve and to former officers of honorable service with annual dues of \$3.00. Associate membership, with annual dues of \$2.00, open to officers of the Army, Navy and Organized Militia and to those in civil life who are interested in the aims of the Association. Honorary members shall be elected by unanimous vote of the Executive Committee.

Associate membership, with annual dues of \$2.00, including yearly subscription to THE MARINE CORPS GAZETTE, open to enlisted men of the Marine Corps.

CONTRIBUTIONS—The GAZETTE desires articles on any subject of interest to the Marine Corps. Articles accepted will be paid for at the GAZETTE'S authorized rates. Non-members of the Association as well as members may submit articles. In accepting articles for publication, the GAZETTE reserves the right to revise or rearrange articles where necessary.

All communications for the Marine Corps Association and THE MARINE CORPS GAZETTE should be addressed to the Secretary-Treasurer, Marine Corps Association, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, Washington, and checks made payable to the same.

NOTICE

[N the files of the Marine Corps Association at the Headquarters of the Marine Corps the following numbers of the Marine Corps Gazette are missing:

SEPTEMBER, 1916.

MARCH, 1917.

JUNE, 1921.


DECEMBER, 1916.

SEPTEMBER, 1918.

SEPTEMBER, 1925.

The Association will be pleased to receive any of the above-mentioned numbers of the Gazette which members may have in their possession and desire to contribute to the Association to complete the files.

Communications regarding this subject are requested by the Editor, Marine Corps Gazette, Headquarters Marine Corps, Washington, D. C.



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